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(https://pic20.picturetrail.com/VOL12/1104763/23549184/393220415.jpg)
US Army Print: Battle of Long Island
“…the riflemen were mostly spitted to the trees with bayonets (their weapons being so slow to load)…these people deserve pity rather than fear.” -Hessian colonel after the Battle of Long Island, August 1776
The history books claim rifles took a full minute to load, while muskets only 20 seconds. That’s understandable, given the time requirement to fit and drive a tight-fitting patched ball. But the accuracy the greased patch provides doesn’t help in close engagements where speed was more important. Don’t you think these riflemen dispensed with the patch inside of normal musket range, speeding up loading to a more comparable ratio? The ball still won’t exactly rattle down the bore, but wouldn’t that change the rate of fire ratio between muskets and rifles to 2:1 instead of 5:1? There were no shortage of rifles of the era like the Girandoni repeater that didn’t use a patch at all. Nor would the evolution of Minie balls shortly thereafter. Or did paper cartridges for muskets play a larger role than this line of thought?
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(https://pic20.picturetrail.com/VOL12/1104763/23549184/393220415.jpg)
US Army Print: Battle of Long Island
“…the riflemen were mostly spitted to the trees with bayonets (their weapons being so slow to load)…these people deserve pity rather than fear.” -Hessian colonel after the Battle of Long Island, August 1776
The history books claim rifles took a full minute to load, while muskets only 20 seconds. That’s understandable, given the time requirement to fit and drive a tight-fitting patched ball. But the accuracy the greased patch provides doesn’t help in close engagements where speed was more important. Don’t you think these riflemen dispensed with the patch inside of normal musket range, speeding up loading to a more comparable ratio? The ball still won’t exactly rattle down the bore, but wouldn’t that change the rate of fire ratio between muskets and rifles to 2:1 instead of 5:1? There were no shortage of rifles of the era like the Girandoni repeater that didn’t use a patch at all. Nor would the evolution of Minie balls shortly thereafter. Or did paper cartridges for muskets play a larger role than this line of thought?
The Hessian was right. The rare rifle armed troops of the American Revolution were almost always militia and were impossible to control - a raged volley was about all an officer could expect before they ran. It happened over and over. It would have been rare for a militiaman, no matter what his weapon, to stand up to a disciplined bayonet charge by British Regulars. Those that did were usually trapped and were unable to fight back when involved in hand-to-hand combat - a hatchet or even a long knife are useless to anyone confronting an enemy under strict discipline and well trained in the use of the bayonet.
As you said, when involved close in, the rifleman could and did use a naked ball to load. This helped for a very few rounds but the rifle used a ball closer to the bore diameter than the musket did. Fouling became a problem for the rifleman much more quickly than it did for the musket armed man. The British ball for the .75 Brown Bess was .66 - .68 in diameter and a soldier could load many more rounds than a rifleman making a similar attempt before the gun became fouled to a point making it nearly impossible to load. The musket armed soldier was then in close and had the bayonet and good training to fall back on, the rifleman didn't.
As far as ammunition, when the US Army adopted the M1803 Rifle for it's rifle regiment, the rifle armed regulars were armed with two types of ammunition: the traditional powder horn and patched ball for accurate, long range fire and paper cartridges just like the line infantry using the smoothbored musket for situations when things became close and fast. The bayonet, however, was not issued to the rifleman until the 1820s, and then it was withdrawn shortly thereafter as unnecessary. The value of the small number of riflemen was considered in probing, scouting and skirmishing and the extra weight was considered to hinder their ability to move rapidly and quietly, the knife was more important to them.
When used properly as skirmishers or in quick hit and run actions against the American Indian, rifle armed troops could be valuable, but until a fast loading rifled arm became available in the 1840s (and not common in the English or American armies until the late 1850s - early 1860s) the fast loading, bayonet equipped smoothbored musket remained the primary weapon of armies world wide. Until then, rifle armed troops had to fall back behind the line infantry in order to avoid massacre.
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Thanks. I didn’t have the background on the M1803 rifle. I’ve never fired a muzzle loader and want to insure I have the technical details correct. The Hessians had Jaeger and Chasseur units armed with rifles, and while I don’t believe all of them used patched balls, their leaders also avoided placing them in situations where they’d have to stand and fire until their barrels fouled.
The rare rifle armed troops of the American Revolution were almost always militia and were impossible to control - a raged volley was about all an officer could expect before they ran.
Please comment if I have this wrong, but to my knowledge, there were only two rifle regiments (with 700-900 riflemen each) raised in 1775 and early 1776. Thompson’s Battalion (with 9 companies, really a regiment) and Miles’s Pennsylvania Rifle Regiment. Neither were militia. Thompson’s was the one of the first Continental Army unit of regulars and Miles’s was raised under the auspices of Pennsylvania but all members were on 18-month active-service enlistments. There was also three or so independent rifle companies raised in Virginia (Morgan’s Riflemen) and Maryland as Continental Army units, all on 12-month enlistments. There may have been other rifle units as part of the various state militias, but I’m unaware of them.
Nor were they misemployed. Thompson’s Battalion provided two companies of scouts attached to Morgan for Arnold’s Quebec expedition while the remainder of the regiment performed as snipers/skirmishers/recce for the Siege of Boston in 1775 and later in the New York and New Jersey campaigns of 1776-7. Nor did they run….that’s why Miles’s 400 riflemen screening Putnam’s left flank took 50% casualties after being outflanked by General Howe with a maneuver force of 10,000 regulars. The Army painting above depicts Miles’s unit being forced to stand and fight when their role was early warning and delay.
(https://americanlongrifles.org/forum/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fpic20.picturetrail.com%2FVOL12%2F1104763%2F23549184%2F395355740.jpg&hash=ae43bd6f10a4dee6e44b2ad0e225da67f76a64c2)
However I certainly agree that rifle units were rare, nor did they last long. The skill levels in marksmanship and field craft they brought with them couldn’t be sustained as their ranks were thinned by casualties and expiring enlistments. They soon devolved into units with less unique skills armed largely with muskets.
In their original form, however, the frontier rifle units were formidable. In Nov 1775, “20 boats” containing British regulars supported by three artillery batteries and a frigate raided Lechmere Point during the siege of Boston to seize cattle. Opposed by only six riflemen from Thompson’s Battalion, the result was 17 British killed to only one American, and no cattle taken...
…Hessian diaries from the New York battles in 1776 describe officers cutting the rank insignia from their uniforms so as not to become early casualties.
…Hessians arriving on Staten Island in July 1776 were forced to change their bivouac plans when they discovered the Kill Van Kull channel, 350-500 yards wide, was no obstacle to the reach of Thompson’s (then under the command of Col Edward Hand) riflemen.
…A rifleman named George Merchant (from Lancaster County) was captured in Quebec and sent with his weapon back to England to give demonstrations intended to aid recruiting by showing what formidable antagonists British forces were facing in America. His demonstrations had exactly the opposite effect.
…Thirty riflemen under Hand stopped a 10,000-man British landing force in its tracks at Throg’s Neck in October, 1776 delaying their offensive by forcing them to land elsewhere. Hand’s riflemen would do similar on multiple occasions at Trenton and Princeton in December and during the winter battles over forage and rations in northern New Jersey in early 1777.
…“Nest of hornets”…”galled by fire”… and men “dropping fast” became common phrases in British and Hessian correspondence.
...In spite of the disaster at Long Island in 1776, by the following spring the myth of British invincibility was permanently broken, with frontier riflemen and their distinctly American rifles playing a role disproportionate to their numbers
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I believe that the Hall's came out at the turn of the century and was in general issue for thirty years or so. Even the Common rifle dates to 1814 does it not? The Hall's is mighty fast, I have seen Dragoons laying down covering fire at skirmishes from prone faster than we could return with our caplock rifles, when I worked on the Santa Fe Trail. The 69 cal muskets were a step back in 1842.
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These quotations are found in many history and reference books. I kept this data from a paper I wrote years ago, I always thought it was pretty blunt:
(https://i740.photobucket.com/albums/xx46/joemama7/005-1.jpg)
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...I always thought it was pretty blunt:
Except I’m not sure how much of the last letter quoted was accurate.
Sure those frontier-raised riflemen were good. But few. Very few. When a rifle cost two to three times the price of a military musket and half the price of a horse, there likely weren’t as many out there as the legends state. Nor were there as many people out there, for that matter. Today’s historians say the period’s population estimates were off by as much as a fourth. So while there were fowlers, muskets and trade guns, there weren’t all that many real riflemen out there. Perhaps 2000 out of a population of 220,000. Nor were there all that many muskets and trade guns either for that matter, as the first real militia (other than some volunteer units previously) wasn’t organized in Pennsylvania until 1777.
For example in 1763 after the Whitehall Massacre, Whitehall and Allen Townships needed an additional 50 guns and a half wagon-load of ammo just to arm the (estimated) 100-man defense company they hastily formed. That's roughly half of the volunteers who were either unarmed or poorly armed.
"NORTHAMPTON TOWN, the 10th, this instant, October, 1763.
To the Honorable JAMES HAMILTON (1710-1783), Esq., Lieutenant Governor and Commander in Chief of the Province of Pennsylvania…
… and we found the inhabitants that had neither Guns, Powder nor Lead, to defend themselves, and that Colonel Burd (James Burd 1726-1793) had lately spoke with his Honor. He had informed him, that he would assist them with guns and ammunition, and he requested of me to write to your Honor, because he was just setting off for Lancaster, and the inhabitants of the town had not chose their officers at the time he set off, so we, the inhabitants of the said town hath unanimous chose George Wolf, the bearer hereof, to be Captain, and Abraham Rinker (1741-1820, later brother-in-law of John Moll I) to be Lieutenant; we whose names are underwritten, promise to obey to this mentioned Captain and Lieutenant, and so we hope his Honor will be so good and send us 50 guns, 100 pound of powder, and 400 pound lead, 150 stands for the guns…
JOSEPH ROTH, Minister ”
Further, many histories make the comment that "the Pennsylvania regiments and separate battalions" of the Continental Line and militia were armed with "rifles". They weren't. Only the few I mentioned were, and those not for long, as the riflemen were replaced by whatever they could find after they were used up.
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I think that more than 2 thousand rifles or more were confiscated from Scottish loyalists in one sweep through the Scotland County, NC area after the Battle of Moores Creek. Just because the rifle cost as much as a car did not mean that men would not buy one. I may not be rich but we own two trucks. Needs must when the Devil drives. Militia Laws, even down here, required a firelock in every mans hands, and excepting the coastal towns and some frontier forts, rifles were what men carried here. Sometimes all that a man owned was a rifle, a mule and a small cabin and made his living on a few acres of tobacco , corn, making naval stores, timber or hide hunting. Down here, where the Rev war was won, rifles played a large part throughout the conflict.
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I agree. Thats the beauty of history, at some point all it is is the path we choose to beleive when several paths have been laid down. I do not mean that in an argumenative way, it just the truth. After researching things like these for over 25 years now, I have concluded that most of the time there is no 100% correct answer. Even though we find bits of info. that seem promising, we were not there and we do not really know if it happened that way. One thing for sure is that by the summer of 1777 Morgan and Cresap had command of over 1000 hand-picked riflemen, this is entirely documented. They were not all Pennsvlvania men, but they were chosen for their rifle skills, and were put to use for that purpose. Their subsequent "sniping" of British officers severely dampened British morale in the following months, and had a huge contribution in the following few years.
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Down here, where the Rev war was won, rifles played a large part throughout the conflict.
You bring up another interesting point. Probably the best modern authority on the immigrant groups that made America is David Hackett Fischer. If you haven’t read Albion’s Seed, you would enjoy it, as it traces German and Quaker Pietist and British and Scots-Irish Borderer values and politics from the 1500’s to present across the different regions of colonial America. For example, there are reasons why Southern and small-town/rural young people comprise the bulk of today’s armed forces…and those reasons date to the 1500’s and earlier.
Popular history.…including Fischer…says that the warriors were the British Borderers, and the German-Americans were more closely aligned value-wise with the pacifist Quakers. If that were accurate, then reading the names on the actual rosters of the 1775-6 frontier rifle regiments should show Scots-Irish/British names disproportionate to their numbers in Pennsylvania’s population. They don’t. German-Americans were about a third of the population and comprise a third or slightly more of Thompson’s and Miles’s Rifle Regiments.
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I have a first hand account of how riflemen were meant to be used. It is a bit long and english crude but its well worth the read not only the reference to rangers but the attitude of the fighting in general. It is the account of my ancestor Capt. Joeseph Hodgkins (and the mass. militia) on Manhattan.
"...on the monday morning thay thought thay would attak us with about six thousand men and drive us all over kings bridge but they were much mistaken. But however as soon as we heard thay were advancing towards us the Gen. sent 200 rangers who met the enemy and fired on them and fought then on the retreat till they got pretty near us, then the enemy halted. Back of the hill and blood a french horn which was for reinforcement (was heard) and as soon as thay got it thay formed into two columns. But our brigade was posted in the eadge of a thick woods and by some climbing uo a tree could see the enemys motion and while that whar aforming the general sent a party to attak them which answered the end for which they were sent. For our people made the attack and retreated twards us to the place whare we wanted them to come and then the enemy rushed down the hill with all speed to a plain spot of ground. Then our brigade marched out of the woods then a very hot fire began on both sides and lasted for up to an hour. Then the enemy retreated up the hill and our people followed them and fought them near an hour longer till they got under cover of their ships which was in the north hudson. Then our people left them the loos. On our side is about 40 killed and 60-70 wounded. One corp. was badly wounded through his knees but I hope he will do well. The lose of the enemy is not sarting but according to the best accountsthat we have they have nearly 500 killed and near as many wounded. They whare seen to carry off several wagon loads besides our people burryed a good many that they left. We whare informed buy two prisoners that they found they had not the milisha to deal with at this time. (which indeed was not the case) They said the surgeon (british) swore that they had no militia to day. This was the first chance we had to fight them and I doubt not if we should have another oportunity but we should give them another dressing..."
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Blackdog, I love to read accounts like that, you can almost feel the passion in it. Obviously it was important enough to him to write it down, and the fact that you have it today is priceless. If you have any more I would love to read it.
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The riflemen, when used as they should have been were a formidable force on the battle field.
But I suspect that they, correctly, thought that standing on an open field in a shower of musket balls to fight the British on THEIR terms was stupid. The frontier rifleman knew how to fight and when some fool made them stand out in a field to be shot down they probably had "morale problems" I would have. For all I know "online sweeps" may still be a military tactic. But I never liked it much. It is a good way to find out where the bad guys are though, when they start shooting....
When used as Morgan's riflemen were used at Saratoga they were battle winners.
But the American officer corps wanted to fight with muskets and bayonets and were too !@*%&@ dumb to see how to use the rifle to its maximum. They were supposed to stand in ranks. The American officer Corps by and large was pretty poor. Even Washington was a slow learner and not much of a tactician it would seem.
We will never know what effect the rifleman had in the American Revolution except to point out that the British Army lost a LOT of officers and NCOs at that crippled a units ability to function properly.
At Saratoga they not only blinded Burgoyne by causing his scouts to flee permanently, they deprived him of key officers, the Fraser killing was especially demoralizing, they destroyed his artillery, the gunners could not man the guns. Its arguable that without Morgan the battle may have had a different outcome.
The Battle of King's Mountain was a rifle fight and it was the key battle in the south since it stopped British recruitment it changed the face of the southern campaign completely.
There is a lot of wishful thinking by the British about pinning riflemen to trees with Bayonets etc. And it likely happened at times. But it was not the norm. One on one a man who had been in a few fights with the natives would give a bayonet armed opponent all the fight he needs and will likely win. When in ranks the bayonet is hard to counter since you may get stuck from the side.
The "funny" part is that by the end of the war the Americans had removed virtually all rifles from the Army while the British had ADDED a rifle company to every Regiment.
The British had been seriously looking at military rifles since the 1740s.
Dan
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I have thought that we may also be a bit mistaken about the availability of riflemen in general. Daniel Morgan used riflemen very successfully in Saratoga but they did get taught a lesson when they pursued a unit of British troops they had shot up. They were led into a unit of grenediers. Francis Marion was said to use them very effectively in gurellia warfare tactics.
When inducted into the army, a soldier was given a uniform and a musket. Most were young men as today and showed up unarmed. Old Hickory ran into this in the war of 1812 where young southren men showed up anarmed. they ran into trouble at Brandywine I believe because the French muskets were issued with ammunition that did not always fit. Rifles were expensive and may have belonged to an individual that was already established in life. These individuals did not show up in great numbers to serve. Daniel Morgan recruited 500 riflemen from several colonies. Also just because someone owned a rifle does not mean he could shoot it that well. When I used to help run our Rondys I used the 2 foot square rapid fire pistol targets so that some could at least shoot a satisfying score. There were a few good shots but many more that had trouble with the 2 foot target. Even off of x sticks, some were not all that good. Morgan knew this and called Timothy Murphy to shoot Fraser at Saratoga when Fraser was rallying the british troops. The German troops armed with rifles did not equalize the field as our riflemen outdistanced them.
When the British organized the 95th regiment and armed them with rifles they used them to their best as a special forces unit. They sniped Napoleons officers and other important targets and were always backed by regulars with muskets and bayonets. They only recruited those that could shoot them, but note that they were an issue arm.
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Loco219,
I agree, the passion is remarkable. I have 4 years of his letters and I can't read them long without my eyes getting wet. The funny thing is he penned the his entire action at princeton starting with the delaware crossing and yet didn't go into great detail of the Saratoga victory other than casulties. If you would like to hear anything in particular let me know.
Back on subject here, clearly the American command knew and what Capt. Hodgkins saw that day they knew exactly the job of riflemen and led the british into a trap and transfered the battle from riflemen to the mititia infantry when the trap was sprung. "For our people made the attack and retreated twards us to the place whare we wanted them to come and then the enemy rushed down the hill with all speed to a plain spot of ground. Then our brigade marched out of the woods then a very hot fire began on both sides and lasted for up to an hour."
Sorry to offend but this action was not an accident. The british knew riflemen couldn't stand and fight and pursuit was the key to not getting picked off. In this case they pursued into a ambush and paid for it. What I find especialy funny is that the Brits didn't even know they were fighting militia. Does that tell us that Americans didn't know what they were doing???
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Throughout our history Morgan is one of our most colorful characters. I have researched him extensively because his life was so interesting. He was a teamster( at that time driving wagons) and at a young age had his own rig. He was a notorious drinker and brawler. He had a reputation for being one of the strongest and toughest men in the colonies. By all rights he should have died from a 500 stroke lashing he received as punishment for beating up a British officer, but as the personal accounts go he was " Too tough to die". This whipping left his back grotesquely scarred, and his hatred for the Brits raw. Personal accounts vary, but there are more than one that say he briefly pondered on killing Frasier, then proclaimed it must be done, and sent Murphy up the tree to to the deed. His brilliance at Cowpens proved his tactical prowess. He not only tricked Tartleton into the trap, he put his own militia in a place where they could not run away, in a sense tricking them too. I feel personally that without the riflemen who served him so faithfully he would have accomplished none of it. The longrifle and the men who mastered it saved our liberty, my humble opinion.
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I have thought that we may also be a bit mistaken about the availability of riflemen in general. Daniel Morgan used riflemen very successfully in Saratoga but they did get taught a lesson when they pursued a unit of British troops they had shot up. They were led into a unit of grenediers. Francis Marion was said to use them very effectively in gurellia warfare tactics.
When inducted into the army, a soldier was given a uniform and a musket. Most were young men as today and showed up unarmed. Old Hickory ran into this in the war of 1812 where young southren men showed up anarmed. they ran into trouble at Brandywine I believe because the French muskets were issued with ammunition that did not always fit. Rifles were expensive and may have belonged to an individual that was already established in life. These individuals did not show up in great numbers to serve. Daniel Morgan recruited 500 riflemen from several colonies. Also just because someone owned a rifle does not mean he could shoot it that well. When I used to help run our Rondys I used the 2 foot square rapid fire pistol targets so that some could at least shoot a satisfying score. There were a few good shots but many more that had trouble with the 2 foot target. Even off of x sticks, some were not all that good. Morgan knew this and called Timothy Murphy to shoot Fraser at Saratoga when Fraser was rallying the british troops. The German troops armed with rifles did not equalize the field as our riflemen outdistanced them.
When the British organized the 95th regiment and armed them with rifles they used them to their best as a special forces unit. They sniped Napoleons officers and other important targets and were always backed by regulars with muskets and bayonets. They only recruited those that could shoot them, but note that they were an issue arm.
Like many things in Colonial America there are assumptions to be made. But there is some stuff written down.
Rifles are reported in use by militia by the 1680s in NY.
Rifles were far more common in native hands than many want to admit by the 1740s.
In 1743 Conrad Weiser reported meeting " twenty Shawanese each with a rifle, two pistols and a sabre". The Deleware were also rifle armed by this time.
John Bartram 4 February 1756; "...they commonly now shoot with rifles with which they will at a great distance from behind a tree...take such sure aim as seldom misseth their mark."
Edward Shippen wrote in April 1756; "The indians make use of rifled guns for the most part..."
Dewitt Bailey further writes in discussion of the Pennsylvania Indian Stores at Shamokin and Ft Augusta "What is particularly interesting about these official Pennsylvania store records is than neither trade-gun nor fowling piece appears to have crossed the counters."
If you have a native shooting from behind a tree 150 yards out how do you effectively deal with him with a musket and bayonet? With a 150 yard start you will never catch him and unless you can cover 150 yards before he reloads getting closer to him would be a bad idea.
Shippen further indicates that rifles of the 1750s were effective to 150 yards.
The above quotes in Chapter 6 of Bailey's "British Military Flintlock Rifles 1740-1840"
Muskets of the day were considered too inaccurate to hit a man with any certainty much past 50 yards. This from actual testing in the early 19th century (see "Firearms of the American West 1803-1865"). I assume that this was the reason for the US Army using far more "buck and ball" cartridges than "ball" IIRC the ratio is 2:1 or better.
Then we have to ask where the natives LEARNED of the rifle and its advantage in accuracy? Had to be from Colonists .
Then we have to ask...
If only the rich/established people had rifles why was it that the rifle companies seemed to come from the frontier where the poor tended to gravitate? They did not seem to recruit riflemen from Williamsburg or New York.
I don't think that the "rifle was too expensive and most people didn't know how to shoot" argument is valid.
Most people DON'T know how to shoot nor do they particularly care to learn. There have always been gun owners, shooters and serious riflemen. Based on people I have met a lot of folks even in the Kentucky rifle community fall into the first category and a minority in the last. Today there are Kentucky rifle types who shoot but don't use the bench for load development since they can't shoot well off the bench? What does this mean? Most of the rifle matches in Colonial America appear to have been rest matches. People who shoot but never shoot from the bench are not even sure if they have an accurate load or not.
I never shoot offhand for serious shots, hunting etc unless there is no other option or the rules require offhand.
There is an account of Breed's Hill from a British officer who felt that most of the officer and senior NCO casualties were from a man who stood on the rampart and shot officers for 15-20 minutes before some British unit fired a volley at him and got lucky. It was stated that he fired and men passed "muskets" up to him. But if the British were advancing then we must assume that he was firing before the British got within range since once within range he was put out of the fight. Shooting officers, apparently at beyond the effective range of a musket, sounds like rifles to me. I would assume he was the best shot and had no respect for enemies effectiveness. Or he thought it was the thing to do. On the ramparts may have given him the ability to shoot over the ranks at the officers and NCOs behind. All we really know is what was related so these are assumptions. But the evidence is pretty good.
The British complained bitterly about officers being "taken off" with a single rifle shot.
We have an account of 1790 on the Ohio where the man captured Charles Johnston states the natives that attacked them were all rifle armed.
Gotta run
Dan
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Part of Washington's supply problem was getting arms so he could arm the Revolution. He got some from the French. I think it was Brandywine where one problem occurred when the soldiers using French muskets had ammunition problems. Were they using French muskets and British styled ammo? Possibly. Ones a .69 bore and ones could be as high as 77. The revolution had many fronts. The battle of Kings Mountain was a rifleman's battle, but was against American Loyalists. The primary battles were not fought by a lot of frontiersmen but by individuals from the more settled established areas. The battle of Saratoga was an interesting study in that it really was not the result of a single battle but a series of skirmishes brought forth because Burgoyne was supposed to meet up with another British General that did not show (can't remember off the top if it was Clinton or Howe). Burgoyne captured Ticondoroga and was marching South. the battle of Oriskany (Drums along the Mohawk) was one of the more famous skirmishes which lead to Burgoyne's defeat. Morgan's riflemen helped win the battle but Benedicts Arnold's refusal to follow Gate's orders is also credited with the win. By Saratoga we had Burgoyne outnumbered 1500 or so to his 5000. Bugoyne was also very low on supplies.
Morgan's win at Cowpens was the result of the use of decoying Tarleton into a group of American Regulars by using the militia to retreat. I am still wondering as much as he was hated why Tarleton did not fall to a rifle ball.
I am not denying that a lot of rifles were made and used at this time, but I do not think they were as common as some think. Riflemen supported by the regulars could do a lot fo damage, just like the modern sniper.
DP
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Here’s another graphic of the 1776 disaster at Long Island on a larger scale with more detail. Nothing wrong about those dispositions for either open or closed-order tactics…they could be a present-day school solution from Leavenworth or Camberly.
Hand’s riflemen met the landing and screened the front, and Miles’s riflemen screened the exposed left flank. Exactly where riflemen should have been used. No dummy laid that out. The remainder of the regiments and separate battalions were armed largely with muskets.
(https://americanlongrifles.org/forum/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fpic20.picturetrail.com%2FVOL12%2F1104763%2F23549184%2F395389828.jpg&hash=6f0a432dac3a0902b65abef923d842cd587faed4)
The problem was in execution on the night of Aug 26-27. Hand’s riflemen apparently let go of Howe’s nose, allowing his 10,000-man maneuver force to slip by. Their column was two miles long. And Miles’s riflemen on the Stuyvesant Heights didn’t detect them going around, allowing them to reach the rear of Sullivan’s Division at daybreak without any warning. The Brits reported chasing off a 5-man patrol at Jamaica Pass, but it’s unclear who they belonged to. Regardless, Miles, Sullivan and Putnam weren’t alerted.
Edward Hand seems to have escaped criticism by historians for this action, but Samuel Miles has been thoroughly pilloried. While obviously he blundered, the disparity in numbers, professionalism and training point to a similar outcome even if Miles had detected and attempted to block Howe in a night action. General Howe had learned hard lessons about frontal assaults and rebel marksmanship that cost irreplaceable casualties at Bunker Hill and during the siege of Boston. Howe with his 10,000-man maneuver force combined with General Von Heister’s 5000-man force fixing General Sullivan’s Division in place by applying pressure from the front, and loyalist guides finding additional routes further to the east, would have continued to outflank and eventually surround Miles with 400 and Sullivan with 1500 troops respectively.
Whether earlier detection would have caused fewer casualties is also arguable, the disparities were so overwhelming. Tactical excellence is applying the greatest available force against an opponent’s most profound weakness at the time least expected, and Howe simply couldn’t have done a better job here.
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If you would like to hear anything in particular let me know.
Is there a date on that Hodgkins letter about that fight in Manhattan? It's a great quote. I'd like to identify the general and pin it down to a specific engagement.
Here's the order of battle then, to provide some insight into CPT Hodgkin's heirarchy:
https://www.bookrags.com//wiki/Long_Island_order_of_battle
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Bob, He wrote the letter on Sept. 30 '76 in Fort Constitution about the action on Sunday the 15th. He describes the movement to stop the brits who had landed in Furtal bay and 3-4 miles from their position they had moved to from "the hill" in Harlem.
As for the heirarchy at the time it was called the "Ipswich militia reg." led by Col. Little, Capt Wade, (at the time) Lt. Hodgkins, Ensign Perkins. 4 sgt. 4cpl, 1 drummer, 1 fifer and 51 pvts. Col. Littles superior was Gen. Nathial Greene. Later when the army was reformed at valley forge Hodgkins accepted the commission for Timothy Bigelow's 15th Mass. Battation of the 9th cont.
Hope that helps paint the picture better.
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Bob, He wrote the letter on Sept. 30 '76 in Fort Constitution about the action on Sunday the 15th.
Wonderful material. You should publish those letters.
It was the Battle of Harlem Heights, and the "French Horn" was a fox-hunting call of "Fox Away with Hounds in Pursuit" intended the the British to insult George Washington. It had exactly the opposite effect and the Brits lost that day.
The "200 Rangers" were the Knowlton's Rangers reconnaissance unit led by Thomas Knowlton reinforced by three companies of the 1st Virginia Regiment under Major Andrew Leitch. Some accounts say these were riflemen but that doesn't appear to be correct....I believe all were armed with muskets.
The landing was at present-day Kip's Bay, and the reference to "King's Bridge" was the original toll bridge across the Harlem River.
(https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/b/b2/Battle_of_Harlem_Heights.Dean.USMA.edu.history.gif/587px-Battle_of_Harlem_Heights.Dean.USMA.edu.history.gif)
https://www.1va.org/history-1776.html
https://books.google.com/books?id=MTdCAAAAIAAJ&dq=battle+of+harlem+heights+johnston&printsec=frontcover&source=bl&ots=JGDSZUSPpS&sig=I0pp7my-raPOM1B_j_CVPxn0Qpk&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=2&ct=result#v=onepage&q&f=false
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Harlem_Heights
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I was always under the impression that the 200 Rangers were riflemen volunteers from Connecicut. But we'll never know for sure what they all carried. Hodgkins mentions Knowlton many more times in "special forces" roles, burning buildings, capturing prisoners, covering retreating etc... never engageing the enemy directly. Thats why many people believe they were riflemen I think. The letters were published by Princeton university in 1958 called "This Glorius Cause" but I do agree that should be brought into mainstream light again.
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Rifles came late to New England. I don't think any Connecticut units were armed with rifles in 1776.
A narrative from August, 1775:
“Rumor reached Boston about a peculiar kind of a musket called a ‘rifle’ which was carried by these new Continental soldiers from the South. In August, Washington held a review of his troops on the Cambridge Common…. There were over a thousand riflemen there…spare, rangy men with the independent manner of the western wilderness. Uncouth they were in their fringed hunting shirts; their breech-clouts and snug-fitting buckskin leggings; wearing moccasins instead of shoes. There they stood, their gunstocks resting on the ground, one hand around the longest barrel anyone in Cambridge had ever seen.”
“A sergeant, far out in the Common, was just finishing supervising the setting of a row of poles, each averaging seven inches in diameter, into holes previously dug for this purpose. He then paced away from the poles….The sergeant stopped at two hundred and fifty paces and the men with the hunting shirts walked out to where he stood. Then they moved out into a rough line of companies… The crowd watched them uproarious; it was an amusing game….no gun ever dreamed of could carry two hundred and fifty paces. The riflemen aimed, and… the shots hit the poles; they were destroyed before the firing stopped.”
“If there is a record of what the generals in Boston said when the British spies got back, it has not been found. We know that Howe (British Major General William Howe) wrote home later about the ‘terrible guns of the rebels.’ We are told that Howe presently offered a reward for the capture of a rifleman with gun” (Bolton; Klein 7-15; Sawyer; Stroh Thompson’s Bn 19-20).
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I believe that the Hall's came out at the turn of the century and was in general issue for thirty years or so. Even the Common rifle dates to 1814 does it not? The Hall's is mighty fast, I have seen Dragoons laying down covering fire at skirmishes from prone faster than we could return with our caplock rifles, when I worked on the Santa Fe Trail. The 69 cal muskets were a step back in 1842.
The Hall Rifle, M1819 did not come to be issued until after 1819 and was never a common weapon in US (or any other) military service, it was, when issued at all, considered a weapon mostly for state militias, the Regulars rarely received them. They were justifiably considered unreliable - the 1819 flint Hall rifle as well as the M1841 Hall Rifle were both equipped with a ramrod for a good reason; they tended to become fouled quickly, especially in damp weather in Florida where it was first used in combat, and the breach would lock or freeze up so subsequent rounds had to be rammed from the muzzle - a hard task since the standard issue ball was larger than the bore. The Hall Rifle was the first instance of a US Rifle of any type being equipped with a bayonet as standard, though the M1817 Common Rifle was, for a short time, issued with bayonet but it was found to be unnecessary for riflemen who normally received the Common Rifle rather than a Hall.
There were Hall's carbines issued to regular Dragoons as early as the mid to late 1830s and they were the standard weapon of the US Dragoons but had the same problem as the rifle. Not to worry, all US Regular Cavalry at the time were Dragoons, very well trained to fight dismounted as well as mounted, and would not need that many rounds, especially when in a mounted fight. The Dragoons were not that fond of the Hall either - that came from practical experience of the ranks, not due to old fashioned thinking by their senior officers.
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I think that more than 2 thousand rifles or more were confiscated from Scottish loyalists in one sweep through the Scotland County, NC area after the Battle of Moores Creek...
The number was apparently 1500 muskets and 300 rifles from around 2000 families.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Moore%27s_Creek_Bridge
That's significant on several levels.
1) Unlike the Palatines, these people had been warring with each other at the clan level for generations, and had an affinity for up-to-date weapons still seen today. (Hence guys named Jackson, McCain and Webb never finding a war they didn't like.) That's around one gun per family...a figure probably never achieved by Pennsylvania Germans, who unless they had been a forstmeister or served in the Army, arrived with zero experience with firearms.
2) The ratio of fowlers/muskets to rifles rings true. Fowlers were more practical on the farm by far.
Add to the cultural differences the general lack of precision in terminology...i.e., calling all guns "rifles" when most of them weren't...and we have the basic American myth of every frontier cabin having the owner's trusty rifle and possibles bag hanging over the mantle. It was more likely a shotgun...more likely hanging over the front door...and more likely still a feature much more common in Scotch-Irish households.
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The Nixons, Johnsons and Grahams were the most notorious Border Rievers on the English Frontier and they settled in Pender County and parts west. They also took to the White House or the pulpit, much to the distress of UK Historians. Sorry about getting my numbers jumbled, it has been years since I was down b Moore's Creek .
Down in Wilmington, NC sharp shooters used to snipe at British Regulars in Wilmington from the Brunswick County side of the Cape Fear. Go to Google Earth and see how far a shot it is from the USS,North Carolina to Front Street.
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I believe that the Hall's came out at the turn of the century and was in general issue for thirty years or so. Even the Common rifle dates to 1814 does it not? The Hall's is mighty fast, I have seen Dragoons laying down covering fire at skirmishes from prone faster than we could return with our caplock rifles, when I worked on the Santa Fe Trail. The 69 cal muskets were a step back in 1842.
The Hall Rifle, M1819 did not come to be issued until after 1819 and was never a common weapon in US (or any other) military service, it was, when issued at all, considered a weapon mostly for state militias, the Regulars rarely received them. They were justifiably considered unreliable - the 1819 flint Hall rifle as well as the M1841 Hall Rifle were both equipped with a ramrod for a good reason; they tended to become fouled quickly, especially in damp weather in Florida where it was first used in combat, and the breach would lock or freeze up so subsequent rounds had to be rammed from the muzzle - a hard task since the standard issue ball was larger than the bore. The Hall Rifle was the first instance of a US Rifle of any type being equipped with a bayonet as standard, though the M1817 Common Rifle was, for a short time, issued with bayonet but it was found to be unnecessary for riflemen who normally received the Common Rifle rather than a Hall.
There were Hall's carbines issued to regular Dragoons as early as the mid to late 1830s and they were the standard weapon of the US Dragoons but had the same problem as the rifle. Not to worry, all US Regular Cavalry at the time were Dragoons, very well trained to fight dismounted as well as mounted, and would not need that many rounds, especially when in a mounted fight. The Dragoons were not that fond of the Hall either - that came from practical experience of the ranks, not due to old fashioned thinking by their senior officers.
In the summer of 1990 a Dragoon re enactment unit spent a week with the staff of the Kit Carson Museum on Rayado Creek. This is right on the Trail. Being that TRS had yet to offer any repro Hall parts all of the arms were the real thing and they had most of the variants of the Dragoon length percussion Hall to hand. These Halls were all smooth bore of about 52 cal. They were loaded with a fixed paper cartridge and a No 11 cap. Now remember that these were all well used Halls not NRA perfect, more like shootable 1600 dollar antiques, 1990 prices. The only failure at the range was the usual nipple fouling. The Dragoons were very carefull about keeping powder out of the stock so they would not blow out the middle of the wood. About half of the Halls had the ramrod spike bayonet and the rest the plain iron rammer. The dragoons dismounted the breechblock and wiped out the crud, swabbed the bore with a wet patch and were quickly pack in action. I did not notice any more problems with their firearms than our half stocked rifles.
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Thanks for your help. Here’s the final passage:
Main Text:
While the frontier riflemen were among the most able of George Washington’s forces in 1775 and 1776 (if not the best behaved), they were few in number and the skill levels in marksmanship and field craft they brought with them couldn’t be sustained as their ranks were thinned by casualties and expiring enlistments.(Note 4) Soon many rifle companies would devolve into units with less unique skills armed largely with muskets. By early 1778 even volunteers were hard to find, and colonies instituted a draft for militia service.(Note 12) Despite their lack of formal military training, in their original form the frontier rifle units were formidable. The British complained bitterly about their officers being targeted by snipers. In November, 1775, “20 boats” containing British regulars supported by three artillery batteries and the guns of a frigate raided Lechmere Point during the siege of Boston to seize cattle. Opposed by only six riflemen from Thompson’s Battalion who were there to tend the livestock, the result was 17 British killed to only one American, and no cattle taken. (Note 13) Hessian diaries from the New York battles in 1776 describe officers cutting the rank insignia from their uniforms so as not to become early casualties. Hessians arriving on Staten Island in July were forced to change their bivouac plans when they rudely discovered the Kill Van Kull channel, 350-500 yards wide, was no obstacle to the reach of Colonel Edward Hand’s riflemen. A rifleman named George Merchant, a “tall and handsome Virginian” (Note 5), was captured in Quebec and sent with his weapon back to England to give demonstrations intended to aid recruiting by showing what formidable antagonists British forces were facing in America. Merchant’s demonstrations had exactly the opposite effect. Twenty five riflemen under Colonel Hand stopped a 10,000-man British landing force in its tracks at Throg’s Neck in October, 1776, delaying their offensive a week by forcing them to land elsewhere, the delay allowing Washington to evacuate the bulk of his forces from Manhattan. Hand’s riflemen would do similar on multiple occasions at Trenton and Princeton in December and during the winter battles over forage and rations in northern New Jersey in early 1777. “Nest of American hornets”… “galled by fire”… “officers taken”… and men “dropping fast” became common phrases in British and Hessian correspondence. In spite of the disaster at Long Island in 1776, by the following spring the myth of British invincibility was permanently broken, with frontier riflemen and their distinctly American rifles playing a role far disproportionate to their numbers (Bolton 110; Field 131; Fischer Washington’s 22-25, 109, 237, 246, 294-96; McCullough 38, 51, 229; Smith 67; Stroh Thompson’s 20, 22, 28, 42).
End Notes:
Note 4: The two companies of Thompson’s Rifle Battalion selected for the Quebec Campaign were not chosen because they were uniquely skilled, but because they were behaving badly in camp at Cambridge. These were Captain William Hendricks’s company from Cumberland County and Captain Matthew Smith’s company from Lancaster County. There had been several incidents of fighting between the back country riflemen and the coastal New England regiments composed largely of fishermen, with one later melee reportedly broken up by George Washington personally (Fischer Washington’s 25; McCullough 38, 51; Stroh Thompson’s 22).
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Today most infantrymen are “riflemen”, and we use the term casually, with occasional sources extending it to the writing of history in error. There were never many true riflemen or rifle units serving in the war; most soldiers were armed with smooth-bore muskets, fusils (a lighter, shorter musket), or fowlers (shotguns) shooting ball, buckshot, or a combination called “buck and ball”. In 1775, Pennsylvania raised nine companies of true frontier riflemen; Maryland two, and Virginia two, with strengths ranging from 60 to 90 men each. New England had few rifles in 1775. Then in early 1776, Pennsylvania raised an additional 12 companies of 72 or more riflemen each under Colonel Samuel Miles, and Virginia and Maryland six more under Colonel Hugh Stevenson. There were certainly rifles here and there in the militia regiments where men often owned their own firelocks, with the southern militias and units raised from frontiersmen probably having a higher percentage of rifles. The ratio of 350 rifles to 1500 muskets confiscated from 2000 Scottish settler households after the 1776 Battle of Moore’s Creek, North Carolina was probably representative of the region (Russell 83). Colonel Peter Kachlein’s Northampton County Militia (Kachlein was from Easton) is also an example. Battle histories refer to them as “Kachlein’s Riflemen”, although likely under half were armed with rifles. The “overmountain men” from Appalachian frontier settlements at the 1780 Battle of King’s Mountain are another example; they certainly had a high percentage of riflemen. But the major rifle units available to Washington in 1775-6 were only the units I list – approximately 2300 riflemen in a force larger than 20,000 (PA Archives Series 2 Vol X; Russell 83; Stroh Thompson’s 13-15).
Note 5: Charles Bolton in his 1902 book identifies the “tall and handsome Virginian” rifleman who was captured at Quebec and sent to England to give rifle demonstrations as a man named “Merchant”. Surviving roster fragments of Daniel Morgan’s Virginia Riflemen based on British prisoner lists contain a man named George Merchant, but more intact Pennsylvania Archives and Oscar Stroh in his 1975 book on Thompson’s Battalion based on those archives list “George Merchant” as a member of Captain Matthew Smith’s company from the Lancaster area, who was probably the same man. Merchant was from Pennsylvania, specifically Donegal on the Susquehanna River in Lancaster County. A head count of archived rosters and roster fragments show 743 in Thompson’s Battalion with 189 of those having German names, and 93 in Morgan’s Riflemen with 21 German-Americans (Bolton 110; Roberts 375; Stroh Paxton 39, Thompson’s 20, 42).
Note 12: War weariness wasn’t limited to the Americans. While the colonies were forced to institute a draft for militia in 1778 after almost three years of war, the supply of recruits became so low in Britain that parliament enacted the Army Press Act the same year (Fischer Washington’s 39).
Note 13: The marksmanship of the frontier riflemen was notable. The arguments used against targeting officers were there would be no one to control the soldiers’ blood lust once the fight was won, or to surrender if the fight were lost. These were rationalizations that relied heavily on the beliefs that soldiers came from the dregs of society, that their ranks included a significant percentage of criminals, and that their corporals and sergeants couldn’t think for themselves or control the men on their own – erroneous beliefs that persist to some extent even today. However when applied to the professional British and Hessian units fighting in North America at the time, such arguments were complete nonsense. Just like in professional military units today, the British and Hessian ranks were largely filled by “country lads” of good character and clean records who wanted to be there, led by a professional corps of able non-commissioned officers. Further, the British would learn a lesson from the Americans and adopt both rifles and sniping two decades later at the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars. (Fischer Washington’s 23, 39).
The British raid on Lechmere Point was well-planned and conducted in substantial force to steal cattle, as food supplies were running low in Boston. From the sparse descriptions in Washington’s letter praising the troops and Lieutenant Colonel Edward Hand’s subsequent letter to his wife, the raiding force was probably company-sized, with upwards of a hundred men and impressive support from three batteries of artillery on Bunker, Breed’s and Copp’s Hills, plus the guns of a British frigate 300 yards offshore. Lechmere Point then became an island at high tide, and the raid was timed for then to isolate the six riflemen tending livestock from reinforcements. Alerted by the gunfire, Colonels Thompson and Hand personally led the regiment in a cross-water counterattack, wading up to their armpits crossing the isthmus. The British departed empty-handed before the reinforcements came within range, however, with most of their (heavy) casualties caused by the original six defenders (Stroh Thompson’s 28).
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Is this part of chapter one of your new book? :)
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Is this part of chapter one of your new book? :)
Yes, on Peter Newhard. Plus a friend is considering doing a piece on colonial gun ownership to bring John Shy's work up to date.
https://press.umich.edu/titleDetailDesc.do?id=23883
For example, we know that almost none of the Palatines and Huguenots brought guns with them to America....they had to acquire all of them here. Which means during the 1755 and 1763 wave of Indian uprisings there were relatively few guns in German households for a number of reasons, one of which is gun production couldn't keep up with the demand. For all the humming and woofing about Moravian gunmaking, their actual production was miniscule...in 1759 they only had one gunmaker working, and he also taught music….and meaningless in terms of protecting growing numbers of settlers.
But what about the Scots, Irish Presbyterians and Borderers? They certainly owned guns in their homelands. Hence the Battle of Culloden, among others. Did they bring them with them? Muskets are difficult to hide should port officials and ship's masters object. Does examination of artifacts reveal they did? Again considering Moore’s Creek…..one gun per household across 2000 households is probably two or three times the density of guns present among Pennsylvania German households during the same period. And I doubt by the 1770’s Carolina and Georgia gunmakers were that much more prolific than Pennsylvania gunmakers.
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Thanks, Bob--and all--for very interesting reading.
I'm sure I heard Bob say he's never fired a muzzleloader. Surely there are some who live on or near the Kitsap Penninsula who can rectify this deficiency! Dave Rase maybe? :-\
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I'm sure I heard Bob say he's never fired a muzzleloader. Surely there are some who live on or near the Kitsap Penninsula who can rectify this deficiency! Dave Rase maybe? :-\
I'm about to fix that. I recently acquired a sound English double, this weekend bought a pile of flask parts at auction, and as soon as I get a proper shot/powder snake made we'll treat the grandchildren to a little 10ga smoke at Bremerton Trap and Skeet. ;)
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For example, we know that almost none of the Palatines and Huguenots brought guns with them to America....they had to acquire all of them here.
…..one gun per household across 2000 households is probably two or three times the density of guns present among Pennsylvania German households during the same period.
Bob, what is your source for this information?
Mart Keen
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Bob, what is your source for this information?
Aaron Spencer Fogleman's book Hopeful Journeys has lots of detail on the conditions in the Palatine-Alsace-Baden at the time.
And Rosalind J. Beiler's IMMIGRANT AND ENTREPRENEUR: THE ATLANTIC WORLD OF CASPAR WISTAR, 1650-1750 is a story about a Kraichgau forester's son who immigrated to America and for a time imported German guns to Philadelphia, among his many other enterprises. Beiler found some cases of city people in Germany demanding the right to own guns and getting it, but there were numerous restrictions and it is clear that very few people there owned guns.
https://www.amazon.com/Immigrant-Entrepreneur-1650-1750-German-American-Institute/dp/027103372X/ref=sr_1_fkmr1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1301422023&sr=8-1-fkmr1#_
The bottom line for the German-Alsatian immigrants is that if they weren't a forester or had served in the army (and to my surprise few of the thousands I’ve studied had), they had zero experience with or access to firearms. Accordingly, they didn't bring any with them. And since the situation was largely peaceful in Pennsylvania from 1685 to 1755, they really didn't need them for their first generation here, either. Snares are cheaper and more effective for hunting than firearms if you don't know how to shoot, and these folks brought many generations of poaching experience with them.
Even after Indian attacks killing thousands from 1755-1757, when another wave of attacks happened in 1763 as part of Pontiac’s Rebellion, there were still large numbers of unarmed German settlers in Pennsylvania. To wit:
"NORTHAMPTON TOWN, the 10th, this instant, October, 1763.
To the Honorable JAMES HAMILTON (1710-1783), Esq., Lieutenant Governor and Commander in Chief of the Province of Pennsylvania…
… we found the inhabitants that had neither Guns, Powder nor Lead, to defend themselves, and that Colonel Burd (James Burd 1726-1793) …would assist them with guns and ammunition, and he requested of me to write to your Honor, because the inhabitants of the town had not chose their officers at the time he set off, so we, the inhabitants of the said town hath unanimous chose George Wolf, the bearer hereof, to be Captain, and Abraham Rinker (1741-1820, later brother-in-law to John Moll I) to be Lieutenant; we whose names are underwritten, promise to obey to this mentioned Captain and Lieutenant, and so we hope his Honor will be so good and send us 50 guns, 100 pound of powder, and 400 pound lead, 150 stands for the guns… JOSEPH ROTH, Minister (Mickley 30)”
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That cultural information about the Palatine immigrants could explain why a rifle culture never developed among white settlers in the Mohawk Valley of NY State. Other factors may be that the Palatine immigrants in the Mohawk Valley were farmers, not hunters, and that they had not experienced raiding from the local Iroquois nations but only from the French and their native allies in the north (armed with fusils). In contrast to other border-living settlers, they seemed particularly helpless when warned of impending attacks from Brant's boys etc- incapable of sending out scouts, etc. We often assume "colonial Germans- must be riflemen or rifle-makers". Those of us interested in the colonial rifle culture and from that area have searched for and longed for true "upstate NY-made colonial rifles" to be discovered, but they do not pop up.
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I will have to buy a copy.
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The interesting thing to me is that Germans seem to have been recruited (willingly on their part) as buffers in the frontier areas of Virginia at about the same time being discussed. Not only did they seem to adapt to the frontier, they were a major part of expanding it to the southwest, where one rifle per family might have been a comic lack of armament in some cases. I wonder if the gun-less culture in Germany isn't being somewhat exaggerated? Not to argue, just hard to reconcile this information with what I've researched esp. in Va.. Either complacency in parts of PA bred less discipline or the harsh reality of the frontier necessitated a different reaction, but the two situations seem at odds.
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Consider the timing.
The real violence didn't begin until 1755. Before that you could get by without guns, and if you had no experience with them, you probably did, as even a basic rifle cost more than a hundred acres of frontier land. But when guns became necessities during the 1755 F&I and 1763 Pontiac's War, ethnic Germans adapted. Hence by 1775 two thirds of George Washington's most famous rifle units were Pennsylvanian with over one out of four being German-Americans, including those rifle units from Virginia and Maryland. That's a close match to the population demographic then, indicating that by 1775 the Germans were just as able and willing to fight as their Scotch-Irish counterparts. It took 20 years for German settlers to grow fangs...but grow fangs they did.
So while major Shenandoah Valley settlement began in the 1730's, the push south and west and major Ohio Valley settlement occured later...Ohio Valley much later...by which time the Germans had adapted to their new environment.
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one gun per household across 2000 households is probably two or three times the density of guns present among Pennsylvania German households during the same period.
My sense of reading around in the scholarship in this area suggests that these numbers give an unwarranted sense of precision, or confidence, about what we really know about the prevalence of guns in early America or early Pennsylvania in particular. We simply cannot treat a letter about the lack of guns in one town (or even several such reports) as representative of the wider situation.
Michael Bellesiles's fraudulent Arming America (2000) insisted that there were very few guns in early America and those that were here were in poor working order, were imported from Europe, etc. That book, and Bellesiles's earlier article out of which the book grew, was refuted by many legal scholars and historians, including:
- James Lindgren, "Fall from Grace," Yale Law Journal (2002): 2195-2249 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=692421
- Clayton Cramer, "Why Footnotes Matter," Plagiary (2006): 1-31 www.plagiary.org/why-footnotes-matter.pdf
- Stephen Halbrook and David Kopel, "Tench Coxe and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms," William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal 7 (1999): 347-99 https://www.davekopel.com/2A/lawrev/hk-coxe.htm
and, most thoroughly, in a monograph:
- Clayton Cramer, Armed America (Thomas Nelson, 2007).
I think we need to know a lot more before we can make any certain claims about any of this.
Scott
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Michael Bellesiles's fraudulent Arming America (2000) insisted that there were very few guns in early America and those that were here were in poor working order, were imported from Europe, etc. That book, and Bellesiles's earlier article out of which the book grew, was refuted by many legal scholars and historians...
Interesting references, thanks. But all of them deal only with the general theme of contemporary gun control, using history either as background, excuse, or refutation. A revisionist historian cum political hack distorts and falsifies references to make his wished-for point and gets called on it. While there appear to be some nuggets in the refutations, that's hardly ground-breaking research.
None of them address the central point made...not by me...but by Brandeis historian David Hackett Fischer and from a different angle South Alabama historian Aaron Spencer Fogleman, that there were major cultural differences between the "Puritans, Cavaliers, Borderers and Pietists" that had a major effect on colonial attitudes and approaches toward almost everything. That the effect of these differences on gun ownership hasn’t been fully explored is a challenge to pursue, not a drawback to shrink from.
My hypothesis is that before the violence of 1755 and 1763, gun ownership among German Pietists was significantly less than among their Scotch-Irish-Borderer neighbors on the frontier and, as a reaction to that violence, by 1775 gun ownership between the two cultures largely balanced itself. As initial evidence I offer primary and secondary sources on post-war life in the Palatinate-Alsace-Baden and British-Scotland-Ireland border regions, the 1745 Jacobite Rising, 1776’s Battle of Moore’s Creek Bridge, the 1763 Whitehall Massacre, the archived rosters of the first two 1775 rifle regiments including Morgan’s Riflemen. Notable is I have yet to find a thorough historical analysis of either the (pivotal) Whitehall Massacre or those rosters…deficiencies that include historians omitting entire 500-man battalions of Thompson’s and Mile’s Rifle Regiments from the Battle of Long Island. Hence there is plenty of room for contributions. I only ask that you be specific.
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In the summer of 1990 a Dragoon re enactment unit spent a week with the staff of the Kit Carson Museum on Rayado Creek. This is right on the Trail. Being that TRS had yet to offer any repro Hall parts all of the arms were the real thing and they had most of the variants of the Dragoon length percussion Hall to hand. These Halls were all smooth bore of about 52 cal. They were loaded with a fixed paper cartridge and a No 11 cap. Now remember that these were all well used Halls not NRA perfect, more like shootable 1600 dollar antiques, 1990 prices. The only failure at the range was the usual nipple fouling. The Dragoons were very carefull about keeping powder out of the stock so they would not blow out the middle of the wood. About half of the Halls had the ramrod spike bayonet and the rest the plain iron rammer. The dragoons dismounted the breechblock and wiped out the crud, swabbed the bore with a wet patch and were quickly pack in action. I did not notice any more problems with their firearms than our half stocked rifles.
Keep in mind that where you use the term "Dragoons" that it should at all times be placed in quotes when referring to reenactors. No offense to the fellows involved, I have been a reenactor for almost 25 years and have been blessed to have always belonged to groups that want to do it right - at least to the best of our abilities. That includes serving as volunteers at the NPS facilities at Antietam and Harpers Ferry under close supervision by the knowledgeable personnel working there who also learned from us and the careful research and documentation done by several of our members.
What I am saying is that the "Dragoons" were in all likelihood firing more than the actual Dragoons of history did except under severe circumstances. With experience and given the opportunity under stress, perhaps the historical Dragoons would have "dismounted the breechblock and wiped out the crud, swabbed the bore with a wet patch" and get quickly pack in action but is there period documentation of this? It is highly doubtful, doing this on horseback (impossible!) or on foot under opposing heavy fire is not without it's disadvantages.
Bob, this is a very fine thread with some interesting points, sorry to have wandered off topic talking about a firearm that was not in existence at the time of the American Revolution.
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None of them address the central point...that there were major cultural differences between the "Puritans, Cavaliers, Borderers and Pietists" that had a major effect on colonial attitudes and approaches toward almost everything. That the effect of these differences on gun ownership hasn’t been fully explored is a challenge to pursue, not a drawback to shrink from.
Yes, I agree entirely! It's an important issue. I was skeptical not about the general claim about cultural forces that may have led German immigrants to possess fewer guns but rather about the attempt to move from this possibility to a quantified claim about the amount of gun ownership among German immigrants.
It's a tricky thing to move from the nature of gun ownership in the "old" country to the nature of gun ownership among those who emigrated to the American colonies. You could believe that they preserved the culture of the "old" country that (as Bellesiles himself argues) severely restricted gun ownership (i.e., state controlled who could own guns). OR you could believe that they recognized the opportunity in the "new" world to possess what they had been forbidden to possess in the old country and seized that opportunity along with many others in the new world. Who knows which scenario is more likely? I would think one could only assess which actually occurred by knowing something about the numbers of guns in whose hands--and that information, at present, is lacking.
The nature of the evidence that survives (or even was produced at the time) may shape what we can now know. When towns found themselves lacking weapons they would have written to request them; when townspeople had plenty of weapons they would have written nothing. This case suggests the validity of the proposition that the absence of evidence can't be taken as the evidence of absence.
This is why Bellesiles and others tried to rely on (or, in Bellesiles's case, falsify) probate records for evidence of the prevalence of guns.
BTW, Clayton Cramer's book, Armed America, is more focused than these other refutations on showing the prevalence of guns in early America and disputing much of the evidence used for the contrary argument. (That is, he's not, in that book, addressing the gun control issue that, as you point out, many of the others who objected to Bellesiles work were primarily interested in.)
Scott
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Bob,
I agree this is a most informative thread. Bremerton Trap & Skeet, is that the place on the way out to the Bremerton airport? I have Hopeful Journeys currently waiting on my reading pile, glad to hear it has interesting information. Look forward to your book.
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Bob,
Bremerton Trap & Skeet, is that the place on the way out to the Bremerton airport?
Yes.
And regarding Hopeful Journeys, I just received Aaron Spencer Fogleman's comments on this paper the other day. He's interested in doing a piece on colonial gun ownership, as the subject has been muddied by longstanding mythology on the one hand and writers with contemporary political agendas on the other.
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In the summer of 1990 a Dragoon re enactment unit spent a week with the staff of the Kit Carson Museum on Rayado Creek. This is right on the Trail. Being that TRS had yet to offer any repro Hall parts all of the arms were the real thing and they had most of the variants of the Dragoon length percussion Hall to hand. These Halls were all smooth bore of about 52 cal. They were loaded with a fixed paper cartridge and a No 11 cap. Now remember that these were all well used Halls not NRA perfect, more like shootable 1600 dollar antiques, 1990 prices. The only failure at the range was the usual nipple fouling. The Dragoons were very carefull about keeping powder out of the stock so they would not blow out the middle of the wood. About half of the Halls had the ramrod spike bayonet and the rest the plain iron rammer. The dragoons dismounted the breechblock and wiped out the crud, swabbed the bore with a wet patch and were quickly pack in action. I did not notice any more problems with their firearms than our half stocked rifles.
Keep in mind that where you use the term "Dragoons" that it should at all times be placed in quotes when referring to reenactors. No offense to the fellows involved, I have been a reenactor for almost 25 years and have been blessed to have always belonged to groups that want to do it right - at least to the best of our abilities. That includes serving as volunteers at the NPS facilities at Antietam and Harpers Ferry under close supervision by the knowledgeable personnel working there who also learned from us and the careful research and documentation done by several of our members.
What I am saying is that the "Dragoons" were in all likelihood firing more than the actual Dragoons of history did except under severe circumstances. With experience and given the opportunity under stress, perhaps the historical Dragoons would have "dismounted the breechblock and wiped out the crud, swabbed the bore with a wet patch" and get quickly pack in action but is there period documentation of this? It is highly doubtful, doing this on horseback (impossible!) or on foot under opposing heavy fire is not without it's disadvantages.
Bob, this is a very fine thread with some interesting points, sorry to have wandered off topic talking about a firearm that was not in existence at the time of the American Revolution.
Good point, This is my point: They were using the real item shooting from the cartridge box on the Llano and they knew their weapons, all practical experience. Many carried a horse pistol and all had sabers. I can only imagine that a man could rectify a jam in combat with some confidence that his buddies would cover him. If we can't count on that then the US would never have adopted cheaper gear like the M 16.
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Back on topic, it may have been quiet north of the Mason Dixie Line but we were having some serious problems early on with the Tuscaroras and before that, the Quakers here in NC. We had a little civil war that managed to define the arguments for the Separation of church and state and the 2nd Amendment.
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Bob and fellow contributors, This truly is an exciting and informative review.
I have been wondering if any of you have access to Clarence M. Busch's work entitled 'Frontier Forts of Pennsylvania' published by the State Printer of Pennsylvania in 1856. Basically the two volume set deals with the Commonwealths response and defense against the Indian raids along the Blue Ridge Mountains during the pre-Revoluntion years of 1755 thru the 1760's and even up to the end of the Revolution in 1783. The forts of the Blue Ridge Mountains extended from Ft.Dupui's in the east [Northhamton Co.] thru the Counties of Lehigh, Berks, Lebanon and Dauphin in the west terminating at Ft. Harris which is present day Harrisburgh, Pa. The two volume set is full of accounts of the fort's commander's begging for supplies [powder and lead] and describing the poor condition of their weapons to the Governor and anyone who would listen.
If you haven't read these accounts I heartily recommend them as it is right in your ball park when considering the populous and armlament of the Pennsylvania settlers before the American Revolution and during the French and Indian War.
Regards, HIB
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Fabulous resource, thanks.
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Off Topic. Bob , you are in for a real treat if you are shooting a 10 Ga. double this weekend for the first time. I spent many relaxing hours deriving pleasures from fine English perc, doubles.
ENJOY. Cheers Bob
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One thing to think about when we delve back into these primary sources: We are examining the past not only through the filter of our own modern mindset, but also through the beliefs and prejudices of the original writer. The people who wrote these accounts made their own editorial decisions based on culture, politics, and personal agendas.
For example, I am wondering about the people who wrote in England about the deadly nature of riflemen. Were they Tories or Whigs? The Whigs were generally sympathetic to the colonists and would have been happy to discourage their fellow subjects from pursuing the war.
Part of the analysis of first person accounts is an analysis of that person's origins, beliefs, and relationship to the subject.
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Bob, arms ownership and attitudes among the pre rev war 18th century PA Germans is a topic worthy of further research (at least in my opinion), and I hope you keep it up and keep us posted. I read some of these posts with great interest, especially to references about a cultural aversion to gun ownership by PA German immigrants that stem back to europe (if I am understanding these notes correctly). That is the first time I have heard that notion, and I would be very interested in more information on this. Probably off-point, and boring for many, I am providing some insights from my past research below for anyone interested.
Speaking from what I have found in research, most of these immigrants, my ancestors included, were very poor. Economic distress was the primary reason they left for the new world. One great resource for anyone interested in learning more about the situation and mindset of the PA Swiss and German immigrant of the era is "List of Swiss Emigrants in the Eighteenth Century to the American Colonies" by Faust and Brumbaugh available at most historical society libraries. Unlike its title, it is far more than a list. It provides terrific insights into why people left Switzerland (and the palatinate). It is based entirely on primary documents and manuscripts / records. For example, reasons for emigration included young people that lost their fathers (no parental protection at home / no one to curb their desire to see the world); divorced people and widows / widowers; letters from others that left describing the wonderful new country enticed many. However, by far the reason was poverty. Emigrants described that they worked night and day and could not even afford their daily bread for their family and really had no choice but to leave. As an aside, it is interesting that many of the swiss leaving at this time indicated that they were heading for "the Carolinas". This was because that was the location most widely publicized in switzerland at the time and many ended up in PA.
That all said, most came here very poor in large numbers between 1734 and 1750. Switzerland panicked when so many of their people began to leave, and began instituting penalties and taxes and other obstacles for those who wished to leave. For example in some cases they would not allow their property in Switzerland to be sold. The swiss even tried to socially ostracize those leaving (basically the swiss officials were panicking) because residents were leaving in huge waves.
Speaking in terms of research I did on one family, the story is likely very typical of the immigrants. My ancestor left switzerland in 1749, with so little money that the swiss even waived his emigration tax. He came through Phila in 1749, and settled in Oley township. He worked hard, and by the time he died at the relatively young age of 62 in 1782 he was a wealthy man for the time. His 1782 estate record as a resident of downtown Reading (a town of only about 500 households at the time) included 3 "old muskets" and a pistol (probably more than the avg household though and may not be a good example ). In 1782, how old is "old", maybe 20+ years? Maybe he bought them solely for protection again the indian incursions of the 1750's or 1760's. Why 4 guns? I always assume he hunted with them. Were they really muskets, or was this a generic term for long guns or rifles of any type? Were they american made? It is interesting, however, that I have come across very few estate records from the time that reference guns as part of the inventory. Granted this is not something I intentionally looked for. I have even seen numerous gunsmith estates where they did not own whole guns. Did many men give away guns to sons before they died? My ancestor apparently died fairly suddenly without a will or any estate planning.
I can understand, and agree, that it is highly unlikely that these immigrants would have brought any guns with them, save for maybe a very few exceptions, and that any guns they owned here were probably acquired here. However, my perception has always been that when they earned enough money they bought themselves a gun. The PA archives include a number of passages that describe how militia men were compensated for rifles that they lost to the british at Long Island and Brandywine in 1775 and 1776. I would think it likely that these rifles pre-dated 1775 and that the residents had them for some time. I doub t that they were made solely for military purposes. Probably the schriet rifle was one of these, which appears to be to be a rifle made for private use and not military, in 1761. And we know that gunsmiths already had functioning shops almost as soon as they arrived (Hachen at least as early as 1752 and likely as soon as he settled). Assuming that many of the guns were made for indian trade, I always thought there would be alocal commercial trade for purchase by the resident immigrants also. Reading had several gunsmiths before 1760 and settlement only got going there in about 1750. We also know thst shop owners such as Conrad Weiser were selling guns in their shops as early as the 1750's and similar to indian trading, traded guns for various labor and services by settlers.. Issues like those in Northampton (lack of arms) were probably because of the great number of impoverished new settlers and lack of a gunsmith or shop selling guns (which is probably why Moll moved there late in 1763 to take advantage of a new market and help the residents in defense).
Sorry for rambling - I guess in my long-winded way my point is that based on my own limited research my own hypothesis is that many PA Germans simply were poor and purchased guns once they could afford them, once they had a town gunsmith that could provide them, or had a local shop that sold them.. But would welcome evidence that they did not want to own guns, as I am solely interested in the real story! I would think that the british letter you show on the first page of posts is probably accurate, describing how rifles are made in numerous areas of pa prior to 1775 and that these were for private purchase and not to arm militia.
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1) …Switzerland panicked when so many of their people began to leave, and began instituting penalties and taxes and other obstacles for those who wished to leave.
2) …And we know that gunsmiths already had functioning shops almost as soon as they arrived (Hachen at least as early as 1752 and likely as soon as he settled).…a cultural aversion to gun ownership by PA German immigrants that stem back to…
3) …based on my own limited research my own hypothesis is that many PA Germans simply were poor and purchased guns once they could afford them, once they had a town gunsmith that could provide them, or had a local shop that sold them.. But would welcome evidence that they did not want to own guns, as I am solely interested in the real story!
1) It was a common practice in Germany and Alsace for communities to require compensation for the loss of an emigrant’s services. Sometimes directly to the local noble landowners; sometimes to the community because the local nobility exercised their right to require free labor from the local commoners and departures created a smaller manpower base from which to draw. This was longstanding policy beginning after the 30-Years-War and continuing until the 1850’s and even the 1880’s when the last of my family emigrated.
2) Certainly. But in the Palatinate, Alsace, Wuerttemberg, Baden, Westphalia, Hesse, Saxony and Bavaria entry into the gunsmith profession was severely restricted by the guild system which controlled supply by restricting the number of smiths, and the nobility which controlled demand. The bottom line is that guns were expensive, scarce and hard-to-get, and if you weren’t a forester/gamekeeper or had hunting rights as a member of the nobility or a wealthier burgher, you didn’t own a gun in those locales. In the 1750’s there weren’t a lot of trained smiths either in America or arriving from Germany…hence the Moravians had to import one specially after their missionaries were massacred in 1755. Further, there is evidence that once he arrived his output was minimal, having almost no impact outside the Moravian community. So for all the humming and woofing today about Andreas Albrecht, I’m not convinced he made the early contributions often attributed to him. Under Albrecht the Moravians in Northampton Cy were producing more sets of chairs than they were guns.
3) Except guns were relatively expensive, and if you were a subsistence farmer there were few ways to acquire even small amounts of cash. In pre-war 1775 a plain rifle with accoutrements cost roughly 6-8 English pounds in Pennsylvania, while a hundred acres of vacant frontier land sold for 5 pounds, trade guns 2-3 pounds, military muskets 3-4 pounds, a horse 10-12 pounds, and a 60’ by 230’ building lot in downtown Allentown 45 pounds. Historians like John Shy and Clayton Cramer talk to how cheap and readily-available guns were in the colonies…except they weren’t talking about Pennsylvania, where militias were few, late and poorly-subsidized for a host of reasons. Hence there weren’t a lot of old militia guns on the used market. Further, a gunsmith who also wasn’t a subsistence farmer himself was a rare creature, especially early-on. Those guys were in the trade to earn cash; they really didn’t need the 50 bushels of grain I had available to trade, because if it was a good year for grain, they had a surplus, too.
Accordingly, I wouldn’t characterize the shortage of guns in the hands of German immigrants prior to the Indian wars of 1755 and 1763 a “cultural aversion” but rather a matter of priorities. As a farm kid my father trained bird dogs as a sideline, I paid for 2 years of college running a trapline while in HS, later graduated in forestry and wildlife biology, and spent some time as an army ranger after being drafted (They said, “With your majors, it’d be a perfect fit.” I said, “No, thanks.” They said, “It pays 25% more.” I said, “Where do I sign?”) Yet I’m certain I’m not as skilled as those early Palatinate, Alsatian, Ulster-Scot and Swiss farmers at poaching restricted lands, but I’m also certain I could acquire as much or more game without a gun as with a gun. In short, until I absolutely needed a gun to defend myself from others having guns, I had higher priorities to spend my scarce cash on.
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There are a considerable number of advertisements to be found for rifle barrels, gun barrels, gun locks, brass mounting etc. (all for sale, and in quantity) in the PA Gazette. Prior to 1750 the ads are much more scarce (yet can be found, here and there), but between 1750 and 1770, not so scarce. Prior to 1750 there are more ads for "ship muskets" and "muskets," "fowling pieces" etc., quite a few in fact. People were definitely interested in obtaining arms, and certainly by the 1750s if not earlier on a more sporadic basis, building them. Primary documentation, not our 21st century opinion and speculation.
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1) Prior to 1750 the ads are much more scarce (yet can be found, here and there), but between 1750 and 1770, not so scarce. Prior to 1750 there are more ads for "ship muskets" and "muskets," "fowling pieces" etc., quite a few in fact.
2) People were definitely interested in obtaining arms, and certainly by the 1750s if not earlier on a more sporadic basis, building them. Primary documentation, not latter-day writers' opinion and speculation.
1) That neatly fits the hypothesis that before the Indian attacks of 1755, the firearms market was more centered on the port and shipping industry than on frontier settlers, especially newly-arriving German settlers.
2) The myth of the “three Newhard brothers from Zweibruecken” was primary documentation archived in Philadelphia, too, based on Pennsylvania naturalization officials not bothering to get straight their true familial relationships and origin. (There were four Neuharts from Rumbach , not three from Zweibruecken, they weren’t brothers, and they were accompanied by a brother-in-law and uncle named Kern and Stoehr respectively) And the more I dig, the more errors and/or contradictions in “primary documentation” I uncover. To wit:
For all the humming and woofing about Moravians around here, what exactly were Andreas Albrecht’s early contributions to gunmaking other than making a few pretty rifles whose toes cracked because he didn’t align the wood grain properly? Or…I’m hardly an artifact authority…was that just his student Oerter who didn’t understand wood grain?
(https://americanlongrifles.org/forum/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fpic20.picturetrail.com%2FVOL12%2F1104763%2F21637099%2F393603263.jpg&hash=080947385f2e263ff53714f2c131b25ca5885715)
- Albrecht arrived in 1750, but taught music at the Nazareth Boy’s School until the trade school opened in Christian Springs in 1757, where he switched to teaching gunmaking, although his previous experience was as a stocker for the army, not a gunmaker.
- You’d think that after the massacre of Moravian missionaries a mere 30 miles to the north in 1755, by 1759 the Moravians’d be producing rifles hand over fist to arm the males in their own population of a thousand-plus, and also others to sell to the local community for much-needed cash. After all, Bethlehem and Nazareth were still supporting refugees from the 1755 attacks. But if you thought that, you’d be wrong, as save perhaps for a few students, Albrecht was the sole gunmaker listed in 1759:
(https://americanlongrifles.org/forum/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fpic20.picturetrail.com%2FVOL12%2F1104763%2F23549184%2F394864877.jpg&hash=ccf05bf78adc3f07580fe2c0ac50424fa0c9686f)
- Plus while he was the master of the gunmaking enterprise, he still taught music every day at Nazareth two miles distant, which with decent artificial lighting still in the distant future, probably took up half his working day.
- Albrecht is the #11 gunmaker between four nail makers and three wood turners. So two years after their missionaries were massacred, the Moravians were probably producing many more sets of chairs than they were guns. Not a very impressive effort.
- A mere year later, in 1760 the Moravian benefactor Count Zinzendorf dies and his heirs sue the Moravian Church for all the $ millions he had advanced them since 1730 to keep their operations afloat. The collectivist “General Economy” the Moravians had been living under hadn’t been paying for itself by a long shot, and it took the church more than a few decades to fully reimburse Zinzendorf’s heirs. More evidence that these communal utopia types had been talking a good game, but hadn’t been working very hard.
- So in 1762 the Moravians ditch the “General Economy” and to generate cash sell their various businesses to their masters. So as they are about to get productive, Albrecht’s response by 1766 at age 48 is to get married (given Moravian “choir” living, he probably hadn’t been close to a woman since 1748 when he left the army) and become a full-time innkeeper. I hope he did better in Lancaster in 1771, because his early accomplishments sure sound overstated to me.
Sources whether primary or secondary are but one piece of the puzzle. Context and perspective of time and place is another. Rational analysis of the first two is a third.
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A mere year later, in 1760 the Moravian benefactor Count Zinzendorf dies and his heirs sue the Moravian Church for all the $ millions he had advanced them to keep their operations afloat. The collectivist “General Economy” the Moravians had been living under hadn’t been paying for itself by a long shot, and it took the church more than a few decades to reimburse Zinzendorf’s heirs. More evidence that these communal types hadn’t been working very hard.
Bob: I know you're usually meticulous in your research, but this is nearly all wrong. Since the point you seem to want to make is that "these communal types hadn't been working very hard," let me just focus on that point. The "General Economy," from what scholars can tell from the extensive accounts that survive, was making a profit--indeed, enough of a profit to fund the church's widespread missionary work in North America. That was the point of the experimental communal Economy--to make a profit--and it was quite successful. If your "test" of what might prove a profit would be the proliferating of gunsmiths or gunshops--a Moravian franchise--you're seriously misunderstanding how Moravian communities worked. Whatever profit a trade produced wasn't used to enlarge the trade; it was used to further mission work.
So the Economy didn't collapse because it was failing. The European Moravian church demanded that the Economy be dissolved and that most of the trades be privatized so the Bethlehem community would produce even more profit, much of which was appropriated to pay off Zinzendorf's debts. (And do you mean that Zinzendorf's "heirs," or that his "creditors," sued to recover debts after his death?) Kate Engel's Religion and Profit: Moravians in Early America (2009) lays all this out as well as anyone.
I assume when you say that "these communal types hadn't been working very hard" you mean only that they didn't produce many guns? Or is there some evidence of their general laziness that you've found?
I'm not sure why your contention about the low level of gun ownership in early America, which I think remains an open question (as the discussion here makes clear), requires you to exaggerate in this way. Or create and then attack straw men. Has anybody made a claim about the number of guns that Albrecht (or the Moravians generally) produced that you're refuting here?
Scott
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"So two years after their missionaries were massacred, the Moravians were probably producing many more sets of chairs than they were guns."
The key word there is "probably." We really don't know, we are only speculating. Interesting, but speculation none the less.
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"...what exactly were Andreas Albrecht’s early contributions to gunmaking..."
A fascinating question which as yet remains to be answered.
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A question remains: if the Indians could trade furs for European guns, why couldn't the farmers do the same? The frontier inhabitants almost certainly did, as to lack arms in those dangerous zone was tantamount to suicide. How else did they obtain arms? We can suppose that gun ownership was widespread and considered vital whether in 'rural, or suburban' areas, as game of some variety (likewise for fur bearing animals), could always be procured. This, with subsistence farming would have served the people well. Just some random thoughts on this highly interesting subject.
Dick
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I don't have to drive 15 miles from where I live deep in the woods to find contemporary churches (in a state not normally considered devout) of three to five hundred congregants who, in proportion, support overseas missionary efforts equal or exceeding those of the colonial Moravians.
The argument isn't important to mine other than an illustration of some of the myths out there being purveyed, but the church's debt to Zinzendorf's heirs was simply too great, accumulated in too short a time, and took too long to pay off to be attributed to however many missionaries living in the bush. By several-fold. If the General Economy was so successful, why do away with it within months of your notes being called in?
This is like making the argument that 16 workers were sufficient to service 12,000 stands of arms turning over every few months at the "Allentown Factory" after Philadelphia was evacuated in 1777 and armory operations shifted to Lancaster, Harrisburg and Allentown. Please. Sixteen workers were barely enough just to load and unload the wagons.
Am I overstating? Probably. But the arguments aren't very convincing and merit a relook.
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I don't have to drive 15 miles from where I live deep in the woods to find contemporary churches (in a state not normally considered devout) of three to five hundred congregants who, in proportion, support overseas missionary efforts equal or exceeding those of the colonial Moravians.
I cannot follow the logic here. I didn't think we were discussing whether we admire the Moravians for supporting missionary efforts. The only point is that the General Economy in Bethlehem was designed to produce enough $$$ to support the community and enable missionary work. The social structure (the choir system, raising children communally) was designed to enable individuals, usually couples, to be detached for missionary work. If there is a point you're making here that I'm missing, please repeat.
The argument isn't important to mine other than an illustration of some of the myths out there being purveyed, but the church's debt to Zinzendorf's heirs was simply too great, accumulated in too short a time, and took too long to pay off to be attributed to however many missionaries living in the bush. By several-fold. If the General Economy was so successful, why do away with it within months of your notes being called in?
What is the myth being purveyed? Did anybody claim that the debt came entirely from the missionary work, as you imply here? Do you have any figures about how extensive the Moravian missions were? And how much they cost? If not, on what is the above statement based?
The studies I've read (I've noted Kate Engel's) show that (A) Bethlehem's communal system was making a profit and (B) the system was dismantled, and the trades privatized, because the European Moravian church expected that would increase Bethlehem's capacity to contribute to paying off the church's debt. This shows that the European church believed that Bethlehem's community could be organized to make more profit. It also shows that the communal organization had earlier had an aim other than the greatest profit possible .
By the way, the inventories and books from many of Bethlehem's trades survive and so the issue of whether they made a profit or not isn't uncertain. I'll add some figures from Engel's book tomorrow.
Scott
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The communal system was making a profit and (B) the system was dismantled, and the trades privatized, because the European Moravian church expected that would increase Bethlehem's capacity to contribute to paying off the church's debt.
Again, that simply doesn’t pass the common-sense test of context and perspective.
If the communal system was making such a handsome profit, why change it?
How would the Moravians, who had no real American experience with privatization in either Bethlehem, Nazareth, Lititz or Wachovia, know that dissolving the General Economy and selling/renting the various businesses to their masters would generate greater profits?
Common sense says they wouldn’t know. And they made the change because the communal system was failing.
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I've explicitly answered the questions you ask in the immediately previous posts, so I'll repeat here and then let it rest.
If the communal system was making such a handsome profit, why change it?
The communal system made a profit. The European church believed that, by privatizing the trades, a greater profit could be made. Not complicated.
How would the Moravians, who had no real American experience with privatization in either Bethlehem, Nazareth, Lititz or Wachovia, know that dissolving the General Economy and selling/renting the various businesses to their masters would generate greater profits?
Well. Moravian communities existed in Europe as well. All were not organized communally. Moravians understood how non-communal economies worked. They lived in them in Europe and America (Lancaster, New York, Philadelphia). So I would say that it is the opposite of "common sense" that "says" that "they wouldn't know" how other economies worked.
And, again, I'll repeat that there is no need for speculation here. Church authorities in Europe and in Bethlehem debated and disagreed about the dissolution of the General Economy. All these documents survive. There is no need to wonder about whether European authorities expected that, by dissolving the economy, they would be able to obtain more revenue from Bethlehem. (More revenue: the General Economy was already making a profit, with that profit being plowed in to missionary activity rather than to pay off the debt left at Zinzendorf's death.)
Good night.
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"Common sense." The hobgoblin of research. ;) Tread lightly when going there!
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Albrecht had gone through the apprentice system in Europe and the Journeyman phase so thinking he was only a gunstocker for the army shows a lack of understanding of the process of producing gunmakers in Germany.
Dan
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If I could ask one additional question, after a good night's sleep, to Bob:
If I understand correctly, your general claim is that there was less gun ownership, particularly among immigrant German populations in colonial Pennsylvania, than has been believed or claimed. And that the Moravian gunsmiths, who have been much written about lately, never produced very many guns of any sort.
If these are the points you most want to make, I am not sure why you need to make claims at all about whether the General Economy in Bethlehem was working, whether the Moravian tradesmen were working hard, about the causes of the Moravian Church's debt after Zinzendorf's debt--or to demean Albrecht because, as is surely true (of any society?), his fellow craftsmen produced more chairs than he produced guns.
These aren't (as far as I can see) relevant to the very interesting issues in bold above.
Scott
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Albrecht had gone through the apprentice system in Europe and the Journeyman phase so thinking he was only a gunstocker for the army shows a lack of understanding of the process of producing gunmakers in Germany.
Whisker page 31:
"I was born in the little town of Celle...when I was thirteen I became the apprentice of a gunstock maker..."
In Albrecht’s own words he describes that he was apprenticed to a gunstocker for four years, then as a journeyman became a gunmaker’s helper for another four years. Then he was accepted into the army as a gunstocker for 8 years. He doesn’t mention standing for the rigorous master’s examination of the time as a gunmaker…you’d think he would have if he had…and by his own admission the vast bulk of his experience was repairing musket stocks broken by soldiers and replacing ready-made government parts.
That he didn’t know how or didn’t care to toss a buttstock in a few gallons of boiling water for an hour so he could correct the severe grain runout at the toe by bending before the final shaping of his blank isn’t particularly impressive. Neither is Christian Springs, the so-called font of early riflemaking, having three adults turning chair parts and only one part-time gunmaker as late as 1759. More impressive is that by 1762 the Moravian Church came to the conclusion that like all utopian schemes since the dawn of man, their communal economy provided few incentives to work either smarter or harder, and they could do better by scrapping it, which they did.
My intention, however, isn’t to slam Albrecht or the Moravian Church, it’s to point out that like the notion that every frontiersman had at least one trusty rifle with which he was an expert hanging over the door ready to go…which by every primary source I’ve found to date wasn’t true among Palatines as late as 1763… the actual accomplishments of the early Moravians could probably also stand some scrutiny, both in output of rifles and exactly who outside of their closed community they influenced or trained. The evidence points to Johannes Moll, not Andreas Albrecht, as the first gunmaker 19-year-old farmer Peter Newhard came in contact with.
http://books.google.com/books?id=VEIOV3P9rHwC&lpg=PA140&ots=oRp99tEz4x&dq=andreas%20albrecht%20gunsmith&pg=PA31#v=onepage&q=andreas%20albrecht%20gunsmith&f=false
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Great debate here, backed by scholarship. I'm a research scientist so enjoy seeing how historical research works. Long held and oft-repeated beliefs (a word full of meaning) are sometimes difficult to study with any objectivity. Knowing it or not, we often look for data that is supportive of our own points of view, discounting or finding potential weaknesses in evidence that is not supportive, and amplifying or emphasizing data that is supportive. One of the best ways to eliminate bias is to set the parameters for gathering data and analyzing data in advance of the study. An example in historical research like this would be to identify a number of towns in Pennsylvania or anywhere else that could be considered "frontier" at that time, and examine the prevalence of different types of guns in probate records, compared to other commodities we "know" were present in every household (chairs or tables for example) over a specified timeframe. This has the potential for eliminating under-reporting in probate records of items that were given away before or at the time of death. Another useful technique is to compare data from probate records from one area to another, though methods of inventorying household goods may vary quite a bit. At the end of the day, however, many grasp dearly held notions all the way to the grave, regardless of emerging new data. And all researchers have a strong drive to conclusion, whether a conclusion is premature or not.
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Albrecht had gone through the apprentice system in Europe and the Journeyman phase so thinking he was only a gunstocker for the army shows a lack of understanding of the process of producing gunmakers in Germany.
Whisker page 31:
"I was born in the little town of Celle...when I was thirteen I became the apprentice of a gunstock maker..."
In Albrecht’s own words he describes that he was apprenticed to a gunstocker for four years, then as a journeyman became a gunmaker’s helper for another four years. Then he was accepted into the army as a gunstocker for 8 years. He doesn’t mention standing for the rigorous master’s examination of the time as a gunmaker…you’d think he would have if he had…and by his own admission the vast bulk of his experience was repairing musket stocks broken by soldiers and replacing ready-made government parts.
That he didn’t know how or didn’t care to toss a buttstock in a few gallons of boiling water for an hour so he could correct the severe grain runout at the toe by bending before the final shaping of his blank isn’t particularly impressive. Neither is Christian Springs, the so-called font of early riflemaking, having three adults turning chair parts and only one part-time gunmaker as late as 1759. More impressive is that by 1762 the Moravian Church came to the conclusion that like all utopian schemes since the dawn of man, their communal economy provided few incentives to work either smarter or harder, and they could do better by scrapping it, which they did.
My intention, however, isn’t to slam Albrecht or the Moravian Church, it’s to point out that like the notion that every frontiersman had at least one trusty rifle with which he was an expert hanging over the door ready to go…which by every primary source I’ve found to date wasn’t true among Palatines as late as 1763… the actual accomplishments of the early Moravians could probably also stand some scrutiny, both in output of rifles and exactly who outside of their closed community they influenced or trained. The evidence points to Johannes Moll, not Andreas Albrecht, as the first gunmaker 19-year-old farmer Peter Newhard came in contact with.
http://books.google.com/books?id=VEIOV3P9rHwC&lpg=PA140&ots=oRp99tEz4x&dq=andreas%20albrecht%20gunsmith&pg=PA31#v=onepage&q=andreas%20albrecht%20gunsmith&f=false
To have an informed discussion on the "gunstocker" we would need to understand what the trade really was and what the training entailed.
Then we would have to know what he was exposed to during his journeyman phase, which in this case apparently lasted about 5 years.
Pg 142 of "Moravian Gunmaking of the American Revolution" shows a gun lock signed by and attributed to Albrecht. If he made this lock its far better quality than many of the locks used on guns and rifles in America. A great many of the imports were little better than junk and this could be why there are shop made locks in this book.
Perhaps he picked these skills up during his 9 or so years in the civilian gun trade before joining the Army. Maybe it was part of his training. Did he have to have lock making skills to work as a gunsmith in the Army? There is also a coffee mill signed by Albrecht. Did he cast the bowl and make the other metal parts? We don't know. But repairing coffee mills and other mechanical devices fell to the smiths and lockmakers of the Moravians. The "lockmaker" also stocked guns and rifles. So apparently he was either a gunstocker who made door locks or a doorlock maker that stocked guns. I know some skilled gunstockers who never had any instruction what-so-ever.
Having the skill to be a master did not mean you would be a master. This was decided by the other masters and required both the skills but also the perceptions of the other master who may or my not agree to have another in the guild. So regardless of skill, personality or to many masters could keep a person from ever being a master. I would also point out that apprentices were not simply accepted, they had a period of time to show some ability and if they lack the ability they were then rejected by the guild. Nor was it possible to simply be apprenticed. A butchers son for example could not become a gunstocker. The FATHERS trade would determine if the boy would even be considered.
You were trying to write off Albrecht as nothing more than a musket repairer, which you then repeated above. I submit that he was more than this.
So far as the grain flow? Who knows where the truth lies. Maybe there were time constraints. Putting wood in boiling water is going to greatly increase to time needed to stock a gun since the wood is going to have to be allowed to normalize again, weeks at least, before doing any thing further. At least I would never trust it until I was sure it had normalized again.
"Dry" precarved stocks that arrive in the west from the east are not really useable for several weeks since immediately inletting parts can result in massive changes in the inletting. The technical term is "Gaposis".
Not much of a problem with bows or chairbacks or cabinets and most carpenter work but its poison in guns. A gap that is "normal" in carpenter work is a massive error in firearms where the fit should be to .001" max.
A friend got some stock wood in recently and it checked so bad after arrival its now useless. He now wishes he had painted or "glued" the end grain but he thought it was dry. And he is not without experience.
Its possible to make a gun from a "dry enough" stock and have it warp and gap afterwards because its too new.
I can't see carefully drying a plank or blank to normalize so it will maintain its shape and size fairly well then tossing it in hot water. If you have lot of time it might be OK, if you can keep it from warping when it drys again but if you have to have a gun out the door in a week or two?
Gunstocks need not be wet to bend BTW.
I have seen finished high grade shotgun stocks bent for cast off and drop with a jig and a couple of heat lamps.
Dan
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More impressive is that by 1762 the Moravian Church came to the conclusion that like all utopian schemes since the dawn of man, their communal economy provided few incentives to work either smarter or harder, and they could do better by scrapping it, which they did.
This says a lot about your attitude about utopian experiments. It is uninformed about the particular utopian experiment that you are discussing. Or do you have some evidence of any sort whatsoever that Moravian craftsmen and craftswomen worked less "smart" or "hard" than others? You do recognize that this was a "utopian" experiment, which, one would think, would lead to some reflection on the fact that profit was not the primary goal of these trades and crafts. And yet repeatedly you seem to assess the "success" of the experiment on whether it produced as much profit as it could. It seems like you can't conceive of a social and economic system designed on other principles. I'd say this assumption is what needs reexamination.
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More impressive is that by 1762 the Moravian Church came to the conclusion that like all utopian schemes since the dawn of man, their communal economy provided few incentives to work either smarter or harder, and they could do better by scrapping it, which they did.
This says a lot about your attitude about utopian experiments. It is uninformed about the particular utopian experiment that you are discussing. Or do you have some evidence of any sort whatsoever that Moravian craftsmen and craftswomen worked less "smart" or "hard" than others? You do recognize that this was a "utopian" experiment, which, one would think, would lead to some reflection on the fact that profit was not the primary goal of these trades and crafts. And yet repeatedly you seem to assess the "success" of the experiment on whether it produced as much profit as it could. It seems like you can't conceive of a social and economic system designed on other principles. I'd say this assumption is what needs reexamination.
I cannot speak to the Moravians and how communism worked for them.
But communism really does not work very well, this has been repeatedly proven. Some research will show that the Plymouth Colony darned near starved to death before adopting free enterprise in food production. The people who could work could see little point is busting their butts to provide food to others at no gain to themselves.
Dan
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_communism
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Due to insufficient corn production and the discontent of the single young men who resented having to provide for other men's wives and children, Bradford changed the original communal use of land and equal division of the harvest and divided the land in plots to be temporarily assigned to individual families who would retain their harvest for themselves. According to Bradford, this resulted in increased productivity and social stability:
At length, after much debate of things, the Governor (with the advice of the chiefest amongst them) gave way that they should set corn every man for his own particular, and in that regard trust to themselves [...] This had very good success, for it made all hands very industrious, so as much more corn was planted than otherwise would have been by any means the Governor or any other could use, and saved him a great deal of trouble, and gave far better content. The women now went willingly into the field, and took their little ones with them to set corn; which before would allege weakness and inability; whom to have compelled would have been thought great tyranny and oppression.
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Here’s an interesting exchange between Commissioner Benjamin Franklin and Deputy Governor Robert Morris after Franklin had been appointed to organize a Pennsylvania Militia after the 1755 Indian massacres of Moravian missionaries at Gnadenhutten (now Lehighton) and dozens of settlers on the Northampton County frontier.
It highlights how poorly armed and unfamiliar with firearms the predominately Palatine settlers were, and that the Moravians had to acquire firearms from New York to defend themselves. There is also a connection to later Northampton gunmaker Peter Newhard. Emphasis is mine.
(https://americanlongrifles.org/forum/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fpic20.picturetrail.com%2FVOL12%2F1104763%2F23549184%2F396083199.jpg&hash=81e08289f44d374c64a96507ada83904b68d5f85)
Jan 14, 1756 Franklin Diary Entry:
"While the several companies in the city and country were forming, and learning their exercise, the Governor prevailed with me to take charge of our northwestern frontier, which was infested by the enemy, and provide for the defence of the inhabitants by raising troops, and building a line of forts. I undertook this military business, though I did not conceive myself well qualified for it. He gave me a commission with full powers, and a parcel of blank commissions for officers, to be given to whom I thought fit. I had but little difficulty in raising men, having soon five hundred and sixty under my command…The Indians had burned Gnadenhutten, a village settled by the Moravians, and massacred the inhabitants; but the place was thought a good situation for one of the forts. In order to march thither, I assembled the companies at Bethlehem, the chief establishment of those people. I was surprised to find it in so good a posture of defence; the destruction of Gnadenhutten had made them apprehend danger. The principal buildings were defended by a stockade; they had purchased a quantity of arms and ammunition from New York, and had even placed quantities of small paving stones between the windows of their high stone houses for their women to throw them down upon the heads of any Indians that should attempt to force their way into them. The armed brethren too kept watch, and relieved each other on guard methodically as in any garrison town.
In conversation with the (Moravian) bishop, Spangenberg (August Gottlieb Spangenberg 1704 - 1792), I mentioned my surprise; for knowing they had obtained an act of parliament exempting them from military duties in the colonies, I had supposed they were conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms. He answered me, "That it was not one of their established principles; but at the time of their obtaining that act it was thought to be a principle with many of their people. On this occasion however, they, to their surprise, found it adopted by but few." It seems they were either deceived in themselves or deceived the parliament; but common sense, aided by present danger, will sometimes be too strong for whimsical opinions.
It was the beginning of January, 1756, when we set out upon this business of building forts. I sent one detachment towards the Minisink, with instructions to erect one for the security of that upper part of the country; and another to lower part with similar instructions; and I concluded to go myself with the rest of my forces to Gnadenhutten, where a fort was thought more immediately necessary. The Moravians procured me five wagons for our tools, stores, baggage, &c. Just before we left Bethlehem, eleven farmers, who had been driven from their plantations by the Indians, came to me requesting a supply of fire arms, that they might go back and bring off their cattle. I gave them each a gun with suitable ammunition. We had not marched many miles before it began to rain, and it continued raining all day. There were no habitations on the road to shelter us, till we arrived near night at the house of a German, where, and in his barn, we were all huddled together as wet as water could make us. It was well we were not attacked in our march for our arms were of the most ordinary sort, and the men could not keep the locks of their guns dry. The Indians are dextrous in their contrivances for that purpose, which we had not. They met that day the eleven poor farmers above mentioned, and killed ten of them; the one that escaped informed us that his and his companions' guns would not go off, the priming being wet with the rain.
The next day being fair, we continued our march, and arrived at the desolate Gnadenhutten; there was a mill near, round which were left several pine boards, with which we soon hutted ourselves; an operation the more necessary at that inclement season, as we had no tents. Our first work was to bury more effectually the dead we found there, who had been half interred by the country people; the next morning our fort was planned and marked out, the circumference measuring four hundred and fifty-five feet, which would require as many palisades to be made, one with another of a foot diameter each. Each pine made three palisades of eighteen feet long, pointed at one end. When they were set up, our carpenters built a platform of boards all round within, about six feet high, for the men to stand on when to fire through the loop holes. We had one swivel gun, which we mounted on one of the angles, and fired it as soon as fixed, to let the Indians know, if any were within hearing, that we had such pieces; and thus our fort (if that name may be given to so miserable a stockade) was finished in a week, though it rained so hard every other day that the men could not well work.”
Franklin's official report of January 26th, and personal letter to Gov. Morris of January 25th, which give more minute details of the fort, were as follows:
Fort Allen, at Gnadenhutten, Jan. 25, 1756.
Dear Sir:
We got to Hays the same evening we left you, and reviewed Craig's Company (the Scots-Irish militia company at Craig’s Settlement) by the way. Much of the next morning was spent in exchanging the bad arms for good - Wayne's Company having joined us. We reached, however, that night to Uplinger's (at Fort Lehigh), where we got into good Quarters.
Saturday morning we began to march towards Gnadenhutten, and proceeded near two miles; but it seeming to set in for a rainy day, the men unprovided with great coats, and many unable to secure effectually their arms from the wet, we thought it most advisable to face about and return to our former Quarters, where the men might dry themselves and lie warm; whereas, had they proceeded they would have come in wet to Gnadenhutten where shelter and opportunity of drying themselves that night was uncertain. In fact it rained all day and we were all pleased that we had not proceeded. The next Day, being Sunday, we marched hither, where we arrived about 2 in the afternoon, and before 5 had enclosed our camp with a strong breast work, musket proof, and with the boards brought here before by my Order from Trucker's Mill (Wm. Kern's Mill at Slatington, an in-law of Gunmaker Peter Newhard), got ourselves under some shelter from the weather. Monday was so dark with thick fog all day, that we could neither look out for a place to build or see where materials were to be had. Tuesday morning we looked round us, pitched on a place, marked out our fort on the ground, and by 10 o'clock began to cut timber for stockades and to dig the ground. By 3 in the afternoon the logs were all cut and many of them hauled to the spot, the ditch dug to set them in 3 feet deep, and that evening many were pointed and set up. The next day we were hindered by rain most of the day. Thursday we resumed our work and before night were pretty well enclosed, and on Friday morning the stockade was finished and part of the platform within erected, which was compleated the next morning, when we dismissed Foulk's and Wetterholt's Companies, and sent Hay's down for a convoy of provisions. This day we hoisted your flag, made a general discharge of our pieces, which had been long loaded, and of our two swivels, and named the place Fort Allen, in honor of our old friend (Judge William Allen, father of James Allen who laid out Allentown in 1762, and also Chief Justice of the Province). It is 125 Feet long, 50 wide, the stockades most of them a foot thick; they are 3 foot in the ground and 12 feet out, pointed at the top, the figure nearly as opposite.”
Reference:
Busch, Clarence M. Report of the Commission to Locate the Site of the Frontier Forts of Pennsylvania, Vol 1. State Printer of Pennsylvania, 1896. Print. Pp184-224
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I cannot speak to the Moravians and how communism worked for them.
But communism really does not work very well, this has been repeatedly proven.
This is fair enough--and there is no way we can know whether the Moravian experiment in Bethlehem would have similarly collapsed due to problems inherent to communal organizations had it not been dissolved, for other reasons, by the European church after about twenty years. It may very well have.
It's worth noting several things in this regard. First, every resident of Bethlehem was asked, when the matter of dissolving the communal economy arose in the early 1760s, what they wanted. Everybody wanted it to continue; their written responses survive. This is not surprising. The communal arrangement guaranteed all residents housing, clothing, care when they were sick or old; it freed them from the "competitive" world. They had to work hard, and the profits--the surplus value--of an individual's labor did not remain with him (or her). It went to the church and, through the church, to the mission work that underlay the founding of Bethlehem itself. We might not want to live under such a system in which we would not keep the profits of our labor. But the residents of Bethlehem chose this system and chose to continue to live under it. They recognized their place within a larger missionary project that seemed, to them, of crucial importance. Not just important: necessary.
Of course this sample of residents who responded is skewed: those who had no liking for what they called communal "housekeeping" could leave the community. Which is to say: living in Bethlehem was voluntary. They received many, many more applications to join the communal economy than the church authorities accepted.
And, finally, what seems most important to say is that they worked hard, and worked well, because they believed that they were working for "the Savior." They were not compelled to live in, or work in, this social arrangement; they willingly chose it and wrote extensively about how rich their lives were in it. Some may treat this as a ridiculous false ideology; but it seems fair, no matter what we may believe, to recognize that they did believe.
Scott
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If anyone wants to read some very detailed accounts of this Moravian attack, as well as other indian attacks in the Berks and Northampton region, I suggest Rupp's "History of Berks and Lebanon Counties". This book has a number of letters written describing the attacks, from Conrad Weiser and others. These accounts, while sad, also provide insights (the accounts mostly are from 1755). letters describe settlers defending themselves with their own guns in a number of accounts, guards riding out from Reading and exchanging fire with indians, neighbors responding to help their neighbors and firing their guns to scare off the indians, men forming groups and pursuing the indians, too many to include here. Seems to include plenty of evidence of gun ownership by the pa germans. One area even had an informal "fort" where neighbors would gather to defend themselves. The poor farmers (described above in Northampton) were described as such, very poor, and driven off suddenly and essentially naked. Documented in this correspondence also include a Noah Frederick who was killed while plowing - the indians stole his goods including his "good rifle gun". Descriptions are made of a Mathias Boeshore and his defending himself with his "rifle". Understandably guns became in even shorter supply as the indians stole them (of course that is what they would be after). The indians would often attack when the men were working or helpless - one account of men out picking cherries when the women were attacked. The men later went after the indians.
Also interesting is that there were notes indicating that there were french officers directing the indian attacks in Northampton County and setting up "headquarters" in that county. Also interesting is that this book also includes a single pa german estate record for a Lancaster guy (a Michael Burst) who died in 1741 and this estate inventory happened to include "a gun".
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"Common sense." The hobgoblin of research. ;) Tread lightly when going there!
Only Thomas Pain could walk there ;D
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Bob, arms ownership and attitudes among the pre rev war 18th century PA Germans is a topic worthy of further research (at least in my opinion), and I hope you keep it up and keep us posted. I read some of these posts with great interest, especially to references about a cultural aversion to gun ownership by PA German immigrants that stem back to europe (if I am understanding these notes correctly). That is the first time I have heard that notion, and I would be very interested in more information on this. Probably off-point, and boring for many, I am providing some insights from my past research below for anyone interested.
Speaking from what I have found in research, most of these immigrants, my ancestors included, were very poor. Economic distress was the primary reason they left for the new world. One great resource for anyone interested in learning more about the situation and mindset of the PA Swiss and German immigrant of the era is "List of Swiss Emigrants in the Eighteenth Century to the American Colonies" by Faust and Brumbaugh available at most historical society libraries. Unlike its title, it is far more than a list. It provides terrific insights into why people left Switzerland (and the palatinate). It is based entirely on primary documents and manuscripts / records. For example, reasons for emigration included young people that lost their fathers (no parental protection at home / no one to curb their desire to see the world); divorced people and widows / widowers; letters from others that left describing the wonderful new country enticed many. However, by far the reason was poverty. Emigrants described that they worked night and day and could not even afford their daily bread for their family and really had no choice but to leave. As an aside, it is interesting that many of the swiss leaving at this time indicated that they were heading for "the Carolinas". This was because that was the location most widely publicized in switzerland at the time and many ended up in PA.
That all said, most came here very poor in large numbers between 1734 and 1750. Switzerland panicked when so many of their people began to leave, and began instituting penalties and taxes and other obstacles for those who wished to leave. For example in some cases they would not allow their property in Switzerland to be sold. The swiss even tried to socially ostracize those leaving (basically the swiss officials were panicking) because residents were leaving in huge waves.
Speaking in terms of research I did on one family, the story is likely very typical of the immigrants. My ancestor left switzerland in 1749, with so little money that the swiss even waived his emigration tax. He came through Phila in 1749, and settled in Oley township. He worked hard, and by the time he died at the relatively young age of 62 in 1782 he was a wealthy man for the time. His 1782 estate record as a resident of downtown Reading (a town of only about 500 households at the time) included 3 "old muskets" and a pistol (probably more than the avg household though and may not be a good example ). In 1782, how old is "old", maybe 20+ years? Maybe he bought them solely for protection again the indian incursions of the 1750's or 1760's. Why 4 guns? I always assume he hunted with them. Were they really muskets, or was this a generic term for long guns or rifles of any type? Were they american made? It is interesting, however, that I have come across very few estate records from the time that reference guns as part of the inventory. Granted this is not something I intentionally looked for. I have even seen numerous gunsmith estates where they did not own whole guns. Did many men give away guns to sons before they died? My ancestor apparently died fairly suddenly without a will or any estate planning.
I can understand, and agree, that it is highly unlikely that these immigrants would have brought any guns with them, save for maybe a very few exceptions, and that any guns they owned here were probably acquired here. However, my perception has always been that when they earned enough money they bought themselves a gun. The PA archives include a number of passages that describe how militia men were compensated for rifles that they lost to the british at Long Island and Brandywine in 1775 and 1776. I would think it likely that these rifles pre-dated 1775 and that the residents had them for some time. I doub t that they were made solely for military purposes. Probably the schriet rifle was one of these, which appears to be to be a rifle made for private use and not military, in 1761. And we know that gunsmiths already had functioning shops almost as soon as they arrived (Hachen at least as early as 1752 and likely as soon as he settled). Assuming that many of the guns were made for indian trade, I always thought there would be alocal commercial trade for purchase by the resident immigrants also. Reading had several gunsmiths before 1760 and settlement only got going there in about 1750. We also know thst shop owners such as Conrad Weiser were selling guns in their shops as early as the 1750's and similar to indian trading, traded guns for various labor and services by settlers.. Issues like those in Northampton (lack of arms) were probably because of the great number of impoverished new settlers and lack of a gunsmith or shop selling guns (which is probably why Moll moved there late in 1763 to take advantage of a new market and help the residents in defense).
Sorry for rambling - I guess in my long-winded way my point is that based on my own limited research my own hypothesis is that many PA Germans simply were poor and purchased guns once they could afford them, once they had a town gunsmith that could provide them, or had a local shop that sold them.. But would welcome evidence that they did not want to own guns, as I am solely interested in the real story! I would think that the british letter you show on the first page of posts is probably accurate, describing how rifles are made in numerous areas of pa prior to 1775 and that these were for private purchase and not to arm militia.
Maybe all of those Swiss were heading to Newbern, NC, the town had good press back in Europe.
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Shortages of guns of any type weren’t limited to Northampton County, but anywhere where Palatine settlers predominated.
In Berks County, Conrad Weiser (1696-1760), Pennsylvania’s most qualified diplomat to the tribes and Benjamin Franklin’s fellow commissioner tasked to establish frontier forts, writes to Deputy Governor Morris Nov 19, 1755. Emphasis mine.
"Honored Sir:
On my return from Philadelphia I met in the township of Amity, in Berks County, the first news of our cruel enemy having invaded the country this side of the Blue Mountain, to wit, Bethel and Tulpenhacon. I left the papers as they were in the messengers hands, and [hastened] to Reading, where the alarm and confusion was very great. I was obliged to stay that night and part of the next day, to wit, the 17th of this instant, and set out for Heidleberg, where I arrived that evening. Soon after, my sons Philip and Frederick arrived from the pursuit of the Indians, and gave me the following relation, to wit, that on Saturday last about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, as some men from Tulpenhacon were going to Dietrich Six's place under the hill on Shamokin Road to be on the watch appointed there, they were fired upon by the Indians but none hurt nor killed. (Our people were but six in number, the rest being behind.) Upon which our people ran towards the watch-house which was about one-half a mile off, and the Indians pursued then, and killed and scalped several of them. A bold, stout Indian came up with one Christopher Ury, who turned about and shot the Indian right through his breast. The Indian dropped down dead, but was dragged out of the way by his own companions. (He was found next day and scalped by our people.) The Indians divided themselves in two parties. Some came this way to meet the rest that was going to the watch, and killed some of them, so that six of our men were killed that day, and a few wounded.
The night following the enemy attacked the house of Thomas Bower, on Swatara Creek. They came to the house in the dark night, and one of them put his firearm through the window and shot a shoemaker (that was at work) dead upon the spot. The people being extremely surprised at this sudden attack, defended themselves by firing out of the windows at the Indians. The fire alarmed a neighbor who came with two or three more men; they fired by the way and made a great noise, scared the Indians away from Bower's house, after they had set fire to it, but by Thomas Bower's diligence and conduct was timely put out again, so Thomas Bower, with his family, went off that night to his neighbor Daniel Schneider, who came to his assistance. By 8 of the clock parties came up from Tulpenhacon and Heidleberg. The first party saw four Indians running off. They had some prisoners whom they scalped immediately, three children lay scalped yet alive, one died since, the other two are like to do well. Another party found a woman just expired, with a male child on her side, both killed and scalped. The woman lay upon her face, my son Frederick turned her about to see who she might have been and to his and his companion's surprise they found a baby of about 14 days old under her, wrapped up in a little cushion, his nose quite flat, which was set right by Frederick, and life was yet in it, and recovered again.
Our people came up with two parties of Indians that day, but they hardly got sight of then. The Indians ran off immediately. Either our people did not care to fight them if they could avoid it, or (which is most likely) the Indians were alarmed first by the loud noise of our people coming, because no order was observed. Upon the whole, there is about 15 killed of our people, including men, women and children, and the enemy not beat but scared off. Several houses and barns are burned; I have no true account how many. We are in a dismal situation, some of this murder has been committed in Tulpenhacon Township. The people left their plantation to within six or seven miles from my house (located at the present town of Womelsdorf) against another attack.
Guns and ammunition [are] very much wanted here, my sons have been obliged to part with most of that, that was sent up for the use of the Indians. I pray your Honor will be pleased, if it lies in your power, to send us up a quantity upon any condition. I must stand my ground or my neighbors will all go away, and leave their habitations to be destroyed by the enemy or our own people. This is enough of such melancholy account for this time. I beg leave to conclude, who am,
Your very obedient,
CONRAD WEISER.
And Frenchmen? There were plenty of Frenchmen.
Oct 16, 1767
"Honored Sir:
According to my last I went up to John Harris's Ferry to visit Capt. Busse… he informed me that on the 12th instant, a French deserter or spy came down the hill near Fort Henry, and made towards Dietrich Six's house, which the sentry of the fort observing, acquainted the commanding officer of the fort thereof, who sent an officer and two soldiers to seize and bring him into the fort, which was accordingly done. I ordered, by express, my son Samuel, who commanded at the fort on Sweetara (Swatara), to march with a ranging party with all possible speed and care and take the said prisoner and convey him safe down to my house in Heidelberg, where he arrived safe with the prisoner about noon yesterday. I examined the prisoner by such an interpreter as I could get, but thought fit to bring him down hither to have a more full examination by the assistance of Capt. Oswald and Mr. James Read, and accordingly came here with him last night. The paper enclosed and a fuse were found in his possession. The examination I left to Capt. Oswald and Mr. Read, who will transmit a fair copy to your Honor. As I've no men to spare in this dangerous time, and Capt. Oswald hath been so kind as to offer a party of the Regulars under his command here to guard the prisoner to Philadelphia, I have accepted his offer, and accordingly put him into custody of the guards appointed by the Captain, which I hope will not be disagreeable to your Honor.
I am, Honored Sir,
Your most humble servant,
CONRAD WEISER."
(Penn. Arch., iii, p. 293.)
We have then recorded the examination of the prisoner at Reading… his name was Michael La Chauviguerie Junior, and his age seventeen. His father was a lieutenant of French Marines and Commandant of Fort Machault, just building, which was 72 leagues up the Allegheny River from Fort Du Quesne (Pittsburgh) and near the Lakes. The son had been given command of a party of 33 Indians, principally Delawares, who were sent out on a marauding expedition. As they neared the Blue Mountains he tells the sad tale of prisoners taken and numerous deserted homesteads. By accident one day he dropped a piece of bread and whilst looking for it his party of Indians became separated from him and he found he was lost. After wandering around for seven days he was forced to surrender at Fort Henry to save himself from starvation.
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I cannot speak to the Moravians and how communism worked for them.
But communism really does not work very well, this has been repeatedly proven.
This is fair enough--and there is no way we can know whether the Moravian experiment in Bethlehem would have similarly collapsed due to problems inherent to communal organizations had it not been dissolved, for other reasons, by the European church after about twenty years. It may very well have.
It's worth noting several things in this regard. First, every resident of Bethlehem was asked, when the matter of dissolving the communal economy arose in the early 1760s, what they wanted. Everybody wanted it to continue; their written responses survive. This is not surprising. The communal arrangement guaranteed all residents housing, clothing, care when they were sick or old; it freed them from the "competitive" world. They had to work hard, and the profits--the surplus value--of an individual's labor did not remain with him (or her). It went to the church and, through the church, to the mission work that underlay the founding of Bethlehem itself. We might not want to live under such a system in which we would not keep the profits of our labor. But the residents of Bethlehem chose this system and chose to continue to live under it. They recognized their place within a larger missionary project that seemed, to them, of crucial importance. Not just important: necessary.
Of course this sample of residents who responded is skewed: those who had no liking for what they called communal "housekeeping" could leave the community. Which is to say: living in Bethlehem was voluntary. They received many, many more applications to join the communal economy than the church authorities accepted.
And, finally, what seems most important to say is that they worked hard, and worked well, because they believed that they were working for "the Savior." They were not compelled to live in, or work in, this social arrangement; they willingly chose it and wrote extensively about how rich their lives were in it. Some may treat this as a ridiculous false ideology; but it seems fair, no matter what we may believe, to recognize that they did believe.
Scott
It must be taken into account that until 1760 they were financially supported from Europe.
The funding dried up after 1760. So they were then forced to privatize more and more as the life style probably degraded. It was also basically a religious cult raising the children communally and indoctrinating them I am sure. Some were likely afraid to be on their own.
Dan
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Moravian Christianity is and has been mainstream and is not considered a cult. But let's stick to longrifles.
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Bob, This is the first I have heard of Christopher Ury being involved in the
Moravian attack. I believe that my ggggg grandfather Christopher Stophel Oury
1742-1824 who was married to Catherina Rupp, may have been the nephew of
this Christopher Ury. My Christopher had a brother
Adam. Their father was Nicolas "Peter" Ury. This Oury family moved from Berks
County, later split off as Northumberland, to Armstrong County along with the
Rupp, Frantz and Schrecongost families and established the first Lutheran church
here. Interestingly Christopher Ury is said to have been married to the daughter
of a full blooded indian. Unverified, but in several written histories.
Great research on your part and much appreciated.
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It's all right here, Rob...and easy to get at:
http://www.usgwarchives.org/pa/1pa/1picts/frontierforts/frontierforts.htm
I had bits and pieces of it, but HIB's tip provided this clean copy. Careful trying to print more than you need....it's huge.
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Putting wood in boiling water is going to greatly increase to time needed to stock a gun since the wood is going to have to be allowed to normalize again, weeks at least, before doing any thing further. At least I would never trust it until I was sure it had normalized again.
Gunstocks need not be wet to bend BTW. I have seen finished high grade shotgun stocks bent for cast off and drop with a jig and a couple of heat lamps.
OK. Here’s an aside from my trade that does relate to 18th-Century gunmaking techniques:
Once wood is fully airdried to equilibrium with the outside air, it can be boiled or steamed for an hour or so without absorbing any serious moisture at all. Once the inside of all those cellulose cells are dry, it takes a lot more than a short stint in a cauldron or steambox to put that water back. Try it using a good moisture meter before and after to see for yourself. A week at the most resting under the workbench, and the blank could be inletted.
(https://americanlongrifles.org/forum/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fpic20.picturetrail.com%2FVOL12%2F1104763%2F21637099%2F394667310.jpg&hash=f05fc27ebfdfbe00098242312c0aa0151bc46816)
For example, here are air-dried Doug Fir laminations @ 12% MC being boiled in a bucket for 40 minutes, then clamped in place as boat knees overnight to take a set before gluing, shaping and installing. They are still 12% after boiling...otherwise there’d be problems gluing, priming and painting.
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And Douglas Fir is extremely stiff and difficult to bend compared to maple and walnut, which are quite easy. (That's why these knees are being laminated instead of bent whole) Once you get the core of the wood up to 180 degrees or so, those woods bend like wet noodles. But like in service, the more grain runout there is at the wrist, the greater the risk of cracking and the weaker the resulting product.
I also occasionally bend gunstocks using heat in the manner you mention…and those 18th-Century smiths certainly could have used hot oil instead of boiling water. I’ve just never heard of anyone back then trying – steam or boiling were the techniques used, although for stockmaking oil is a superior method.
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Putting wood in boiling water is going to greatly increase to time needed to stock a gun since the wood is going to have to be allowed to normalize again, weeks at least, before doing any thing further. At least I would never trust it until I was sure it had normalized again.
Gunstocks need not be wet to bend BTW. I have seen finished high grade shotgun stocks bent for cast off and drop with a jig and a couple of heat lamps.
OK. Here’s an aside from my trade that does relate to 18th-Century building techniques:
Once wood is fully airdried to equilibrium with the outside air, it can be boiled or steamed for an hour or so without absorbing any serious moisture at all. Once the inside of all those cellulose cells are dry, it takes a lot more than a short stint in a cauldron or steambox to put that water back. Try it using a good moisture meter before and after to see for yourself. A week at the most resting under the workbench, and the blank can be inletted.
(https://americanlongrifles.org/forum/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fpic20.picturetrail.com%2FVOL12%2F1104763%2F21637099%2F394667310.jpg&hash=f05fc27ebfdfbe00098242312c0aa0151bc46816)
For example, here are air-dried Doug Fir laminations @ 12% MC being boiled in a bucket for 40 minutes, then clamped in place as boat knees overnight to take a set before gluing, shaping and installing. They are still 12% after boiling...otherwise there’d be problems gluing, priming and painting.
(https://americanlongrifles.org/forum/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fpic20.picturetrail.com%2FVOL12%2F1104763%2F21637099%2F392573227.jpg&hash=7dd88a16fbd31bff5b556243e0520817ea05a523)
(https://americanlongrifles.org/forum/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fpic20.picturetrail.com%2FVOL12%2F1104763%2F21637099%2F359943593.jpg&hash=7fc324a67d0a14c66a3fd661b542bff17150662f)
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(https://americanlongrifles.org/forum/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fpic20.picturetrail.com%2FVOL12%2F1104763%2F7081299%2F99960843.jpg&hash=1fbfa60bd8911585a820d6e637633fc32ea7143e)
And Douglas Fir is extremely stiff and difficult to bend compared to maple and walnut, which are quite easy. Once you get the core of the wood up to 180 degrees or so, those woods bend like wet noodles. But like in service, the more grain runout there is at the wrist, the greater the risk of cracking and the weaker the resulting product.
I also occasionally bend gunstocks using heat in the manner you mention…and those 18th-Century smiths certainly could have used hot oil instead of boiling water. I’ve just never heard of anyone back then trying – steam or boiling were the techniques used.
(https://americanlongrifles.org/forum/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fpic20.picturetrail.com%2FVOL12%2F1104763%2F21637099%2F356506370.jpg&hash=5c1394a97ac6f63bfa6d58bfe6cc9a14213bc394)
I understand this. Bowyers steam bow staves and bows cannot be made from wet wood. But bows and boats and chairs are not gunstocks there is little need for tight fits. It possible to build a house with wet wood and it was routinely done in the past and not too distant past. There are a lot of houses in the Anchorage AK area made with fresh cut studs (hemlock?). Came up from Seward rough cut so it could be stacked, I off loaded it of the cars and it went into the stud mill. This stuff was so wet the top layer of the studs would sometimes cork screw in 24-48 hours.
I will not put the time and energy into a piece of wood I am not reasonably sure is stable. I have been down this road to my sorrow before.
It is possible to moisture test a stock as "good" and stock a gun with it and have it shrink away from the metal.
BTDT.
So moisture meters are just a guide. They tell you when the stock is too wet but will not assure the wood is ready to stock. Minor instability is not going to ruin a bow or a chair back and wood boats are usually wet anyway. But, again, gunstocks are not chairs. Having the buttplate or patchbox "grow" larger than the wood in 3 months (or even before the stock is finished) and the fits become sloppy or fingers catch on metal edges is simply not acceptable unless building aged guns.
A dry piece of wood is not necessarily stable and dunking it in boiling water for an hour is not likely to enhance stability.
If you live on the west coast dry wood is only relative, like living in the humid east. We routinely see temps of 100+- and humidity in the teens in summer. As I previously mentioned "dry" stocks can warp and check here. Even precarves need some rest time and these are, supposedly, dry when cut.
Do you have historical documentation for boiling or steaming being used to bend gunstocks?
One must remember that good wood was easier to get back in the day so bending stock blanks before their use was probably not needed it make not have been on the "radar". Until the advent of sport wing shooting gun fits were less important so bending the stock to correct the pointing of the gun was less important.
Dan
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It must be taken into account that until 1760 they were financially supported from Europe.
The funding dried up after 1760.
Dan
It's taken me a few days to get back to this. (The discussion below stems from Kate Engel's Religion and Profit: Moravians in Early America [Penn State UP, 2009] and the page numbers refer to it.)
I am honestly not sure whether Bethlehem did depend on financial support from Europe, but I do not think it did. Engel writes about Bethlehem as if it were self-sufficient (and making sufficient profit to fund missionary work).
In 1770, by John Ettwein's accounting, Bethlehem itself had spent £18,700 on missionary work during the period of the General Economy: the point of his accounting was to show how much the community had contributed--that is, independent of European support. Engel notes that "the trades were the main source of revenue for the Oeconomy" (54) and itemizes the profits of each. In 1752, for instance, Bethlehem's trades made a profit of £1,036. Between Dec 1753 to July 1755, the trades brought in £1,022 of profit--that is, over and above (a) what had been invested in them (supplies, building upkeep, etc.) and (b) the work they had performed for the community itself (which was quantified at £2,500 worth of work). This last is a crucial factor: each tradesman would do work for the community itself and also work for outsiders, the tailor, for instance, producing the clothes that community members received instead of wages, or the butcher producing the necessary meat that the community needed to eat. Other tradesmen contributed most if not all of the other necessaries of life. So the "profits" Engel mentions identify what the trades produced after these trades supplied what the community needed to survive, including, of course, the lumber and stones necessary to build the community itself. The labor was "freely" contributed in exchange for clothing, food, housing, health care, etc.
After Zinzendorf's death, the trades remained profitable: "every year between 1763 and 1771," Engel writes, "the Diacony saw returns of greater than £900" and the profits increased throughout the 1770s (204).
From reading Engel, one is led to think that Bethlehem did not depend on financial support from Europe.
Scott
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1) Do you have historical documentation for boiling or steaming being used to bend gunstocks?
2) I will not put the time and energy into a piece of wood I am not reasonably sure is stable. I have been down this road to my sorrow before.
1) I have historical docuemtation that they used tree crotches, which convinces me they understood the disastrous grain runout I'm talking about very well. But human nature what it is, I'm also sure that just like today, many builders didn't give a hoot how well their work held up across fifty or more years providing the attractiveness of of a figured buttstock garmered them more money today. I'm only suggesting that with bending, you can have both.
2) I've grown, harvested, milled and seasoned dozens of acres of Bigleaf Maple bottomland for profitable music wood since 1975, and the problem with maple is besides being heavier, less stable, and with a weaker strength-to-weight ratio than walnut, is that the figure is largely limited to the sapwood, and the sapwood beneath the limbs or at the butt at that. There is little figure above the crotch. So if you can't use walnut heartwood (a superior wood for gunstocks in every respect), then you'll achieve best results by bending your figured maple blanks so the preponderence of fracture lines are parallel to both the barrel channel and the stock's comb, and then letting the wood rest for at least a week after every major cut or inletting operation. Remember that in figured maple you're working largely is sugar-laden sapwood, which is even less stable and prone to unpleasant surprises.
Further, maple is difficult to season properly...for best results figured maple should be airdried to outdoor equilibrium at the rate of a year to an inch of thickness and then gently vacuum-kilned down to to 7% prior to inletting. From listening to you I suspect you're dealing with wood that's gone from green sapwood@ 100%+ MC to 7% in a mere two or three weeks of oven kilning. Profitable for the mill....but at your expense.
Otherwise notions that the old masters had significantly better wood than you do are probably mistaken concerning sugar maple, a relatively short-lived tree that begins deteriorating at 80 or so years. They simply had more of them to choose from.
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Time for a new thread. Bob, here are some of the projects that I have been involved in.
www.woodenboatrepair
Or google: Moores Marine Yacht Center Beaufort, NC
Danny
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Surviving examples show us that crotch wood was rarely used in the 18th century or before for gunstocks. It became fashionable well into the 19th century.
The best trees with curl will have the figure throughout most all of the tree. Even the small branches will have the wavy grain. Lesser quality trees will have curl in fewer areas. Curl in wood is a genetic condition. Stocks from the root flare often have figure from wood compression. Stocks cut from low on the trunk that take advantage of the root flare (stump cut) are often the best in terms of figure and grain through the wrist. Stump cut stocks were commonly used throughout the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries and still are today when recreating guns from this era.
Maple may be heavier, have a lower strength to weigh ratio and less stable than American Walnut, but it is in my view, positively a superior stock wood for longrifles. Make some longrifles and you will realize this.
In my limited experience with vacuum kiln dried wood, I have found it to be poor to work with as compared to good air dried wood. I've experience very few stability issues with proper air dried wood. I'm pretty picky about such things as well.
Bending a stock prior to shaping may seem like a good idea, but I don't think it's very practical or necessary. As long as the grain is decent and your not using the gun as a club, there will likely be few no problems. I like perfect grain through the wrist and sometimes my guns have this, but sometimes they don't . As long as the grain isn't at a severe angle to the the wrist, I don't consider it to be problematic.
Ideas and thoughts about a subject are one thing, but experience sorts it all out.
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I'll leave the stockwood issue alone as it's fairly off topic, isn't it? :D
Bob, not to be pedantic, but I suppose I shall be nevertheless:
"This is like making the argument that 16 workers were sufficient to service 12,000 stands of arms turning over every few months at the "Allentown Factory" after Philadelphia was evacuated in 1777 and armory operations shifted to Lancaster, Harrisburg and Allentown. Please. Sixteen workers were barely enough just to load and unload the wagons."
I have no idea from where you are deriving the number of 12,000 stands of arms relative to the Allentown facility. In October of 1777, following the evacuation of Philadelphia and the establishment of *one of many such repair operations* in Allentown, John Tyler was begging the council to send along arms for repair: "As we have no very large Quantity of arms here I hope we may receive such a supply from time to time as will keep the people in Employ." Further, the return of December 4, 1777 specifically states that between October 15 and December 4, the operation at Allentown under the direction of Cowell and Tyler received 810 muskets, 36 rifles and 5 carbines for repair. They did not need to stock this many new arms but rather they were diverted to the armory for repair. Cowell directly stated on more than one occasion that he was employing 16 armorers and as late as March of 1778 reinforced this notion within a letter to the Council as he stated that he had constructed a shop suitable for the employment of 16 hands. The numbers indicate a far cry from 12,000: this particular facility was not servicing the entire American army. In Northampton County alone, arms have been shown (via period documents) to have been sent to Bethlehem and Easton for repair likewise. This does not take under consideration the likelihood that individuals were also receiving contracts for smaller repair operations in exactly the same manner as individuals had been in the city of Philadelphia prior to its evacuation (I use the term likelihood as I have seen scant reference to such private contracts in NH County, although scant does not indicate none i.e. the Berlins in Easton, Mathias Muller, Christian Oerter etc.; contrarily, there are numerous surviving advertisements and reference to private hands being employed by the state within the city of Philadelphia). In short, Cowell and Tyler referred to 16 men in their employ as pertaining to the operation under their direction between Sept/Oct 1777 and January 1779. James Carter, apparently sent as some sort of "hall monitor," found the two overseers completely competent to handle the operation/operations on their own. Frederick Hagner's letter of May 20, 1778, also indicates that all was well in NH county and that he had a decent number of arms on hand - @ 800 - and that Tyler and Cowell would shortly have available another 150 apiece.
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Here you go (Moravians):
Main text:
John Moll’s arrival in Allentown was only months after the colonial assembly approved generous funding for raising and arming provincial militia companies after the October, 1763 massacre of 23 people, most of them defenseless women and children, in neighboring Whitehall and Allen Townships, arms being described in desperately short supply.
"NORTHAMPTON TOWN, the 10th, this instant, October, 1763.
To the Honorable JAMES HAMILTON (1710-1783), Esq., Lieutenant Governor and Commander in Chief of the Province of Pennsylvania,
… we found the inhabitants that had neither Guns, Powder nor Lead, to defend themselves, and that Colonel Burd (James Burd 1726-1793) …would assist them with guns and ammunition, and he requested of me to write to your Honor, because the inhabitants of the town had not chose their officers at the time he set off, so we, the inhabitants of the said town hath unanimous chose George Wolf, the bearer hereof, to be Captain, and Abraham Rinker (1741-1820, later brother-in-law to John Moll I) to be Lieutenant; we whose names are underwritten, promise to obey to this mentioned Captain and Lieutenant, and so we hope his Honor will be so good and send us 50 guns, 100 pound of powder, and 400 pound lead, 150 stands for the guns… JOSEPH ROTH, Minister (Mickley 30)”
Perhaps someone in Allentown knew John Moll and asked him to come. Fifty guns provided by the province would only accommodate the militia company, and probably every family who didn’t own a gun wanted one or more. There were no other gunmakers in the immediate area then except the Moravians at Christian Springs, but despite the 1757 expansion of their enterprise mentioned previously, a record dated 1759 (Figure 20 below) lists only one part-time gunmaker there. The Moravians had to import weapons from New York to supply their own needs in 1755, and by 1759 their weapons output likely remained insufficient to service others, as the population of their local communities was 886 and growing. Meanwhile, the general Indian uprising of Pontiac’s Rebellion with all its terror raged throughout the frontier region in 1763 and 1764, with the well-publicized July, 1764 massacre of a schoolmaster and 11 children in Franklin County adding urgency to the community effort to arm themselves. Moll’s primary interest was paid work; the demand for weapons in the Allentown area was immediate and well-funded, and Moll probably sought outside labor to assist. Nineteen-year-old Peter Newhard, talented and ambitious but destined to remain subordinate to an older brother and father in a farming operation long on land but short on cash, could easily have been one of those assistants, bartering training for labor (Busch 184-224; Klees 100; Moravian Historical Society; Silver 66). (Note 18)
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Christian Springs’ 1759 “Distribution of Trades”
Andreas Albrecht is listed as the sole Buechsen Schaefter (gunmaker) at #11 between four nail makers
and three wood turners. As Albrecht also taught music at their school two miles away at Nazareth
during this period, the Moravians were producing more sets of chairs than they were rifles.
End Notes:
Note 18: Sources conflict. Dennis Kastens states the 1764 tax rolls list a married person (or widower) named Moll rather than single gunmaker John Moll I, who was first listed in 1772. Brent Wade Moll states the 1764 Moll was described as a gunsmith. Some students don’t believe much gunmaking was occurring in the Lehigh Valley outside the Moravian enclaves in the early 1760’s, which favors Kasten’s version. I’ve used Moll’s version because it coincides with a John Moll’s Sep 1763 sale of his Berks County land and gunsmith shop a few months before appearing in Allentown in 1764. This was land either he or his father perhaps acquired circa 1750, the date a John Moll appears on neighboring land warrants (Berks County courthouse in the Recorder of Deeds Office for Rockland Twp). The Indian uprisings throughout the summer of 1763 culminating in attacks in Northampton County in October mentioned in the first paragraph also support the Moll version, because the result was an urgent request for arms and ammunition, which were described as being in short supply, and 24,000 English pounds were soon appropriated by the Colonial Assembly for raising and equipping an 800-man defense force. Local gunmakers and merchants selling guns were clearly busy and well-funded by 1764, albeit with workaday muskets, fowlers or trade-gun types rather than the works of art most likely to survive. Further, Joseph Mickley also mentions Abraham Rinker (1741-1820) as the lieutenant of the local volunteer defense company in October 1763. Rinker was the older brother of Lydia Rinker (1749-unk) who married John Moll I in 1772. The newly-arrived stranger Moll couldn’t have married into the Rinker family without a close, longstanding relationship that probably began with Moll servicing Rinker’s defense company with weaponry in 1764. Strings of coincidences usually aren’t.
References:
Busch, Clarence M. Report of the Commission to Locate the Site of the Frontier Forts of Pennsylvania, Vol 1. State Printer of Pennsylvania, 1896. Print.
Klees, Frederic. The Pennsylvania Dutch. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1950. Print.
Mickley, Joseph J. Brief account of murders by the Indians, and the cause thereof, in Northampton County, Penn'a., October 8th, 1763 [database on-line]. Provo, UT: The Generations Network, Inc., 2005. Original data:,. Brief account of murders by the Indians, and the cause thereof, in Northampton County, Penn'a., October 8th, 1763. unknown: unknown, 1875. Web.
Moll, Brent Wade, The Moll Family in Pennsylvania, http://www.angelfire.com/pa5/mollpa/. Web.
Moravian Historical Society, 214 East Center Street Nazareth, Pennsylvania 18064, http://www.moravianhistoricalsociety.org/index.html. Web.
Silver, Peter Rhoads. Our Savage Neighbors. New York: WW Norton and Company, 2008. Print.
Sipe, C Hale. The Indian Wars of Pennsylvania. 2 vols. 1929: Bowie, Md; Heritage Books, 2000. Web
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I have no idea from where you are deriving the number of 12,000 stands of arms relative to the Allentown facility.
Here’s two specific references:
http://www.lehighvalleyhistory.com/lehigh/allentowncity.html
http://www.angelfire.com/pa5/mollpa/revwar.html
A report about the activities of the factory was sent to Thomas Wharten, President of the Supreme Council of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia on May 1lth, 1778:
Your Excellency receives herewith an accurate report about the weapons to be found in my posession ... and how many can be properly repaired until the 20th of this month:
(in my possession in stock)
800 Muskets and bayonets, scabbards 550 Bayonet belts
750 Cartridge pockets
45 Shot bags and 18 Powderhorns 400 Knapsacks
75 Blankets
25 Tent covers
140 Camp kettles
(In John Tyler's possession) 31 rifles
(Ready by the 20th of May)
150 Muskets and bayonets by John Tyler
150 Muskets and bayonets by E. Cowell
These weapons etc, are positively in good condition and we will do our best to finish still more and to serve our country.
Frederick Hagner, Second Lieutenant
July 20th, 1778
It was reported to the War Office that the government still has at least 12,000 stands of arms at Allentown, which can be delivered to militia on the order of the Council.
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Bob, my understanding has always been that arms were removed from Phila (and maybe NY?) since the major cities were under british threat and existing arms were relocated to these more remote facilities. This reference does not mean 12,000 stand were made in Allentown, they were just stored there.
Regarding Moll - note also that even though published secondary sources may not list Moll in the Lehigh Valley between 1764 (where he shows up) and 1772 (where he shows up again) he was likely there. Some tax lists did not survive, others were incomplete, and in many cases past research for published lists was not very comprehensive. In many other cases, names on original lists was so distorted as to be almost unrecognizable ("Noll" instead of Moll as a possible example) - they seemed more interested in collecting the money than name spelling accuracy. Sometimes such ommissions or errors can be tracked by reviewing previous and subsequent lists. It would be interesting for someone in the area, with interest in the subject, to track down all available original tax lists in this timeframe for this vicinity (various municipalities in the area) to review them to see if he shows up on any intermediate lists - he could have lived in several areas around Allentown before settling at one spot permanently.
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???
Hagner's letter is exactly that to which I was referring. He indicates 800 muskets, 31 rifles and that Tyler and Cowell would be able to provide another 150 apiece very shortly. These were repaired arms - a repair may have constituted a cleaning and a snapped frizzen screw, or more, or less. Furthermore, the letters of Hagner, Cowell, Tyler and Carter are all direct from the horse's mouth; the sources you note above are unreferenced and are rehashing rehashed information. Now that I see the text you mention, I do recall reference to Styles - will have to try to find it again - but it is only referring to arms in storage which quite possibly(likely?) never left the proverbial wagons; there has never been any primary reference or indication that arms in that quantity were being serviced, repaired or otherwise addressed by armorers. Allentown certainly did become something of a crossroads for men, materials and munitions ca. late 1777-early 1779, but every primary reference which I have found points towards something of a specialization when it came to repair work - I may be wrong, and I have no problem admitting that, but I do not believe Cowell and Tylers armorers were working on leather, kettles or tent covers. There are a few brief references to a cooper factory in Allentown during the same period as well as contracted saddlers, possibly a hideworks or a 'leather factory' of sorts, although I'm not sure that it was centralized to the extent that Cowell's armory was. I'll go through my paperwork and find Styles' letter as well as a few other things and get back to this shortly...
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July 20th, 1778
It was reported to the War Office that the government still has at least 12,000 stands of arms at Allentown, which can be delivered to militia on the order of the Council.
Here's the document that Bob quotes above (slightly different wording in the original):
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(from Pennsylvania Archives, Ser. 1, Vol. 6, p. 655)
Nothing about there being this many arms "turning over every few months" at Allentown--which would indeed be a prodigious amount of arms!!
Scott
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You beat me to it - I just got back in and took some time to find it. Should have checked here first!
After the British pushed on to Philadelphia and the Committee had an "oh $#@*" moment, they ordered a LOT of things up to Northampton Co. for safekeeping, and in prodigious quantities. The minutes of the committee illustrate this very clearly and descriptively. For example, they sent hundreds - if not thousands - of books belonging to the state upriver to Easton for safekeeping, but I don't believe that this indicates they were all rebound in the process. :P
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My purpose is not to detail the comings and goings of the "Allentown Factory", but to suggest that, given Allentown at the time only had around a hundred adults living there, that the large quantities of arms involved meant that considerable work was probably farmed out to local smiths and joiners. Here’s all I have to say about it:
Main Text:
“Later, John Moll I’s Allentown gunshop was undoubtedly busy with wartime work at a time when he, Peter, and other local gunsmiths also had militia duties between 1777 and 1783. As Philadelphia was about to fall to the British in September 1777, Congress moved federal armory operations to Lancaster, Harrisburg and Allentown. The archived reports from the “Allentown Factory” (Note 21) show it to be a large operation -- “300 muskets will be ready by” …“800 muskets on hand”… “12,000 stands of arms” -- are impressive quantities even today, especially in a town with only 54 buildings and a population of 300, two-thirds of them children. The factory probably used as many skilled workers and subcontractors as it could find, including militiamen Moll, Peter Newhard, and probably also the joinery shop just blocks away owned by a fellow militiaman, Peter Newhard’s younger brother George “Jacob” Neuhard (1752-1835). That may be the explanation for the references in old gun collector’s handbooks to “Allentown gunsmith Jacob Newhardt producing rifles circa 1770-1780”, because besides the armory work, if he were provided with locks and barrels, Jacob could easily have built and signed several rifles in his lifetime (Kastens Vol IV 111, 113, 246, 248; PA Archives Series 5 Vol II, Vol VIII; Kettenburg; Sipple; Brent Wade Moll)
…Family notes tell us that during the Revolutionary War, Peter was kept busy making guns, but he also served in the militia. Northampton County Militia rosters of May, 1778, show a “Peter Neihart” in Captain John Morritz’s 4th Company of the 2d Battalion, a company that fought at the Battle of Brandywine the previous September. (Note 23) Privates Peter Newhard, Jacob Neuhard and John Moll probably spent their militia drill and active-service days working on guns rather than serving as line infantry, regardless of the presence of an armory locally. Militiamen initially supplied their own firelocks, and it would be a foolish company commander indeed to have skilled gunsmiths performing close-order drill when he also had dozens of fragile, farmer-owned flintlocks of various makes, vintages and conditions to rely on for survival, not to mention his government-owned equipment. Last, patriotism and resolve weren’t in short supply among these early Pennsylvania Germans. Peter’s 63-year-old father Michael also served as a private in the 1st Battalion of the Pennsylvania Militia during the war, when the usual age range was 18 to 53 (Gabel on Neihart 25; Kastens Vol IV 111; LDS Genealogical Library; PA Archives Series 5 Vol II, Vol VIII 48).
End Notes:
Note 21: The Kettenburg Pages, combining original, unedited archival records with commentary, is the best reference for studying the “Allentown Factory,” the temporary armory established after British forces forced the evacuation of arms-making and repair facilities from Philadelphia. Surviving archives mention that 16 workers accompanied the evacuated arms and equipment, and from extensive personal professional experience with manpower requirements for modern prepositioned equipment stocks, my (and Kasten’s) view is that the quantities involved were too large for only 16 workers, and that every qualified gunsmith, blacksmith and joiner in the Allentown area were employed along with their workshops at one time or another to repair and maintain these relatively fragile flintlocks (Kastens Vol IV 54).
Note 23: Peter Newhard had a cousin close in age with the same name who was also a militiaman; one of 1737 immigrant Frederick’s sons. Both have early militia records dated 14 May, 1778. From the surname spellings associated with each at the time, “Peter Neihart” serving in the 4th Company, 2d Battalion, 8th Militia Class was probably the gunsmith, and “Peter Neyhard” serving in the 6th Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Militia Class was probably the farmer. Gunsmith “Peter Newhard” also served later in the 8th Company, 2d Battalion, 8th Militia Class under Captain Ritz from 1780-83. In turn, John Moll I served in Captain Wagner’s Company of the 4th Battalion during the war(LDS Genealogical Library; PA Archives Abstract File).
Note 25: Cabinetmaker, occasional gunmaker and later politician George “Jacob” Neuhard (Newhardt) served as a private in brother-in-law Captain George Graff's militia company, and is found in the surviving record of 14 May, 1778. Later he was serving in Captain Shriver’s 3rd Company on 23 April, 1782, and is found as a Captain commanding the 4th Company, 5th Battalion from 1786 to 1789 (LDS Genealogical Library; PA Archives Abstract File).
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"...and that every qualified gunsmith, blacksmith and joiner in the Allentown area were employed along with their workshops at one time or another..."
Absolutely, would agree with you there 100% when you put it that way!
Hair splitting, right? :D
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A friend believes that the number of poorly trained "gunsmiths" that the musket stocking of the American Revolution, and this took place ever where gunmaking was going on, produced was the reason the Golden Age rifles evolved.
We see a lot of rifles that were obviously made by people who did not know what they were doing and the people who could do good work displayed it to show the divide.
I would also point out, and I have not read the entire thread, that there were other places making guns other than Allentown.
Dan
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Almost every published reference on the early “Northampton-Lehigh-Allentown School” talks to Andreas Albrecht being a major player, with many suggesting he could have trained Peter Newhard. I don’t talk to artifacts as that’s not my lane….but from the context and perspective of time, place, events and people, no evidence points to Albrecht. No records exist of any non-Moravian apprentices, the Newhards had no cash to pay for schooling and the Moravians then needed cash more than labor. And only one part-time gunsmith as late as 1759 servicing a Moravian community numbering a thousand following a history of Indian attacks since 1755…because of which Bethlehem had to import guns from New York? The Moravians of the early 1760’s were probably the boutique gunmakers of their day. A tiny operation with little or no impact on the surrounding communities. Whatever contributions they made probably came later.
The evidence strongly points to John Moll I, instead. Brutal Indian attacks for which the Allentown area was badly unprepared occur by surprise in Oct 1763, 24,000 English Pounds are finally appropriated to pay, arm and equip a serious provincial militia, and Moll is in place in Allentown making guns within months, if not weeks. At the exact same time Moll is probably looking for assistants to help him reap some of that money by exchanging training for labor, Peter Newhard is a talented and ambitious but frustrated 19-year-old farmer destined to spend the next 30 years subordinate to a father and older brother in a farming operation long on land but short on cash. Later, the newcomer Moll marries the younger sister of the 1763 local militia company lieutenant. And later still, Moll’s #1 gunmaker son and grandson both marry Newhard women. Whether you characterize it as wild-eyed speculation or logical deduction, strings of coincidences usually aren’t.
And here’s one of several references to Allentown jointer Jacob Newhard making guns:
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PS....just like there are problems sorting out gunmaker Peter Newhard from his farmer cousins with the same name, there were also at least three John Molls.
http://www.digitalarchives.state.pa.us/archive.asp?view=ArchiveIndexes&ArchiveID=13
Revolutionary War militia records are badly incomplete and most only begin in 1778, but they list John Molls in Northampton, Berks and Northumberland Counties.
So there is still a Berks John Moll existing at the same time Allentown John Moll is.
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Bob,
I agree that anything that suggests that Albrecht might have trained Newhard is pure speculation and the suggestion itself is unlikely, unless Newhard was Moravian? The Moravians accepted many non-Moravians into their schools but not (I think) into their apprentice systems. And I think you're right that there seems not to have been substantial gun production from the Moravians in the period right after 1755. So if "major players" mean "producers of large amounts of rifles," you're surely right. If "major players" means "having a significant influence on styles," amount of production isn't necessarily a factor. Others more skilled in tracing the transmission of regional styles would have to weigh in on that one.
When the gunshop opened in Christian's Spring in 1762, however, the "investment" (for lack of a better word) of the Moravians in gunmaking and the volume of their production may have altered significantly. Bob Lienemann's introduction to MGMAR notes that there were over 300 gunstock blanks in the 1762 Christian's Spring inventory; in the 1764 inventory there were 233 gunstock blanks (which could mean that some 70 or more had been used since the 1762 inventory?) along with 15 English made barrels. We know, too, that Albrecht had apprentices working under him, including Oerter in 1763 and after. So, by 1762, the Moravians seem to have committed to an master/apprentice system with regards to gunsmithing that was expected to produce significant amounts of product.
I don't know why it needs to be either Moll or the Moravians. By the early 1760s, it seems like there could have been varied sites of significant gun production in the area.
If I am drawing unwarranted conclusions from the information in these inventories, I hope somebody will let me know.
Scott
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The Moravians accepted many non-Moravians into their schools but not (I think) into their apprentice systems.
When the gunshop opened in Christian's Spring in 1762, however, the "investment" (for lack of a better word) of the Moravians in gunmaking and the volume of their production may have altered significantly. Bob Lienemann's introduction to MGMAR notes that there were over 300 gunstock blanks in the 1762 Christian's Spring inventory; in the 1764 inventory there were 233 gunstock blanks (which could mean that some 70 or more had been used since the 1762 inventory?) along with 15 English made barrels. We know, too, that Albrecht had apprentices working under him, including Oerter in 1763 and after. So, by 1762, the Moravians seem to have committed to an master/apprentice system with regards to gunsmithing that was expected to produce significant amounts of product.
Moravians didn't open up pay schools to outsiders until almost 30 years later. And that was the general academy at Nazareth. There is no record of any non-Moravian apprentices in their trade schools, and they kept meticulous records.
I don't dispute anything in MGMAR…in fact those records of gunstock use track nicely with my own conclusions based on the outside demand and funding available. I’m saying that the evidence of a Moll-Newhard link occurring completely outside of the (then) insular Moravian sphere is vastly stronger. While I don’t write about it, that Albrecht was only a part-time gunmaker before 1762 and was married and gone by 1766 is significant to how great or small his contributions there.
But given all the evidence pointing to less than half the Palatine families being armed even as late as 1763, the total demand in Northamption was likely in hundreds if not thousands of guns, not scores.
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Sigh.
Your claim that "Moravians didn't open up pay schools to outsiders until almost 30 years later" is either off-topic (if you mean to stress "pay", which wasn't the issue) or simply and completely mistaken. You are, I suspect, thinking of one particular Moravian educational institution. But many Moravian communities had day schools that non Moravians could attend. The school in Lancaster, begun in the 1740s, had many non Moravian students, including Mennonites, in the 1750s and after.
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Your claim that "Moravians didn't open up pay schools to outsiders until almost 30 years later" is either off-topic (if you mean to stress "pay", which wasn't the issue) or simply and completely mistaken. You are, I suspect, thinking of one particular Moravian educational institution. But many Moravian communities had day schools that non Moravians could attend. The school in Lancaster, begun in the 1740s, had many non Moravian students, including Mennonites, in the 1750s and after.
Context: Northampton School.
You're right, of course. As you point out the limitations of some readers to follow context, I should probably amend it to read, "The Northampton County Moravians didn't open up "pay schools" to outsider until almost 30 years later.
And those are Moravian words, not mine:
http://www.moravianhistoricalsociety.org/education/nazWalkTour-3.php
In 1759 the school for Moravian boys needed a larger home, and it was decided to move the school from Bethlehem to the Manor House in Nazareth. It was a boarding school, and the boys and their teachers both lived and studied together. By 1783 the school became a "pay school," open to the sons of non-Moravians as well as Moravians for a fee. Nazareth Hall continued at this location until the school was closed in 1929.
Something like this:
"Moravians immigrated to Northampton County in 1740 and 1741 in groups sufficiently large they would have required some initial help to successfully overwinter on the frontier. They still considered themselves part of the Lutheran denomination, and German Protestant churches generally cooperated well with each other in frontier communities, the different denominations even sharing buildings. Moravians were evangelicals who later opened their schools to non-Moravian children on a cash tuition basis, and their boarding school at Nazareth would later become well known for that practice. Peter’s father by 1740 had log buildings up and a small crop in, and his land was near the route from Philadelphia to the Moravian holdings, so a connection was likely. At Christian Springs Peter would have also come in contact with gunmaker Christian Oerter (1747-1777), who in 1766 took over as master there. Working strongly against the possibility of non-Moravian boys studying under Albrecht or Oerter in the late 1750’s - early 1760's is that Moravian activities were exceptionally well-documented, yet no such apprenticeship records exist. Moravian “pay schools” in the Northampton area open to outsiders didn’t come into being until over two decades later, and during the period Peter was learning a trade, Moravian society there remained relatively closed. Further, the Moravians also needed cash more than labor, and in the late 1750’s cash was scarce among subsistence farmers like the Newhards (Moravian Historical Society, Kettenburg)."
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Apologies for not realizing that your assertion ("Moravians didn't open up pay schools to outsiders until almost 30 years later") was only about Northampton County Moravians. The "context" that shaped my clarification was the several previous mis-statements of fact you've offered in this thread (the 12,000 stands of arms "turning over every few months" in Allentown, the General Economy in Bethlehem "failing" economically), so I read the recent statement as yet another such instance.
Now, about Northampton County. Nobody disputes what you say about the Bethlehem school moving to Nazareth, etc.; the girls school, still in Bethlehem, opened itself to non-Moravian girls in 1785. But there were other Moravian schools in Northampton County besides the particular instance you seem to think exhausts the subject. Are you aware of these other Moravian schools in Northampton County in the 1750s and 1760s?
I'll add, too, that the statement of mine that you felt the need to "correct" for some reason (that "the Moravians accepted many non-Moravians into their schools but not...into their apprentice systems") was mentioned to support your point that Newhard probably did not apprentice under Albrecht. I did not suggest that Newhard might have gone to a Moravian school.
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By the early 1760s, it seems like there could have been varied sites of significant gun production in the area.
You comments about other Moravian schools are noted, thanks. But the issues would be their location and did they charge tuition?
And what other significant gun production in the area circa 1760? Hess, Moll, Rupp et al were all later.
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But what other significant gun production in the area circa 1760? Hess, Moll, Rupp et al were all later.
I thought you had said that Moll was at work in Allentown shortly after 1763? So I was just noting that, since the Christian's Spring gunshop was opened in 1762 and its inventories suggest a significant amount of product, "by the early 1760s, it seems like there could have been varied sites of significant gun production in the area": Moll in Allentown and Albrecht and others in Christian's Spring. About Moll I only know what I've read in your work some time ago. My point was that there's no reason to minimize the Moravians' production at this moment in order to emphasize the significance of Moll's work. We don't really know any figures about "demand," which is the only thing that could lead one to believe that the area couldn't sustain or didn't need the amount of guns these two producers may have been turning out....
Or am I misunderstanding something?
Scott
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You comments about other Moravian schools are noted, thanks. But the issues would be their location and did they charge tuition?
The issues for your study may be their location and whether they charged tuition. But the more general issue that I responded to was whether it is accurate to state that there were no opportunities for non-Moravians to attend a Moravian school until 1783 (either generally or even in Northampton County). Non-Moravians could and did--and in Northampton County. Since forum readers will rely on information posted here for their own research, it's important that it be as reliable as possible (even if, for your study of Moll & Newhard, it doesn't matter that there were other Moravian schools in Northampton county because they were open at the wrong time, or too far away from where we know Newhard was, etc.).
Scott
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Roughly 30 rifles a year (from the stock blank inventories) between 1762 and 1764 is a significant amount of product? With "English" barrel and lock provided, it took one man two weeks to build a rifle.
It sounds like the Moravian "for-profit" enterprise and Moll's operation in Northampton Town began around the same time and on a similar scale....beginning slowly and growing in workers and output as the demand increased as a result of nearby incidents. Notably the October 1763 Whitehall-Allen massacre and the July 1764 massacre of an entire schoolroom in Franklin County.
And my point about Moravian school location and tuition doesn't just apply to the Molls and Newhards. The area had only been settled since around 1740. By 1760 alll the locals surrounding the Moravian communities were still subsistance farmers with very little hard cash on hand to pay for schooling. And except for the missionary schools among the Delawares, all the Moravian schools I'm aware of were established to generate cash. If you know of others, I'm interested.
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None of these other small Moravian schools charged tuition. I'm not talking about schools among the Delaware. None of these schools were large, some didn't last long, but they existed and they taught children.
They may not have been in the area, or have been open at the time period, that is relevant for Moll and Newhard. But they existed in several locations in Northampton County where there were Moravian settlements (or even itinerant ministers) as well as in nearby counties that may have been closer to a resident in Northampton County than other parts of that county.
So, although the difference doesn't matter for your study, it misrepresents the actual situation to state that non-Moravians could not study in Moravian schools until 1783 when the Nazareth academy opened its doors to non-Moravians boys who had families able and willing to pay.
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Roughly 30 rifles a year (from the stock blank inventories) between 1762 and 1764 is a significant amount of product?
By 1760 alll the locals surrounding the Moravian communities were still subsistance farmers with very little hard cash on hand to pay for schooling.
The two inventories with the number of gunstocks on hand does not relate to production. There is no way you can infer the number of guns produced. They could have produced a thousand guns or no guns in the intervening two years. There is no way to tell unless production records are available. It only tells us how many gunstocks were available at that particular point in time.
It is also extremely difficult to ascertain if the farming is subsistence or not. If they are subsistence farmers it would mean they could only produce the food required for their immediate family and have absolutely none for sale. In order to make a claim of subsistence farming the local area and individuals must be studied in detail. You must look at land, estate and tax records and combine them together to try to ascertain the wealth of the area and individuals. Just because someone lives in a rundown log cabin is no indication of their wealth. The farmer that builds the large stone farmhouse might go bankrupt. No difference between then and now. One the best economic studies of southeastern Pennsylvania during the colonial period is James T. Lemon's "The Best Poor Man's Country." Immigrants to Pennsylvania could arrive basically penniless and within ten or twenty years have a substantial fortune.
Mart Keen
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...In order to make a claim of subsistence farming the local area and individuals must be studied in detail. You must look at land, estate and tax records and combine them together to try to ascertain the wealth of the area and individuals.
....Immigrants to Pennsylvania could arrive basically penniless and within ten or twenty years have a substantial fortune.
Actually, I've done exactly that for the 2000 or so members of the extended Neuhart family stemming from six, 1737 German/Alsatian immigrants, with two more families immigrating in 1754 and 1766. Plus a few Molls immigrating in 1731, the Kuntz's immigrating in 1738, and a few Rupps immigrating in 1750.
And everything you say is true....only for the Lehigh Valley area after, not before, the Revolutionary War. Lemon’s book deals with SE Pennsylvania that had been settled since the 1680’s…I’m writing about NE Pennsylvania that wasn’t acquired from the Lenape until 1737. By the period in question in the early 1760's...after only 20 or so years of settlement...farmers were still pulling stumps. All those 2 and 300-acre tracts that would eventually make them wealthy had only around 50 acres cleared and in cultivation by then. For example, gunmaker Peter Newhard's father Michael was one of the wealthiest landowners in Whitehall Tp when he died in 1793, but in 1768 had only 70 acres out of 200 cleared and in cultivation with five grown sons assisting.
Further, while the limestone bottomlands of the Lehigh Valley had lovely loam, forest soils require a decade or more of green manuring via crop rotation before they achieve full productivity. Establishing prosperous farms took decades, not years…it can take several days to pull a 200-year-old walnut tree stump using horses, and weeks to pile and burn them, and some ideal bottomland tracts were abandoned solely because the timber was too heavy. For example Michael’s cousin Frederick (my 5th Great Grandfather) also eventually became one of the wealthiest men in the township, but he lost almost 10 years of progress when he exchanged 200-acre parcels in 1746 to acquire land easier to clear. In 1765 on his new parcel, he was taxed for 305 acres, 8 horses, 7 cattle and 8 sheep, yet he still only had 85 acres under cultivation and had four grown sons working the property.
The Rupps were a rare exception. Married to the Alsatian Von Peterholz family, George Rupp arrived in 1750 already wealthy. His sons Herman and Johannes (John I) Rupp became gunmakers because they wanted to, not because they had to. Their mother was the daughter of a count.
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Fifty acres of cleared land is not subsistence farming. With fifty acres of cleared land you have a lot of surplus grain for sale. Those amounts of cleared land are common no matter where you are in southeastern PA during the colonial period. Most of the farms where not totally cleared of timber until about the 1820's. The Germans would retain large amounts of land so it could be subdivided for their children. The Germans did not believe in primogeniture like the English. All children would receive an equal share of the estate. Farmers during the colonial period could make a nice living on 50 acres of cleared land and definitely increase their wealth. Even today the average size of an Amish farm in southeastern PA is about 30 to 60 acres. It's difficult to farm any more than that with horses or mules for one family.
Mart Keen
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Fifty acres of cleared land is not subsistence farming. With fifty acres of cleared land you have a lot of surplus grain for sale.
Mart Keen
Mart, I take it you are not a farmer? Especially one who uses the methods of farming and the equipment available in the mid-18th Century? And we are not isolated from others like they were then, even among the Amish community who do use horses but have the advantage of well settled areas with good roads and markets to choose from.
On 50 acres you have to graze at least one or two head of cattle and at least one good strong horse (you need the horse for plowing and transportation) maybe raise a hog or two, build a house and a barn (small yes, but you still need them) as well as grow crops for food for you and your family, not just grain. You'll also need a stand of timber in a remote area for future use, there's no lumber yard to get wood from. 50 acres today, especially with hybrid seed and power equipment allows a larger output than the 18th Century farmer ever dreamed of. Especially if you can do without livestock and buy your meat, milk and butter at the grocery store.
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With fifty acres of cleared land you have a lot of surplus grain for sale.
That sounds nice, except that if it was a good year for cereal rye on your farm, it was a good year on everyone else’s farm, too, making the price of surplus often not worth the trip to market. Grain and other produce is bulky, wagons were expensive, and 70 miles to the nearest cash market in competition with older, much more productive farms much closer to the market was a two-week event over unimproved roads.
Plus, in Frederick Neuhart’s example, 85 cultivated acres of slowly-progressing fertility minus 4-6 acres per draft horse, 3-4 acres per cow, 2 acres per sheep times 8 horses, 7 cattle and 8 sheep equals 69 acres minimum just to support your livestock. And Frederick had one of the more prosperous farms then. His oldest son failed entirely at farming between 1762 and 1764 on 250 acres in Mt Bethel Tp, and scraped by making shoes and hunting and trapping until he had the opportunity to join the Continental Army in 1776.
As I said, in the early 1760’s in the Lehigh Valley there wasn’t a lot of cash on hand to support luxuries like school tuition, new rifles, etc, et al.
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Was it large a "cash" economy in this area at this time? I honestly don't know, but much of what I've read about other communities, such as described in Diane Wenger's excellent A Country Storekeeper in Pennsylvania: Creating Economic Networks in Early America, 1790–1807 (2009), point out that shopkeepers would often accept goods in lieu of cash and would keep extensive credit/debit logs that could stretch for years with little cash ever being exchanged. (I realize 1790-1807 is a later period, Bob, than you explicitly mentioned. But I am asking whether we know much about whether there was a cash economy in the pre-Revolutionary period you did mention.) What Wenger notes about Schafferstown was certainly true as well in Bethlehem, where the "stranger's store" carried on a thriving trade with surrounding communities.
We published in 2006 at Lehigh University Press an excellent book, Backcountry Crucibles: The Lehigh Valley from Settlement to Steel, but I cannot recall how much it addresses the question of a "cash economy" in the Lehigh Valley before the Revolution.
Has anything been written that offers evidence about what gunsmiths would take in exchange for their products? That would be interesting.
Scott
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Yes, I do farm and have written on agricultural history. If they are subsistence farming in the Lehigh Valley, how can a farmer afford 8 horses, 7 cattle and 8 sheep? The period of subsistence farming in southeastern PA lasts only about 2 to 3 years for a new settler on virgin soil. You must also remember that initially they got tremendous yields out of the newly cleared land. The soil was much more fertile and large supplies of minerals were returned to the top soil by the burning of the trees and brush. About the time of the Revolutionary War the soils are being depleted, but the use of gypsum returns to the soils to a more productive level. The early settlers also got around a great deal. From Lancaster they routinely went to Philadelphia and New Castle, Delaware to sell grain and this is in the 1720's. They would get to Philly in 3 days and more often then I ever do. Pennsylvania had large surpluses of wheat during the colonial period and much was shipped to Europe at high prices. This may be hard to believe but bread was even shipped to the West Indies from Pennsylvania. That must have been hard bread!
Mart Keen
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... You must also remember that initially they got tremendous yields out of the newly cleared land. The soil was much more fertile...
I suggest you run that one by a soil scientist. Or even your county agent.
... (I realize 1790-1807 is a later period, Bob, than you explicitly mentioned. But I am asking whether we know much about whether there was a cash economy in the pre-Revolutionary period you did mention.)
I'm a rural, West-coast forester. I grow things in an area that was primeval forest only 75 years ago, bought much of my land from the original homesteaders, and in clearing many acres for mixed use, including farming, I can assure you that six inches inside the weathered exterior, all those ancient stumps are still just as sound as they were the day the trees were felled in 1936. Fortunately I no longer have to use picks, shovels, crowbars and horses. I can also assure you that freshly-cleared forest soils are years and decades away from the calendar photos of fertile, Amish farms that come to mind when pondering Pennsylvania, limestone-based alluvial bottomlands notwithstanding.
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Creating even a break-even farm from primeval forest is more akin to the movement of a caterpillar than a greyhound. Starting with rude huts, a few cultivated acres, and years of porridge and venison, the more land you cleared, the more livestock you could support. With growing sons and more livestock still, you could progress at a greater pace….but as I demonstrated earlier, each additional mouth to feed, animal or human, required considerable tillable acreage. Further, children required things that couldn’t be made on the farm or easily bartered for, hence the desirability of a cash-generating trade to supplement the early but small farm surpluses of questionable value.
How long did it take for Lehigh Valley farms established in 1740 to generate cash above and beyond the subsistence level? In my judgment it was the war with its inflated demand and prices. But certainly not after only 20 years or land clearing in 1760.
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Bob:
Is the land you live on in Washington State, covered with conifers or deciduous trees? That makes a big difference on initial soil fertility. I know this is off the subject of rifles but my statement was questioned.
Mart Keen
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children required things that couldn’t be made on the farm or easily bartered for, hence the desirability of a cash-generating trade to supplement the early but small farm surpluses of questionable value.
How long did it take for Lehigh Valley farms established in 1740 to generate cash above and beyond the subsistence level? In my judgment it was the war with its inflated demand and prices. But certainly not after only 20 years or land clearing in 1760.
It should be possible to discover, through research, whether the Lehigh Valley had a cash economy (i.e., how much trade was conducted in cash, whether consumers needed cash to procure what they needed beyond what they could produce): there are day books, ledgers, correspondence, etc., that survive on which to base a study that would yield information about this. Or the pre-Revolutionary LV could be compared to other communities that have been studied--as Bob says, at a similar stage of development with similar natural resources to make the comparison legitimate. Perhaps such studies have already been done (the one that comes to mind, about another community, I've already mentioned).
Anybody read the following?: Michael Kennedy, "The Wheels of Commerce: Market Networks in the Lehigh and Musonetcong Valleys, 1735-1800," in Backcountry Crucibles: The Lehigh Valley from Settlement to Steel (Lehigh University Press, 2006): 208-224.
Without such a study, we are just telling stories. Perhaps children required things that couldn't be bartered for; perhaps barter did the trick. Any evidence for one or the other? Do we know what rifle makers accepted as payment for their product? If cash was short (as it always was), would they accept alternate means of payment?
Nor should different issues be confused (as with the schooling thread). One issue is whether LV farms generated surplus cash (Bob proposes, above, that they did not until at least 1760). Another issue is whether cash was needed (i.e., whether there was a "cash economy") or whether most things could be obtained through other means.
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Is the land you live on in Washington State, covered with conifers or deciduous trees?
Deciduous trees in the alluvial, sandy-loam bottomlands. Just like in Pennsylvania, only predominately Bigleaf Maple with Pacific Crabapple, Vine Maple, Black Cottonwood, Red Alder, Cascara, etc. The gotcha that makes our uplands conifer heaven is bone-dry summers beyond the capacity of deciduous trees not near a watercourse to tolerate, not soil conditions. Red and Yellow Cedar and Western Hemlock can tolerate the winter wet feet of bottomlands, but require firmer soils to thrive. All three species have shallow roots adapted to hardpan glacial till, lacking the taproot of Doug Fir and the like. A 15-ton tree, 180 feet tall only becomes a windthrow in soft soils. A nurse tree or peat producer.
While a commonly-repeated belief, the myth of fertile, virgin forest soils is exactly that. Even the limestone-based, alluvial bottomlands where the walnut trees thrived. They were certainly more fertile that the thin, rocky soils on the shale slopes and plateaus of the Blue Hills/Kittattiny Ridge, but like all forest soils they were way too acidic and too fungus-laden, with either too much or too little humus to support optimum yields of cereal grains requiring more neutral and well-drained soils of uniform texture. As you know, most of those cereal grains had their origins on the grasslands of SE Asia Minor and semi-arid steppes of Western Asia and North Africa, and wouldn’t thrive unassisted on American soils until the tall grass prairie lands of the Midwest opened for settlement. Newly-cleared forest soils require massive applications of ground dolomitic limestone the pioneers didn’t have, and in the absence of that wood ashes and years of sunlight and crop rotation with the turning under and/or burning of residue and green manure to approach the level of tilth, a more neutral pH, and low-fungus environment native grasslands both here and in Asia possessed on Day One.
Pennsylvania Indians knew exactly what they were doing applying controlled burns to forest understories to increase productivity of forage and browse for game animals, and we do the same today. But it’s a mistake to think the few ashes produced change centuries of high-acid, fungus-laden leaf mold into the semi-arid grassland conditions native to cereal grains.
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These posts are somewhat off "rifle" topic, but the question of how goods were paid for is relevent to gun purchases. Did the colonial Pennsylvania Germans barter? From what I have read, that was the primary basis of the frontier economy. Who would have cash? Of course some circulated, but probably not as much as many believe. They surely bartered. And farmers would not trade grain with other farmers, for crops of equal value, they would travel to the towns and trade townfolk for goods that they needed such as hardware, clothing and guns and other merchandise. That's why towns such as colonial Reading set up huge markets in their main streets, to give a place for the farmers to set up. Market days were big events, and these trading days were so popular that large structures were built to house them in Reading prior to the Revolution. People traveled fairly significant distances to make these market days. Therefore obviously rural folk had "extra" goods for the demand to be in place for the "marketplace".
Even townsfolk bartered with each other. For example, stone masons and carpenters helped others build, and traded services for goods and other services. That same exchange occurred between other various trades. People that had acquired some means held mortgages for others, even for properties that they sold (to earn money on "credit"). Incidentally, based on court records, PA Germans took each other to court OFTEN especially for debts due. The British, who generally ran the court system, found these frequent lawsuits to be a curious aspect of the PA Germans. Probably through trading, someone like Moll would have learned of a concentrated demand for guns (and hence want to move to the demand). I would suggest that any narrative or book about this period relevent to exchange of goods and services (especially that tries to establish any assumed commerical operations on this exchange) should include some due diligent research on the barter culture of the day. After all, even as late as the whiskey rebellion in 1794, that rebellion was caused by frontier people that refused to pay taxes on bartered whiskey because they did not have cash.
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I realize it's a later time period and a little farther west, but didn't Leonard Reedy's ledgers reflect bartering,and payment of service with goods? Even simple lock repairs were sometimes repaid over a period of years.
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In my mind there is no doubt colonials bartered then, just like a recession causes an increase in bartering today, at least out here among rural loggers. The off-the-books economy. But besides knowing what various commodities and services were worth in colonial times, one had to be familiar with the exchange rates of half a dozen currencies in use. That headache is how we wound up with a US Treasury Department.
But if I were John Moll and had rifles to sell, it wouldn’t be long before I’d want only cash. A tradesman and not a farmer by 1772, Moll had one small lot in Allentown, one small barn and one cow to feed his young family. He didn’t even own a horse for transportation. There was only so much he could safely store and use. Once the loft was full of fodder for the cow, the frau had a couple-three changes of clothes, the firewood racks and candle bins were overflowing and the larder was full to the extent they’d have trouble using more before it spoiled, he’d have little choice but to ask for cash.
Further, when Peter Newhard died in 1813, he was a wealthy man with 345 acres of prime bottomland at Laury’s near Trucker’s Mill. Yet his estate inventory included “notes outstanding” from Peter Kuntz, David Kuntz, and John Rupp. The wording could go either way, but probably Newhard was extending credit for something….probably gun parts. Based on the markings of this Lockplate, perhaps he was assembling locks in the last years of his life.
(https://americanlongrifles.org/forum/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fpic20.picturetrail.com%2FVOL12%2F1104763%2F23549184%2F392897602.jpg&hash=d8b745ab20c79c42b5f5e9fb778c167beaa13b8c)
Either way it appears he was extending credit to younger gunmakers, perhaps former apprentices or collaborators, as there is little doubt at least David Kuntz was his apprentice.
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And pioneer farmers? One doesn’t have to scratch very deep out here to meet some real pioneer farmers, or their children at least. The two younger lads sitting with their feet dangling over the log floats of their family houseboat cum logging camp are Delbert and Albert Sprague, who my family bought acreage from in 1975, when they were in their 80’s. We went in together to buy their half-section hunting camp. At the time they were living on the farm they had established 50 years earlier, 17 miles closer to civilization.
(https://americanlongrifles.org/forum/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fpic20.picturetrail.com%2FVOL12%2F1104763%2F18228023%2F391181901.jpg&hash=13f8136459a0511afc1ddd005d7a26fbedae7233)
Further, gunmaker Peter Newhard has no shortage of descendants who made their way out here following the logging trade.
This is his cousin Frank Clayton Neyhart (1862-1925) and Frank’s son, Chet (1889-1966), who were in Seattle by 1900 and logging along Hood Canal in Brinnon by 1910.
(https://americanlongrifles.org/forum/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fo.mfcreative.com%2Ff1%2Ffile04%2Fobjects%2Ff%2F6%2F7%2F4f67c440-4117-44e7-aabd-13210df1b8b5-1.jpg&hash=cef4d77cf85f80fe0a1c901779dfb149f37cbf53)
When I wonder what Peter Newhard’s riflemen cousins looked like during the Revolutionary War on their way to Quebec and the Battle of Long Island, this photo of two old-time, misery-whip loggers comes to mind. Lean, hard, determined, tough as nails.
Today their descendants still log and truck-farm on the Olympic Peninsula near the town of Brinnon in the Dosewallips Valley, and raise Standardbred horses in the Tahuya Valley across and down the canal from Brinnon and also above Blaine, Washington, and race them at harness tracks in British Columbia.
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Dont forget the most important trade items, Charcoal, iron, files, planks, salt and credit at the local market.
Y'all haven't mentioned the most important component of early farming: access to water transport, none of the colonials built where there was not a deep creek or river. Just look at a map and that will jump out.
Around Eastern NC farmers took their crop to market in a local sailing scow or coastal skiff of some sort and exchanged it for store credit which could be transfered from on business to another in town.
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We have to be careful in studies of what people did or did not do to not drag in the 19th or 20th century.
The turn of the 20th century influx to this area which resulted in little homesteads all over the place that then starved out or even the people who settled in the 1870s were far different than those that came out in 1840s and these were different than the ones who settled Kentucky in the 1770s.
We have to be careful not to let what WE, today, would do creep into the research. Its very easy to do.
Such as demanding cash. Sure everyone would PREFER cash. But getting it is another thing.
Reedy had been buried for a couple of years before a bill for 62c was paid and it had run for a couple of years before his passing.
A simple look at what 25 cents of even a dime would buy in the 1930s will show that 25 cents was a significant amount of money to common people in the 18th century. As an example Reedy charged 33c for a bullet mould.
So why did he do this?
His neighbors needed their firearms repaired. It was likely pretty important, not optional perhaps, so he fixed the guns on TIME or took barter.
Dan
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While a commonly-repeated belief, the myth of fertile, virgin forest soils is exactly that. Even the limestone-based, alluvial bottomlands where the walnut trees thrived. They were certainly more fertile that the thin, rocky soils on the shale slopes and plateaus of the Blue Hills/Kittattiny Ridge, but like all forest soils they were way too acidic and too fungus-laden, with either too much or too little humus to support optimum yields of cereal grains requiring more neutral and well-drained soils of uniform texture. As you know, most of those cereal grains had their origins on the grasslands of SE Asia Minor and semi-arid steppes of Western Asia and North Africa, and wouldn’t thrive unassisted on American soils until the tall grass prairie lands of the Midwest opened for settlement. Newly-cleared forest soils require massive applications of ground dolomitic limestone the pioneers didn’t have, and in the absence of that wood ashes and years of sunlight and crop rotation with the turning under and/or burning of residue and green manure to approach the level of tilth, a more neutral pH, and low-fungus environment native grasslands both here and in Asia possessed on Day One.
If the virgin soils are so acidic, how did Pennsylvania become an exporter of wheat during the colonial period? Exporting means you are way beyond subsistence farming. Our topsoils have a pH of about 6.5 with no additions, perfect for the uptake of nutrients by a plant. Lime burning did not enter the picture until the 1820's.
While bartering was going on for small purchases, cash was also being used during the colonial period. When you purchased land from the Penns you paid with cash. The ledgers and journals of the receiver general are filled with nothing but cash transactions. Only the very first settlers could pay their yearly quitrent of 1 shilling per 100 acres with wheat. I've never seen a deed in Lancaster County where the land was paid for with anything other than cash.
The pioneer settlers were doing quite well on their "subsistence" farms. Hans Hess arrived in 1717 with basically nothing and when he died in 1733 he had 65 pounds of cash in his chest and another 56 pounds loaned out to other individuals. Michael Greider arrived about 1724 and died in 1740 with 82 pounds in cash and clothing and another 100 pounds loaned out to other individuals. They are just poor dumb farmers on their "subsistence" farms.
Mart Keen
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Edith Cooper in the book: The Kentucky Rifle and Me, states that the gunsmith, Joseph Long, "would take a gun or guns to barter for what was needed." This same book shows a store ledger showing items bought by Joseph Long on credit starting in June 1847 (?), and settled May 1850 by "a rifle and sundries". The amount settled was $15.52.
Regards,
Bradford
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This is a great thread in this thread....
The many recent contributions confirm that there were many forms of exchange in colonial and revolutionary Pennsylvania: cash, barter, and long-term credit arrangements. Some types of exchanges might have required certain types of payment, as in Mart's example; other producers or sellers would be happy to have cash but more likely have accepted barter or have had a ledger in which they tracked credits & debits from each regular customer. (This is what I am most familiar with from my research, and what Diane Wenger shows at length in her study of a Shafferstown shopkeeper.)
Michael Kennedy (article referenced in my previous post: I'm happy to email a PDF of it if anybody wants one) shows that, for the Lehigh Valley, Durham Furnace was (beginning in the 1740s) a major center for local trade and commerce. When they weren't needed on the farm, farmers would often be hired to haul material--for distances that could be covered in a day. (For longer distances, the Furnace hired "professionals.") Perhaps they were paid in cash; this may have been one way even "subsistence" farmers (whatever that might mean) could earn a bit of cash. I don't have the book in front of me, but I think Kennedy found that 66 different Lehigh Valley farmers sold butter to Durham Furnace between 1740-1746. So the ledgers from that business show that many LV farmers were producing surplus in the 1740s.
The take-away point, it seems to me, is that one simply cannot assert any "general truth" about "the" Lehigh Valley economy or about LV settlers from 1740-1800. It is simply inaccurate to say that no Lehigh Valley farms would have "generate[d] cash above and beyond the subsistence level" until 1760 or that it would have taken 20 years to do so: the Durham Furnace ledgers disprove that. It may be that a particular farmer or individual did not produce a surplus, but one could "know" this only by knowing something about that particular individual's particular circumstances: there is no reliable generalization that could be used to tell us anything about a particular individual (i.e., "no LV farmers made a surplus so this particular farmer couldn't have"). Similarly, one cannot generalize from one individual's circumstance, if it could be known, to a sweeping claim about "the" LV economy or about "all" LV farmers.
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If the virgin soils are so acidic, how did Pennsylvania become an exporter of wheat during the colonial period?
Simple. They conditioned the soil via good farming practices. But it didn’t happen overnight.
Like I said, you should go talk to a soil scientist before hanging your hat on the old saw of “fertile virgin forest soils.” The notion that there are significant residual nutrients in forest soils supporting a hundred tons or more of biomass per acre…on a nutrient supply of only forest litter…doesn’t even pass the layman common-sense test. Squanto’s one fish per hill of maize was a massive dose of nitrogen and phosphorous to get it to grow, and a necessary one. Nor does it pass the common-sense test that you can take a plant that evolved over the millennia in semi-arid grasslands and have it thrive in soils almost completely opposite in characteristics without significant soil conditioning and fertilization.
1) …Durham Furnace was (beginning in the 1740s) a major center for local trade and commerce. When they weren't needed on the farm, farmers would often be hired to haul material--for distances that could be covered in a day.
2) …I think Kennedy found that 66 different Lehigh Valley farmers sold butter to Durham Furnace between 1740-1746. So the ledgers from that business show that many LV farmers were producing surplus in the 1740s.
…The take-away point, it seems to me, is that one simply cannot assert any "general truth" about "the" Lehigh Valley economy or about LV settlers from 1740-1800. It is simply inaccurate to say that no Lehigh Valley farms would have "generate[d] cash above and beyond the subsistence level" until 1760 or that it would have taken 20 years to do so: the Durham Furnace ledgers disprove that…
More circular logic akin to saying that communism produced healthy profits for the Moravians, but when they needed even larger profits they abandoned it in favor of capitalism. You’re talking yourself into what doesn’t make sense.
1) Perhaps nearby farmers who lived along King’s Road hauled for Durham Furnace. Most Northampton County farmers couldn’t get to there within a day’s travel. It was 34 miles to Michael Newhard’s farm over what in the 1740’s were only widened footpaths.
2) Hausfraus having surplus butter, eggs, herbs and the like is a complete triviality compared to the basic arithmetic of building a farm from a forest:
While progression with each added horse, each growing son, and improving soil fertility eventually became geometric, initial progress working alone during the first decade+ was slow, and more assets meant more cost in acreage..…Fodder for each draft horse required 4-6 acres, each cow 3-4 acres, each sheep 2-3 acres, depending on soil fertility.
Using the sweeping generality of the case of Frederick Neuhart and his (eventual) five sons, it took 22 years to clear and till 85 of 305 acres, and by 1768 the farm supported 11 people, 8 horses, 7 cows and 8 sheep. But the livestock alone consumed at least 70 of those 85 acres, leaving only 15 acres to feed 11 people and provide a surplus for sale.
Did they have some surplus by 1768? Butter, eggs, wool, seasonal veal, etc? Did it generate some cash as well as bartered goods? Sure. But not a lot of either. Hardly the wagon loads of produce and grain they would need to be considered a market producer. And Frederick’s was one of the more prosperous farms around Allentown in 1768.
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Most Northampton County farmers couldn’t get to there within a day’s travel. It was 34 miles to Michael Newhard’s farm over what in the 1740’s were only widened footpaths.
Did most Northampton County farmers live at Michael Newhard's farm? If not, how does the second sentence above follow from the first?
How far was Durham Furnace from Easton? Or from Bethlehem? Or were these two towns not in Northampton County?
And surely you wouldn't have mistaken Kennedy's proof that Durham Furnace was a place in Northampton County where individuals sold surplus as a claim that it was the only place in Northampton County for individuals to sell their surplus?
And ...
More circular logic akin to saying that communism produced healthy profits for the Moravians, but when they needed even larger profits they abandoned it in favor of capitalism.
Rather than re-explain this one, I'll just ask: does reading what others have learned from studying the actual records figure into your notion of research?
Or, even more simply: have you any evidence that the General Economy was unprofitable?
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Did they have some surplus by 1768? Butter, eggs, wool, seasonal veal, etc? Did it generate some cash as well as bartered goods? Sure. But not a lot of either. Hardly the wagon loads of produce and grain they would need to be considered a market producer. And Frederick’s was one of the more prosperous farms around Allentown in 1768.
So, let's sum up. You've now granted that there was a surplus and it did generate some cash.
The goal line has now changed so, suddenly, the question has become whether they can be considered a "market producer." When did this issue arise in any of the previous discussions in this long thread?
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The core of the issue of transitioning from a subsistence to a market economy with a starting point of primeval forest is the basic arithmetic of how many men and horses it took to clear land, and how many acres it took to support each. Only above and beyond that do you have produce available for market, and all this nibbling around the edges of selling butter and eggs or performing the occasional day labor is exactly that. Interesting, but peripheral.
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Facts (from Michael V. Kennedy, "'Cash for his turnups': Agricultural Production for Local Markets in Colonial Pennsylvania, 1725-1783," in Agricultural History 74 [2000]: 587-608):
"John Appel sold between 40 and 80 pounds of bacon a year to the Durham Ironworks store in Bucks County from 1745 to 1749. Appel raised hogs on his 10-acre holding and took advantage of this nearby market by producing surpluses every year. Andreas Brinker arrived at Durham in the early 1740s with his family, including his wife, son, daughter, and brother. The Brinkers were tenants and worked the harvest on Durham's farmland. After acquiring his own parcel of 25 acres in 1746, Brinker sold hay, oats, beans, turnips, and beef to the ironworks annually." (p. 598)
So I guess people did produce a surplus, and have a market for it, on very small parcels of land.
Most of Kennedy's essay is devoted to showing that, rather than towns, mill stores and ironworks stores (which sold both to the often large numbers of laborers who worked at these sites and the surrounding populace) were the main sites of commerce in colonial Pennsylvania. He shows that "by mid-century, 90 percent of Pennsylvania's population lived within 5 miles of a mill store" (593) and that "more than 85 percent of Pennsylvania's population lived within 10 miles of an ironworks" (594).
So I guess most farmers in Pennsylvania had access to a local "market" (a mill store or ironworks store) at which to sell whatever surplus they produced.
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"John Appel sold between 40 and 80 pounds of bacon a year to the Durham Ironworks store in Bucks County from 1745 to 1749. Appel raised hogs on his 10-acre holding and took advantage of this nearby market by producing surpluses every year. Andreas Brinker arrived at Durham in the early 1740s with his family, including his wife, son, daughter, and brother. The Brinkers were tenants and worked the harvest on Durham's farmland. After acquiring his own parcel of 25 acres in 1746, Brinker sold hay, oats, beans, turnips, and beef to the ironworks annually." (p. 598)
What’s significant here is that you don’t need a horse to raise hogs on a tenancy of 10 acres. But you do to raise hay and oats over and above your own family’s need on 25. Brinker made enough from four years of selling bacon to spend 12-15 English Pounds on a horse.
But on a cash basis the proceeds from 40 pounds of bacon would have supported Frederick Neuhart’s family and livestock for less than a week.
As I said, in the early 1760’s in the Lehigh Valley there wasn’t a lot of cash on hand to support luxuries like school tuition, new rifles, etc, et al.
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From same source:
"When farmers sold commodities to company stores, they were automatically given book credit. All commodities had a recognized value, and credit was assessed by volume sold. Some was used immediately to purchase other products, including ironware, clothing, and goods not produced locally, such as coffee, rice, or tobacco. In more than 25 percent of transactions, companies eventually paid some cash to farmers. However, to trace the winding road of credit from sale of certain commodities through the purchase of others requires a careful reading of all company records....Account credit was recorded in cash terms as transactions were noted, but companies paid cash at the time of sale less than 15 percent of the time...Most companies settled accounts in cash annually, although others did so quarterly or even monthly. Until then, store purchases were deducted from available credit" (607).
Many "luxuries" were thus available at these company stores: Kennedy's various articles lists many of them. So many farmers could obtain them on the credit they earned through selling their (perhaps small) surpluses.
We have a rough idea how much rifles tended to cost. How much cash was necessary, do you suppose, for "school tuition"? (And where would these schools that charged "tuition" be? The several Moravian schools in the 1740s-60s did not, as I mentioned, charge tuition.)
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Simple. They conditioned the soil via good farming practices. But it didn’t happen overnight.
Simple? What are there good farming practices? They have no gypsum, no lime and not enough livestock to make much of a dent in the manure required to fertilize the soil. Much of the livestock was not even enclosed in the early period so the collection of manure would be almost none existent. Clover and other legumes were not introduced to the Americas until about the Revolutionary War. How long did this process take to make the soil capable of supporting wheat?
Mart Keen
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Simple. They conditioned the soil via good farming practices. But it didn’t happen overnight.
Simple? What are there good farming practices? They have no gypsum, no lime and not enough livestock to make much of a dent in the manure required to fertilize the soil. Much of the livestock was not even enclosed in the early period so the collection of manure would be almost none existent. Clover and other legumes were not introduced to the Americas until about the Revolutionary War. How long did this process take to make the soil capable of supporting wheat?
Mart Keen
We don't know that all the land being farmed had to be cleared. Other farmers had been in most places in Eastern NA before the Europeans took over. Nor did the Europeans need native help to farm unless they were not farmers to begin with. Using fish as fertilizer was known in Europe.
What native tribes inhabited the land before they died off? Had it regularly been burnt off and non-nut trees killed off? If natives were living there were they farming? Had they cleared plots for farming? If they were farming were their fields regrown to "old growth" already or was it just the more easily cleared new growth that was 10-20 years or less old or were they maybe still small meadows?
We don't know that it would not support wheat as soon as the trees were dead. Do we have information to that effect from the time?
We don't know how open the forest was. Could they have ringed the trees and planted around them before cutting them OR after a year or two BURNED THEM DOWN during the winter rather than cutting ? Were the trees 4-6 ft in diameter or smaller? They did not need room for a 40 ft tiller and a 30 ft Combine head after all.
How much wheat is needed to support 1-3 adults and 0-4 kids? What was the productivity? 10 Bushel to the acre? 15? More? How many people will 400 pounds of wheat feed for a year? How about corn? Wheat was not the only grain crop.
What to feed the hogs? Acorns probably, not crop grains if the farmers had any sense. Free hog feed if their are Oaks to get acorns from. So would the farmer want to clear all the Oak?
These need to be answered before we start pontificating about acidity and what they could grow and how much they could clear etc etc. How they starved for years because they could not clear the land and the land as too acidic etc etc.
Finally after the settlers figured out that all the natives were not friendly having a firearm was not some luxury that a person could take or leave. You don't need any wheat if you are dead.
Dan
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Transition to a cash-based economy took the better part of two generations.
To judge the transition of the Lehigh Valley economy from the hand-to-mouth subsistence farms of 1738 to something more closely resembling a modern cash-based economy, let’s look again at what we know about Frederick Neuhart, according to various Lehigh County and church histories the patriarch of one of the most prosperous farms in the area. The location is on the lower Jordan Creek; land that is now at or within the city limits of Allentown.
Quote:
A provincial tax was assessed Jan. 2, 1765, the year of Frederick's death. He was taxed for 305 acres (of which 85 acres was under cultivation), 8 horses, 7 cattle and 8 sheep, indicating a sizeable farming operation for that period. His sons, Lorentz and Frederick, now single, were in their 20's, and doubtless did most of the farming work. His will as Frederich Neuhart of Whitehall township, cordwainer, was executed on Jan. 1, 1764, and signed Fridrich Neihart, and made the following provisions:
(1) To two sons, Frederick & Lawrence the sum of 30 Pounds each.
2) To eldest son, Christopher, five shillings, as his full share of my estate (because of advancements in my life time).
(3) To wife Maria Margaretha all real and personal estate during her natural life, afterward to my children: Frederick. Lawrence, Daniel, Peter, Juliana wife of Stephen Schneider, Salome, Sophia, and Elizabeth Barbara, share alike. (Note this excluded Christopher, whose farm purchased in Mt Bethel Tp with his father’s assistance in 1762 had failed by 1764.).
(4) Executors to be friends, George Knauss and George Jacob Kern (nephew of the owner of “Trucker’s Mill” in Heidelberg Tp), with power to see that minor children are educated and to bind them out to learn trades or husbandry. Witnesses were Thomas Hunsicker, Johannes Roth, J. Okely. Probated May 14, 1766. Original will and other estate papers in Register's file #428 at Easton, Pa.
The tax list for 1771 records the widow with 270 acres, 2 horses, 2 cattle. Sons Lorentz and Frederick each with 2 horses, 3 cattle and 2 sheep, obviously all living on the homestead. The widow and the children were in agreement on May 27, 1771 that Frederick and Lorentz should have the land which proved to be about 366 acres and it was released to these two sons for a nominal consideration, doubtless a further consideration was a separate agreement and bonds in which Frederick and Lorentz were obliged to pay the other heirs their share of the real estate value as directed in the father's will, the timing of this land division doubtless brought about by Frederick Jr. 's recent or imminent marriage.
Unquote.
The farm was acquired by purchase from the original homesteader in Nov, 1746. And 22 years later, only 85 of 305 acres was cleared and in tillage with five grown males working the land. Further, over 70 of the tilled 85 acres were required just to support the existing livestock, leaving only 10-15 acres to feed and provide income for the 9 residents of the farm, which alone would have been marginal.
When he wrote his will in 1764, Frederick’s cash legacies to his sons indicate he had accumulated around 90 Pounds net in the 27 years since his (penniless) arrival on the frontier. How much cash was derived from the farm and how much from Frederick’s and his older sons’ seasonal trade as cordwainers? Probably most was derived from their trade, as local farmers needed substantial shoes to do heavy work, and as of 1764 the farm acreage arithmetic indicate it was still a capital asset, with most of the family farming effort being reinvested in the cycle of land-clearing and tillage to make the farm grow as opposed to producing short-term income.
Thus by 1764 there was some cash income, but most of it probably came from shoemaking.
In turn, Frederick’s third son Lorentz’s will of 1814 demonstrates a largely complete transition from the hand-to-mouth subsistence farming of 1740 to a largely cash economy of 1800.
Lorentz’s assets included 183 acres along the Jordan Creek plus additional acreage on Northampton Cy plus a grist mill on the Jordan he built in 1790 that continued operation into the 20th Century.
Quote
50 pounds to Zion Reformed Church
50 pounds to the poor of Northampton Cy
To son Jacob my plantation of 100 acres with water rights, valued at 2100 pounds.
To two sons Johannes and Daniel the mill and its 9 acres, plus adjacent woodlands, together valued at 3100 pounds.
To son Friedrich 17 acres plus the land I gave him in my lifetime.
To son Daniel all the land and buildings he now farms plus the adjacent woodlands.
To my son Friedrich and my daughter Elizabeth, wife of John Moll II, my 24 acres in Heidelberg Tp.
To my daughters Elizabeth, wife of John Moll II, Anna Maria, wife of David Jundt, and Salome, wife of George Jundt, the 142 acre tract I own in Northampton Cy.
Executors will be my son Friedrich and my son-in-law Johann Moll (John Moll II) Register’s File #218 in Allentown
Unquote
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Bob,
I honestly admire the hard work you've done to recover and interpret these varied records. So please take the following as serious queries.
A. You write that "When he wrote his will in 1764, Frederick’s cash legacies to his sons indicate he had accumulated around 90 Pounds net in the 27 years since his (penniless) arrival on the frontier." But it doesn't indicate that, does it? It indicates that he had 90 pounds when he died. He might have accumulated much more earlier and lost (or spent) much of the cash he had accumulated. Or throughout his life he might have made a lot, spent a lot, and had 90 pounds leftover when he died. I just cannot see how one can with confidence draw the certain conclusion you have here.
B. How does this single instance enable any general conclusions whatsoever about the Lehigh Valley economy?
C. What are you trying to assess when you argue, as you do here, that there was not a "modern cash-based economy" in the Lehigh Valley in, say, the 1760s? Nobody that I've read on this list (or off) has suggested such a thing. To say that farmers had markets to which they could sell small surpluses and, on the credit they earned, obtain necessaries and luxuries certainly has little resemblance to a "modern cash-based economy." But nor is this "hand-to-mouth subsistence." As early as 1738 there was a varied economy in the Lehigh Valley: opportunities to earn cash, neighborly barter, opportunities to obtain luxuries through other forms of trade, opportunities for extended credit arrangements, and--as numerous studies have shown by analyzing extensive ledgers that have survived--mill stores and ironwork stores that were real centers of commerce, "markets" for local surpluses. Many, many studies over the past two decades have shown this.
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Unlike with the Ulster Scots, slash-and-burn agriculture wasn’t practiced by German immigrants. Klees describes colonial Pennsylvania German agriculture of the 1780’s and later, after much of the land and soils had been in tillage for 40 years and longer. Emphasis is mine.
Fredric Klees, The Pennsylvania Dutch, McMillan 1951
The Fat Earth p191
From colonial days to the present the Dutch country has been noted for its fine farms. By the time of the Revolution Pennsylvania was• the granary of the colonies, and a little later the descendants of the Pennsylvania Dutch made the Shenandoah Valley the granary of the South. In 1789 Benjamin Rush had written: "The German farm was easily distinguished from those of others, by good fences, the extent of orchard, the fertility of the soil, productiveness of the fields, the luxuriance of the meadows." Even today Lancaster County produces more per acre than any other county in the country, while• back in the days of the Civil War Oliver Wendell Holmes, the essayist and poet, found words of high praise for the farms of southeastern Pennsylvania:
“Much as I had heard of the fertile regions of Pennsylvania, the vast scale and the uniform luxuriance of this region astonished me. The grazing pastures were so green, the fields were under such perfect culture, the cattle looked 50 sleek, the houses were so comfortable, the barns so ample, the fences so well kept, that I did not wonder when I was told that this region was called the England of Pennsylvania. The people whom we saw were, like the cattle, well nourished; the young women looked round and wholesome.”
The excellence of the Pennsylvania Dutch farms was no accident; they were the result of good judgment, hard work, and superior methods of farming. To a large degree the Pennsylvania Dutch were the founders of the agricultural prosperity of America.
At the very start they chose good land whenever possible. It has often been said that they hunted out the land where the trees grew tallest, for there they knew the soil would be most fertile; that they looked for the black walnut, which grew best in limestone soil; or that they sought out blue stones streaked with white-in other words, limestone.Whatever their method of judging the fertility of the soil, they chose some of the richest land in America. Coming from one of the most fertile agricultural sections of Europe, the Rhineland, the early German settlers undoubtedly had an eye for good land; and, once having come into possession of it, they kept it. But in some sections, where the English, mostly Quakers, and the Scotch-Irish had already preempted the best farmland, they had to take what was left and only gradually were able to get hold of the good lands, and. then only because the Quakers had a hankering for the easier money of trade and the Scotch-Irish an itching heel. On poor soil the Dutch had no more success than the English and the Scotch-Irish, as is shown by the poor farms of many of the Dutch hill dwellers of Pennsylvania and by the Southern mountaineers of Pennsylvania Dutch blood.
In 1799 Thomas Hill described the Pennsylvania Dutch farmers as "the most early rising, hard working people I ever saw." Many of them, especially the "plain people," are still that. They have never been afraid of hard work or of getting their hands dirty. In the early years they deliberately chose to cut down the tall forest trees instead of girdling them and leaving them to die. And this they did with their own hands. There were no slaves on Dutch farms, and few of the Dutch were gentlemen farmers. The Dutchman was a dirt farmer who guided the plow and sowed the grain himself.
Possibly the greatest difference between the farms of Pennsylvania and those of the other colonies was brought about by the firm belief of the Dutch in the necessity of conserving the fertility of the land and, if possible, increasing it. The wasteful methods that wore out the good earth of the tidewater tobacco plantations in Maryland and Virginia were avoided. In the first decades the Dutch permitted the fields to lie fallow for a time to regain their fertility. Or sometimes plaster of Paris was used to build up the soil. This was good for the first time it was tried, but with each application the benefit became less. Later on lime took the place of plaster of Paris, and the limekiln became a familiar feature of the Dutch landscape. But the most important ways to keep the land fertile were the use of manure and the rotation of crops. The Dutch have always had a strong faith in both. Even in the early years there was some rotation of crops, though the usual four-year rotation of corn, oats, wheat, and hay--clover and timothy-mixed was not developed until shortly after 1800. But white clover was planted as early as 1748, and by 1780 the more important red clover was grown on almost every Dutch farm. To the Amish depleting the land, as was done in the South, was literally sinful; to the other Dutch farmers it was stupid. With his idea of permanency the Pennsylvania Dutch farmer thought of himself as holding the land in trust, as being honor bound to pass it on to his sons as rich and fertile as he received it from his father. In their attempt to be good farmers the Dutch were greatly aided by the early German newspapers of Pennsylvania. In the eighteenth century they printed the best articles on agriculture to be found in the country.
Fortunately even the earliest settlers had a clear idea of a good farm.
At the back of their mind they had the model of the Palatinate farm, which when not despoiled by war was exceedingly rich. Wheat, rye, oats, barley, and buckwheat were the principal grains on the Palatinate farm. Potatoes, introduced early in the eighteenth century, were widely grown. Hemp and flax were important crops. Almost every farm had its orchard of apples and pears, a line of cherry trees, and a vineyard on a hillside. There was a herd of cows and a sty or two of pigs; there were chickens, geese, and ducks. There was a row of beehives in the orchard. This idyllic picture represents the ideal rather than the actual, for in the war-torn Palatinate a farmer seldom made this dream come true. Yet it was this conception of what a farm should be, well ordered and self-sustaining, that the Palatine farmer brought with him to Pennsylvania and handed on to his sons. By the last quarter of the eighteenth century (which also means not until around 1775 after 30 or more years of tillage) farm after farm in the Pennsylvania Dutch country showed that this ideal had been attained, that in Pennsylvania the Palatine farmer's utopia had been realized.
Naturally the new conditions in Pennsylvania forced some slight modifications of the Palatine immigrant's original plans. He could no longer build his house in a country village as he had commonly done back in the Rhineland. When each farm had many acres, the distance became too great to make living in a village practicable. Since land was so cheap, the early farms were of large size. Many were 300 or 400 acres, while 600 or 700 acres were not uncommon in the original grants. Most of this was in forest, and for a long time the clearings were relatively small. The early settler's greatest disappointment, however, was not that he had to forgo the friendly life of the village-the enormous number of acres he owned made up for that--but in his failure to start a vineyard. Unable to induce the grapes of the Rhineland to grow in Pennsylvania, he had to give up the wines to which he had been accustomed for centuries. Happily all the other fruit he had grown along the Rhine throve in Pennsylvania. The peaches were even finer than those back home and needed much less pampering. The grains and vegetables of Europe also grew well in Pennsylvania. Furthermore, there was• corn, an invaluable new grain, and several new vegetables: squash, pumpkin, sweet potatoes, .and lima beans. Even the climate was not greatly unlike the one he had known on the other side of the Atlantic. The summers were far hotter and the winters somewhat colder, but the mean temperature was much the same. Both regions had about the same number of frost-free days.
The basic pattern of the farm in Pennsylvania, that of the single farmstead with the family forming the unit, was the one on which the American farm was molded. In New England there was a tendency to settle in villages instead of on individual farms, while in the South the plantation worked by slaves became the rule. In addition the Pennsylvania Dutch farmer of the eighteenth century combined general farming with the raising of livestock. This is still the pattern of many farms in the Dutch country, especially in Berks County; and it was this method of farming that spread to the prairie states of the Middle West. By growing diverse crops the farmer was able to rotate them and thus preserve the fertility of the soil; and by selecting his crops wisely he could keep himself and whatever help he had busy round the calendar.
These farms were as self-sustaining as it was possible for them to be.
A large variety of fruit and vegetables was dried for winter use, for this was long before the sealed glass jar had been thought of, and only the richest preserves would keep in crocks covered with paper. Meats were smoked over hickory or salted in brine for the winter. Honey and maple sugar took the place of "store" sugar. Even the clothes on their backs and the cloth stretched over the hoops of the Conestoga wagons were spun at home from flax and hemp grown on the farm or the wool of their sheep. Their very shoes were often made on the farm. Candles and soap were home-made, too. Every farmer was a Jack-of-all-trades …
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B. How does this single instance enable any general conclusions whatsoever about the Lehigh Valley economy?
Among the original six immigrant families I'm studying and their children, I have at least 50 more almost-identical examples. Only few of them feature a war hero from the Battle of Long Island (Frederick's oldest son Christopher) or a gunmaker today referred to as "John Moll II".
In Frederick's case, the records are remarkably thorough. If there had been a natural disaster like his son Christopher likely experienced in losing his Bethel Tp farm, we'd know about it.
However you want to characterize it, evolution of the local economic life beginning with two adults with small children building a log cabin farmstead in the wilderness in 1738 to prosperous farms and mills worth several thousand Pounds was slow….especially in the first generation before the family’s sons were grown. A foundry 35 miles distant over unimproved trails, an Indian trading post at Bethlehem 15 miles distant and a major market in Reading 35 miles distant were certainly part of that evolution, but weren’t the drivers. The ability to convert forest to productive farmland was the driver, and that largely didn’t reach fruition until the second generation reached adulthood around the time of the Revolutionary War.
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Here's where I'm going with this:
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Note 10: German and Alsatian immigrants had little experience with firearms in their home countries, and the absence of universal militia service in Pennsylvania until 1778 plus pleas for weapons after the 1755 and 1763 Indian attacks demonstrate they were slow to acquire them. By 1775, while fowlers, muskets and trade guns were fairly common, rifles probably weren’t owned by frugal Pennsylvania German farmers unless a return on investment could be realized in winter hunting and trapping. (Note 4) In pre-war 1775 a plain rifle with accoutrements cost roughly 6-8 English pounds in Pennsylvania, while a hundred acres of vacant frontier land sold for 5 pounds, trade guns 2-3 pounds, military muskets 3-4 pounds, a horse 10-12 pounds, and a 60’ by 230’ building lot in downtown Allentown 45 pounds . Some sources report significantly different prices and those can be accurate reports, but there were also later wartime runaway inflation, a plethora of currency types and different currency exchange rates between the various colonies to consider. What something “cost” then requires context of place, time and examples as well as comparable currencies (Fogleman 145; Kenneth Roberts; Valuska Thompson’s Rifle Bn1; Whisker 158).
The transition from hand-to-mouth subsistence farming to an economy we’d recognize today took almost two generations. The evolution of local economic life beginning with two adults with small children building a log-cabin farmstead in the wilderness in 1738 to large, prosperous farms and mills worth several thousand pounds (probably Pennsylvania Pounds) was slow, especially in the first generation before the family’s sons were grown. While the local markets: a trading post at Bethlehem 6 miles distant, a foundry (Durham Furnace) 21 miles distant, and major markets in Reading and Philadelphia 37 and 65 miles distant, all over unimproved roads and trails, were certainly part of that evolution, they weren’t the drivers. The ability to convert forest to productive farmland was the driver, and that largely didn’t reach fruition in the Lehigh Valley until the second generation approached adulthood around the time of the Revolutionary War.
For example, Rifleman Christopher’s father Frederick Neuhart (1699-1765), according to various Lehigh County and church histories, was the owner of one of the most prosperous farms in the area at the time of his death. The location was on the lower Jordan Creek; land that is now at or within the city limits of Allentown. A provincial tax was assessed Jan. 2, 1765. He was taxed for 305 acres (of which 85 acres was under cultivation), eight horses, seven cattle and eight sheep, indicating a sizeable farming operation for that period. His will as Frederich Neuhart of Whitehall Township, cordwainer, was executed on Jan. 1, 1764, was signed “Fridrich Neihart”, and made the following provisions:
(1) To two sons, Frederick & Lawrence the sum of 30 Pounds each.
(2) To eldest son, Christopher, five shillings, as his full share of my estate because of advancements in my life time.
(3) To wife Maria Margaretha all real and personal estate during her natural life, afterward to my children: Frederick. Lawrence, Daniel, Peter, Juliana wife of Stephen Schneider, Salome, Sophia, and Elizabeth Barbara, share alike. (Note this excluded Christopher, whose farm purchased in Mt Bethel Township with his father’s assistance in 1762 had failed by 1764, perhaps due to some natural disaster).
(4) Executors to be friends, George Knauss and George Jacob Kern (1737 fellow immigrant and nephew of the owner of “Trucker’s Mill” in Heidelberg Township Note 14), with power to see that minor children are educated and to bind them out to learn trades or husbandry. Witnesses were Thomas Hunsicker, Johannes Roth, and J. Okely. Probated May 14, 1766. (Kastens Vol IV 14-16; Klees 191-96; Register's file #428 at Easton)
Frederick’s farm was acquired by purchase from the original homesteader, John Eastburn, in November, 1746. Twenty years later, only 85 of 305 acres were cleared and in tillage with five grown males working the land. And at four to five acres per horse, three to four per cow and two per sheep, over 70 of the tilled 85 acres were required just to support the farm’s livestock, leaving only 10-15 acres to feed and provide income for the nine residents of the farm, which alone would have been marginal. Plus they didn’t need eight horses just to till 85 acres, as later generations would own half that many to farm similar tracts. They owned extra teams because land clearing remained a major part of their efforts. When he wrote his will in 1764, Frederick’s cash legacies to his sons (including Christopher) show he had accumulated over 60 Pounds in the 27 years since his largely penniless arrival on the frontier. How much cash was derived from the farm and how much from Frederick’s and his older sons’ seasonal trade as cordwainers? Probably most was derived from their trade, as all the local farmers needed substantial shoes to do heavy work, and as of 1764 the farm acreage arithmetic indicates the farm was still a capital asset under development, with most of the farming effort being reinvested in the cycle of land-clearing and tillage to increase productive farmland acreage as opposed to producing short-term income. Thus by 1764 there was some cash income, but most of it probably came from shoemaking.
In turn, Frederick’s third son Lorentz’s (1740-1817) will of 1814 demonstrates a largely complete transition from the hand-to-mouth subsistence farming of 1740 to a more cash-based economy of 1815, with an attendant rise in cash on hand and cash values. Lorentz’s assets included 183 acres along the Jordan Creek (his share of his father’s farm) plus additional acreage in “Northampton County” (in 1812 Allentown and the original family farm became part of Lehigh County), plus a grist mill he built in 1790 that continued operation into the 20th Century. Note that in his lifetime Lorentz doubled the number of acres he originally inherited.
(1) Fifty pounds to Zion Reformed Church.
(2) Fifty pounds to the poor of Northampton County.
(3) To son Jacob my plantation of 100 acres with water rights, valued at 2100 pounds.
(4) To sons Johannes and Daniel the mill and its nine acres, plus adjacent woodlands, together valued at 3100 pounds.
(5) To son Friedrich 17 acres plus the land I gave him in my lifetime.
(6) To son Daniel all the land and buildings he now farms plus the adjacent woodlands.
(7) To son Friedrich and daughter Elizabeth, wife of Johann Moll, my 24 acres in Heidelberg Township.
(8) To daughters Elizabeth, wife of Johann Moll, Anna Maria, wife of David Jundt, and Salome, wife of George Jundt, the 142-acre tract I own in Northampton County.
(9) Executors will be my son Friedrich and my son-in-law Johann Moll (today known as gunmaker John Moll II). (Kastens Vol IV 36-37; Register’s File #218 at Allentown)
Two sons aren’t mentioned in the will: Christian who in 1798 married and moved west to establish a farm on the Susquehanna River in Columbia County, and Peter who in 1800 established a blacksmith shop on Sumner Avenue in Allentown. As there appears to be no enmity involved (both sons named boys after their father in the years following his death), it is likely their father helped them establish new farms and businesses and didn’t mention that in his will. Hence his actual wealth was probably two parts greater than his will reflects.
Note 4: The two companies of Thompson’s Rifle Battalion selected for the Quebec Campaign were not chosen because they were uniquely skilled, but because they were behaving badly in camp at Cambridge. These were Captain William Hendricks’s company from Cumberland County and Captain Matthew Smith’s company from Lancaster County. There had been several incidents of fighting between the back country riflemen and the coastal New England regiments composed largely of fishermen, with one later melee reportedly broken up by George Washington personally (Fischer Washington’s 25; McCullough 38, 51; Stroh Thompson’s 22).
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Today most infantrymen are “riflemen”, and we use the term casually, with occasional sources extending it to the writing of history in error. There were never many organized rifle units serving in the war; most soldiers were armed with smooth-bore muskets, fusils (a lighter, shorter musket), or fowlers (shotguns) shooting ball, buckshot, or a combination called “buck and ball”. In 1775, Pennsylvania raised nine companies of true frontier riflemen; Maryland two, and Virginia two, with strengths ranging from 60 to 90 men each. New England had few rifles anywhere in 1775. Then in early 1776, Pennsylvania raised an additional 12 companies of 72 or more riflemen each under Colonel Samuel Miles, and Virginia and Maryland six more under Colonel Hugh Stevenson. There were certainly rifles here and there in the militia regiments south of New England where men often owned their own firelocks, with the southern militias and units raised from frontiersmen probably having a higher percentage of rifles. The ratio of 350 rifles to 1500 muskets confiscated from 2000 Scottish settler households after the 1776 Battle of Moore’s Creek, North Carolina was probably representative. (Although probably a greater density of firearms than were present in German households - unlike many Scots, Palatines and Alsatians brought little experience with firearms with them to America, and wouldn’t acquire them until necessity demanded it.) Colonel Peter Kachlein’s Northampton County Militia (Kachlein was from Easton) is also an example. Battle histories refer to them as “Kachlein’s Riflemen”, although likely under half were armed with rifles. The “overmountain men” from Appalachian frontier settlements at the 1780 Battle of King’s Mountain are another example; they certainly had a high percentage of riflemen. But the major rifle units available to Washington in 1775-6 were only the units I list – approximately 2300 riflemen in a force larger than 20,000 (PA Archives Series 2 Vol X; Russell 83; Stroh Thompson’s 13-15).
Note 14: Several references on Peter’s father Michael Newhard (1713-1793) list his (and other family members’) origin as the town of Zweibruecken, Germany. In fact like most Neuharts, he was from the village of Rumbach which is 32 miles to the southeast, but administratively part of the (then) Duchy of Zweibruecken. Period references to Zweibruecken refer to the province of origin, not the town. Today both towns are in the German state of Rhineland Palatinate
The Neuharts sailed to Philadelphia on the St Andrew Galley, John Stedman, Master, arriving Philadelphia on September 26, 1737. Passengers included Michael Newhard’s maternal uncle Johannes George Stoehr (1687-1753), Stoehr’s wife Margaretha Dock (1688-1753) and their four children ages 15-22. The Stoehrs settled in Lancaster County. Also Frederick Neuhart’s brother-in-law Johann George Kern (1696-1763), Kern’s wife Catherine Elizabeth Fraudhueger (1703-1781) and three children ages 12-14. There was also a Johann George Kuntz listed as a passenger who was probably a relative of George Neuhart’s mother Susanna Maria Kuntz (1678-1723). The Kerns, whose paternal uncle had immigrated in 1732 and owned nearby “Trucker’s Mill” (Figure 13), settled by 1738 on the 200 acres adjacent to Frederick on Coplay Creek in Whitehall Township and the two men filed together for a survey of the 400-acre tract on February 1, 1743. Benjamin Franklin, in 1755 the Pennsylvania official tasked to establish frontier forts during the French and Indian War, would buy the lumber to build Fort Allen at Trucker’s Mill. The mill was known as “Kern’s Mill” until immigrant Nicholas’ son William took over in the early 1750’s. William was a good-natured, jovial man and a “Trockener” is German slang for a jokester, hence the English corruption, “Trucker’s Mill” (Busch 162, 184-224).
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I'll resist replying at any length to the description of Bethlehem as an "Indian trading post," which (a) it wasn't and (b) for a sense of its size and activity (lazy?!?!), think of Pownall's 1755 description of over forty trades: "saddle-tree maker, sadler, glover, shoemaker, stocking-weavers, 4 frames going, button maker, taylor & women taylor, hatter, ribband-weavers, linnen-weavers, 6 looms in work, woollen-weavers, three looms at work, wool-comber, dyer, fuller, dresser, tanner, currier, skinner, butcher, miller, chandler, oil-maker, baker, cooper, joiner, carpenter, mason, glazier, brickmaker, stone cutter, turner, potter, stovemaker, wheelwright, blacksmith, gunsmith, nail-maker, lock-smith, pewterer, tinman, silvermith, clockmaker, harness-maker, hemp dresser, boat-builder, surgeon, apothecary." Most of Bethlehem's customers at its "stranger's store" were whites, not Indians.
But I see why, given the argument you want to make, it would be important to minimize Bethlehem as well as the fact (not interpretation) that "by mid-century, 90 percent of Pennsylvania's population lived within 5 miles of a mill store" (Kennedy 593) and that "more than 85 percent of Pennsylvania's population lived within 10 miles of an ironworks" (Kennedy 594)--mill stores and ironworks stores being major centers for local trade. Although I happened to mention Durham Furnace, that particular site was not (as these statistics make clear) the only potential market that your Newhards could have been regularly involved with.
But, even more basically, wouldn't you want to know--from the ledgers that survive from a few mills and ironworks--whether any Newhards happen to appear in the ledgers? And, if so, what they were selling to these small industrial communities? And what, in exchange, they took home? Wouldn't that be interesting information to know?
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…think of Pownall's 1755 description of over forty trades: "saddle-tree maker, sadler, glover, shoemaker, stocking-weavers, 4 frames going, button maker, taylor & women taylor, hatter, ribband-weavers, linnen-weavers, 6 looms in work, woollen-weavers, three looms at work, wool-comber, dyer, fuller, dresser, tanner, currier, skinner, butcher, miller, chandler, oil-maker, baker, cooper, joiner, carpenter, mason, glazier, brickmaker, stone cutter, turner, potter, stovemaker, wheelwright, blacksmith, gunsmith, nail-maker, lock-smith, pewterer, tinman, silvermith, clockmaker, harness-maker, hemp dresser, boat-builder, surgeon, apothecary." Most of Bethlehem's customers at its "stranger's store" were whites, not Indians.
But I see why, given the argument you want to make, it would be important to minimize Bethlehem as well as the fact (not interpretation) that "by mid-century, 90 percent of Pennsylvania's population lived within 5 miles of a mill store" (Kennedy 593) and that "more than 85 percent of Pennsylvania's population lived within 10 miles of an ironworks" (Kennedy 594)--mill stores and ironworks stores being major centers for local trade. Although I happened to mention Durham Furnace, that particular site was not (as these statistics make clear) the only potential market that your Newhards could have been regularly involved with.
Given. I changed that.
But markets for the relatively minor amounts of excess these (distant) frontier farms had circa 1760 weren’t the driving force to their achieving eventual prosperity. Their ability to convert forest to productive farmland was.
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Ok, I think I do understand, then, where you have been coming from: if the aim of your study is to show how the Newhards' "achieved prosperity" given their impoverished beginnings, I see why you (probably rightly) stress the slow process of creating productive farmland rather than any market- or credit-based trading. This makes perfect sense.
My points, throughout this long thread, have only aimed to show that some of the generalizations you make along the way weren't reliable--and weren't really necessary to tell the above narrative about the Newhards. I certainly wasn't suggesting that the Newhards' stocked up on luxuries through credit or earned much cash; I don't know anything about their activities. But there were other paths to prosperity in the Lehigh Valley, as well as many available markets for local products, that your study doesn't need to deny in order to focus on how the Newhards themselves achieved prosperity over several generations.
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Personally, I think that the development of agriculture was a bad move on humanity's part but I am having a blast reading this discussion. It is like hanging out with a few profs at the coffee shop on Saturday morning.
Danny
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I think that looking at numbers alone is not true picture of the Rifleman's significance during the Revolution.
Lets look at a few high points.
The Saratoga battles may well have been far more difficult had Morgan's Riflemen not been present. They forced the smoothbore armed French Canadian and Indian Scouts to stay in camp and virtually all of them quit and returned to Canada. For a bitter description of this by a British Lt. see "Colonial Riflemen in the American Revolution" by Huddleston. Burgoyne finally issued orders that any soldier going beyond the pickets would be executed because if they went into the woods they were going to die anyway or at least that was the perception.
As a result of his scouts gong home Burgoyne had no idea of the disposition or numbers facing him. He was blinded.
Prior to the arrival of Morgan they had spied and sniped at will. Did I mention the Riflemen decimating the British Artillerymen and capturing the guns? Killing numerous officers including Frasier, at about 300 yards, whose death demoralized even Burgoyne.
King's Mountain was a rifle on rifle fight and it destroyed the British effort in the south. After King's Mountain their previous success in recruiting locals to their cause evaporated. It is seen as the key to the British defeat in the south. The British themselves saw it as a disaster.
The frontier was apparently held, for the most part by riflemen. Possibly because the natives, at least a considerable percentage were often rifle armed. Its not possible to counter the natives with their mode of warfare by standing in lines with muskets. If you are in a Fort armed only with muskets and people outside can see over the walls even from 300 yards out there will be problems that only the rifle can deal with effectively. Muskets won't work. This was why by the end of the Revolution every British Regiment had riflemen in their ranks. There must have been a reason.
Most of the battles in which the Patriots fielded a significant rifle force were wins. If riflemen were deployed the Patriots won 63% of the time. If the force was mostly or all riflemen the percentage climbed to 74% see "The Frontier Rifleman" by LaCrosse.
We tend to underestimate the confusion that surely resulted when officers and NCOs were killed in British units and this happened in most actions where riflemen were present. Without someone to give orders the British Infantry was far less effective
The casualties amongst the British Officers and Senior NCOs at Breeds Hill were so devastating that the normal "regalia", badges of rank if you will, were abandoned for the duration of the Revolution. We can only guess at the final outcome if the Patriots had been supplied with another 100 or 200 pounds of powder. No rifles at Breed's Hill? The results indicate otherwise. As does a description of a Sharpshooter by a British officer though he does not mention his being rifle armed the results clearly indicate he was..
Sure the riflemen had "problems" they lacked discipline etc etc. They tended to break ranks and run if used as linear tactic infantry and I don't blame them. Its a !@*%&@ poor use of the rifle. Standing on s field in a hail of musket balls is not something I would like either.
But in actual combat they were often priceless though the Generals often refused to see it.
The biggest problem seemed to be lack of overall reliability in service which I largely attribute the the cheap import locks used on a great many rifles of the time. This was not really fixed until the early 19th century, in military rifles at least, when Harpers Ferry began production of better quality locks. This resulted in the rather poor 1792 Contract Rifles being relocked with the HF locks over about a 10 year period starting about 1805.
Dan
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I’m not underplaying the role of frontier riflemen, I’m only stating that there weren’t as many as told in folklore.
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While the frontier riflemen were among the most able of George Washington’s forces in 1775 and 1776 (if not the best behaved) Note 4, they were few in number and the skill levels in marksmanship and open-order fighting they brought with them couldn’t be sustained as their ranks were thinned by casualties and expiring enlistments. Soon many rifle companies would devolve into units with less unique skills armed largely with muskets. By early 1778 even volunteers were hard to find, and colonies instituted a draft for militia service. Note 12 Despite their lack of formal military training, in their original form the frontier rifle units were formidable. The British complained bitterly about their officers being targeted by snipers.Note 13 In November, 1775, “20 boats” containing British regulars supported by three artillery batteries and the guns of a frigate raided Lechmere Point during the siege of Boston to seize cattle. Opposed by only six riflemen from Thompson’s Battalion who were there to tend the livestock, the result was 17 British killed to only one American, and no cattle taken. Hessian diaries from the New York battles in 1776 describe officers cutting the rank insignia from their uniforms so as not to become early casualties. Hessians arriving on Staten Island in July were forced to change their bivouac plans when they rudely discovered the Kill Van Kull channel, 350-500 yards wide, was no obstacle to the reach of Colonel Edward Hand’s riflemen. A rifleman named George Merchant, a “tall and handsome Virginian” Note 5, was captured in Quebec and sent with his weapon back to England to give demonstrations intended to aid recruiting by showing what formidable antagonists British forces were facing in America. Merchant’s demonstrations had exactly the opposite effect. Twenty five riflemen under Colonel Hand stopped a 10,000-man British landing force in its tracks at Throg’s Neck in October, 1776, delaying their offensive a week by forcing them to land elsewhere, the delay allowing Washington to evacuate the bulk of his forces from Manhattan. Hand’s riflemen would do similar on multiple occasions at Trenton and Princeton in December and during the winter battles over forage and rations in northern New Jersey in early 1777. “Nest of American hornets”… “galled by fire”… “officers taken”… and men “dropping fast” became common phrases in British and Hessian correspondence. In spite of the disaster at Long Island in 1776, by the following spring the myth of British invincibility was permanently broken, with frontier riflemen and their distinctly American rifles playing a role far disproportionate to their numbers (Bolton 110; Field 131; Fischer Washington’s 22-25, 109, 237, 246, 294-96; McCullough 38, 51, 229; Smith 67; Stroh Thompson’s 20, 22, 28, 42).
Note 4: The two companies of Thompson’s Rifle Battalion selected for the Quebec Campaign were not chosen because they were uniquely skilled, but because they were behaving badly in camp at Cambridge. These were Captain William Hendricks’s company from Cumberland County and Captain Matthew Smith’s company from Lancaster County. There had been several incidents of fighting between the back country riflemen and the coastal New England regiments composed largely of fishermen, with one later melee reportedly broken up by George Washington personally (Fischer Washington’s 25; McCullough 38, 51; Stroh Thompson’s 22).
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Today most infantrymen are “riflemen”, and we use the term casually, with occasional sources extending it to the writing of history in error. There were never many organized rifle units serving in the war; most soldiers were armed with smooth-bore muskets, fusils (a lighter, shorter musket), or fowlers (shotguns) shooting ball, buckshot, or a combination called “buck and ball”. In 1775, Pennsylvania raised nine companies of true frontier riflemen; Maryland two, and Virginia two, with strengths ranging from 60 to 90 men each. New England had few rifles anywhere in 1775. Then in early 1776, Pennsylvania raised an additional 12 companies of 72 or more riflemen each under Colonel Samuel Miles, and Virginia and Maryland six more under Colonel Hugh Stevenson. There were certainly rifles here and there in the militia regiments south of New England where men often owned their own firelocks, with the southern militias and units raised from frontiersmen probably having a higher percentage of rifles. The ratio of 350 rifles to 1500 muskets confiscated from 2000 Scottish settler households after the 1776 Battle of Moore’s Creek, North Carolina was probably representative. (Although probably a greater density of firearms than were present in German households - unlike many Scots, Palatines and Alsatians brought little experience with firearms with them to America, and wouldn’t acquire them until necessity demanded it.) Colonel Peter Kachlein’s Northampton County Militia (Kachlein was from Easton) is also an example. Battle histories refer to them as “Kachlein’s Riflemen”, although likely under half were armed with rifles. The “overmountain men” from Appalachian frontier settlements at the 1780 Battle of King’s Mountain are another example; they certainly had a high percentage of riflemen. But the major rifle units available to Washington in 1775-6 were only the units I list – approximately 2300 riflemen in a force larger than 20,000 (PA Archives Series 2 Vol X; Russell 83; Stroh Thompson’s 13-15).
Note 5: Charles Bolton in his 1902 book identifies the “tall and handsome Virginian” rifleman who was captured at Quebec and sent to England to give rifle demonstrations as a man named “Merchant”. Surviving roster fragments of Daniel Morgan’s Virginia Riflemen based on British prisoner lists contain a man named George Merchant, but more intact Pennsylvania Archives and Oscar Stroh in his 1975 book on Thompson’s Battalion based on those archives list “George Merchant” as a member of Captain Matthew Smith’s company from the Lancaster area, who was probably the same man. Merchant was from Pennsylvania, specifically Donegal on the Susquehanna River in Lancaster County. A head count of archived rosters and roster fragments show 743 in Thompson’s Battalion with 189 of those having German names, and 93 in Morgan’s Riflemen with 21 German-Americans (Bolton 110; Roberts 375; Stroh Paxton 39, Thompson’s 20, 42).
Note 12: War weariness wasn’t limited to the Americans. While the colonies were forced to institute a draft for militia in 1778 after almost three years of war, the supply of recruits became so low in Britain that parliament enacted the Army Press Act the same year (Fischer Washington’s 39).
Note 13: The marksmanship of the frontier riflemen was notable. The arguments used against targeting officers were there would be no one to control the soldiers’ blood lust once the fight was won, or to surrender if the fight were lost. These were rationalizations that relied heavily on the beliefs that soldiers came from the dregs of society, that their ranks included a significant percentage of criminals, and that their corporals and sergeants couldn’t think for themselves or control the men on their own – erroneous beliefs that persist to some extent even today. However when applied to the professional British and Hessian units fighting in North America at the time, such arguments were complete nonsense. Just like in professional military units today, the British and Hessian ranks were largely filled by “country lads” of good character and clean records who wanted to be there, led by a professional corps of able non-commissioned officers. Further, the British would learn a lesson from the Americans and adopt both rifles and sniping two decades later at the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars. (Fischer Washington’s 23, 39).
The British raid on Lechmere Point was well-planned and conducted in substantial force to steal cattle, as food supplies were running low in Boston. From the sparse descriptions in Washington’s letter praising the troops and Lieutenant Colonel Edward Hand’s subsequent letter to his wife, the raiding force was probably company-sized, with upwards of a hundred men and impressive support from three batteries of artillery on Bunker, Breed’s and Copp’s Hills, plus the guns of a British frigate 300 yards offshore. Lechmere Point then became an island at high tide, and the raid was timed for then to isolate the six riflemen tending livestock from reinforcements. Alerted by the gunfire, Colonels Thompson and Hand personally led the regiment in a cross-water counterattack, wading up to their armpits crossing the isthmus. The British departed empty-handed before the reinforcements came within range, however, with most of their (heavy) casualties caused by the original six defenders (Stroh Thompson’s 28).
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One the best economic studies of southeastern Pennsylvania during the colonial period is James T. Lemon's "The Best Poor Man's Country." Immigrants to Pennsylvania could arrive basically penniless and within ten or twenty years have a substantial fortune.
Now I see where the comments about “virgin forest soils” come from and I agree. It’s worthy of an explanation:
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Note 31: The myth of virgin, primeval-forest soils quickly becoming productive for farming is persistent. They weren’t. Residual soil nutrients existing in any quantity when hundreds of tons of forest biomass per acre are sustained by only leaf and mast litter is impossible. Plus the presence of the common native understory plants Mountain Laurel, huckleberry, azalea, ferns and blueberry indicates soils far too acid for general farming without treatment. If forest soils had significant residual fertility, the natural cycle of a century or more of quick-germinating, fast-growing, short-lived, nitrogen or humus-producing pioneer tree species with low nutrient requirements like locusts, alders, sassafras, willow and birch wouldn’t occur, and the climax forest trees that succeed them like American Chestnut, Black Walnut, White Oak, Yellow Poplar and the various hickories would reseed and thrive immediately. Left to nature, they don’t, and they won’t. The first forest to emerge after a major fire or clear cut is invariably the soil-building pioneer forest; Mother Nature’s crop rotation to leguminous green manure. University of Toronto geographer James Lemon’s 1972 study of colonial Pennsylvania appears to support the myth when he reports higher yields of wheat and other grains from “new land”. However his data collected primarily from the period 1758-1790 comes from Chester and southeast Lancaster Counties, areas that had been settled since 1682 and 1710, not from frontier areas like Northampton County still being cleared on a large scale. The practices of crop rotation then involved leaving land to lie fallow for as much as a decade, then clearing the resulting “grubenland” of saplings and brush to plant corn, hemp or flax to “reduce the fatness” of the land for successive wheat production, which would “run to straw” if the land was too rich. Although agricultural reformers like John Beale Bordley (1727-1804) wouldn’t fully understand the contribution of nitrogen-fixing legumes until the 1780’s, the saplings of those grubenlands consisted of leguminous locust and alder seedlings that enriched the soil. Lemon’s “new land” was largely grubenland taken out of fallow and put into crop production (Kennedy 597-98; Lemon 40, 154, 169).
By the time of the Revolution southeast Pennsylvania was the granary of the colonies, and later descendants of Pennsylvania Germans would soon make the Shenandoah Valley the granary of the South, but that didn’t occur quickly.10 One acre of heavy timber required around 35 man-days and a team of horses to clear. Then it took years of superior farming techniques to condition the freshly-cleared soil and several decades to create farms where land-clearing wasn’t an activity co-equal to farming. My grandfather told us stories of his childhood job of chinking huge land-clearing fires with kindling as late as 1895 on his parent’s Wyoming County farm established in the early 1850’s (Kennedy 598; Klees 191; Lemon 27).
Palatine and Alsatian settlers chose optimal land where they could, seeking alluvial bottomlands where the trees grew tallest, because there they knew the soil would be deep, loamy and easy to till once cleared. They looked for Black Walnut trees, which preferred well-drained, limestone soil with optimum moisture conditions; or they sought ground having the actual blue stones streaked with white. Coming from the fertile alluvial plains of the Rhine River, they had an eye for good soil. They deliberately chose to fall and stump trees for burning instead of girdling them and leaving them to die. Crops don’t grow well competing with roots extending to the diameter of the tree’s former crown, and the alkaline wood ashes and charcoal became a much-needed soil amendment to neutralize and condition acid, leaf-mold soils. Wasteful methods like monocropping that depleted the soil as practiced by tobacco and cotton farmers further south were avoided. In the first decades around 30% of tillable acreage was permitted to lie fallow or in cover crops that were plowed under as green manure. Gypsum was used to build up the soil. Later lime took its place, and the limekiln became a familiar feature of the Pennsylvania landscape. But the most important methods to increase fertility were the use of animal and green manure and the rotation of crops, techniques that had been practiced successfully in the Rhine Valley for centuries. White clover was planted as early as 1720, and by 1780 the larger, more important red clover legume was grown as hay or cover on almost every farm. Farmers were greatly aided by the early German newspapers of Pennsylvania, printing the latest articles on agriculture (Kennedy 590, 598; Klees 191-202; Lemon 3, 157; Parker 182-82).
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This thread is now up to 10 pages, and I admit I have not read them all, but have yall talked about the Maryland and Virginia Rifle Regiment aka Rawlings Regiment? Longest serving Rifle regiment of the war. Decimated at Ft Washington, but reconstitued and sent west to garrison Ft Pitt and the western posts.
One of the members of the unit was court martialed for attempting to desert becasue he started dressing like an indian, but Aquited:
6 June 1779 Court Martial at Ft Pitt:
Joseph Neal a soldier in Col' Rawling's Regiment was brought
before the Court on suspicion of Deserting. Denies the Charge.
No proof appearing against him & the suspicion arising only from
Cutting one of his Ears & painting like the savages. The Court are of Opinion that the Prisoner did it through wantonness & not with the Design of Deserting & therefore do quit him of the Charge.
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... but have yall talked about the Maryland and Virginia Rifle Regiment aka Rawlings Regiment? Longest serving Rifle regiment of the war. Decimated at Ft Washington, but reconstitued and sent west to garrison Ft Pitt and the western posts.
Was this one of the 1775 or 1776 regiments?
Pennsylvania raised nine companies of true frontier riflemen in 1775; Maryland two, and Virginia two, with strengths ranging from 60 to 90 men each. These included Thompson's Regiment from Pennsylvania and Morgan's Riflemen from Virginia. Then in early 1776, Pennsylvania raised an additional 12 companies of 72 or more riflemen each under Colonel Samuel Miles, and Virginia and Maryland six more under Colonel Hugh Stevenson.
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maryland_and_Virginia_Rifle_Regiment
This is Stevenson's unit, renamed Rawling's Regiment, but sometimes still called Stevenson's as that is how the members of the unit involved around Ft Laurens are recorded. Confusing as all get out.....
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maryland_and_Virginia_Rifle_Regiment
This is Stevenson's unit, renamed Rawling's Regiment, but sometimes still called Stevenson's as that is how the members of the unit involved around Ft Laurens are recorded. Confusing as all get out.....
Got it.
William Nester's 2004 book, The Frontier War for American Independence, covers the western department under Brodhead and Hand quite well.
http://www.amazon.com/Frontier-Amer-Independ-William-Nester/dp/0811700771
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Digging up an old topic I found doing research.
A friends father is a historian and was telling me a of one of their relatives who was part of Morgan’s Riflemen (Francis Triplett). I think he’d get a kick out of it if I build a period correct rifle like they would have used. I don’t have a lot of background on revolutionary war weaponry and I’ll a can find is they were rifled “Virginia long rifles”.
Would Kibler’s Colonial Kit bet a good place to start?
What caliber would likely have been used in Cowpens (as an example where Francis Triplett was part of the engagement)
Can someone point me north to where there might be images of rifles from that era? Just looking for inspiration for the project. We talked a long time one day about this and he’s 87 now but still hunts every fall.
Thanks for any help.
Phil
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Hi,
A Kibler colonial or woodsrunner would likely fit the bill. Chambers Mark Silver Virginia rifle would also work. Any Dickert, Oerter, Albrecht, or early Reading gun would be fine. Get a copy of Shumway's Rifles in Colonial America Vol 1 and 2 to see many rifles that could overlap the Rev War. If Triplett was at Cowpens, it was not as part of Morgan's rifle corps. They were already disbanded. Maybe he was in the Virginia militia at the time.
dave
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Dave
TY for the info! I may have misunderstood the order (and I haven’t read Judge Tripletts book if I must be honest). I’ll read up. Thank you for the answer! I’ll check out the kits and go from there.
Phil